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Abstract
We are by nature moral beings who desire virtue.1 This fact is borne out by innumerable
studies.2 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics remain among the most
influential works on ethics and human moral psychology. Aristotle claims that human beings can
develop good character traits and achieve virtue with the appropriate upbringing (what Aristotle
called habituation). Much of what Aristotle says about character traits, virtue, and habituation is
accepted today and inspires character education.3 Yet recent results in experimental psychology
challenge the notion of character traits and virtue as understood by Aristotle. 4 The challenge is
the abundance of evidence showing that almost all human beings lie, cheat, steal, and harm
others; we lack virtue. Christian Miller captures the problem when he says, “the burden is on the
Aristotelian to show how realizing such a normative ideal is psychologically realistic for beings
like us.”5 This dissertation argues that virtue is not a realistic ideal for us absent God’s help. I
contend that Aristotle was mistaken about human nature and the power of a good upbringing to
create good character traits and achieve virtue. Further, I assert that Aristotle’s mistake has been
incorporated into the secular western world view and contemporary character education

1

Jan-Willem Van Prooijen and Paul A. M. Van Lange, Cheating, Corruption, and Concealment: The Roots
of Dishonesty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2. Also note the relationship between virtue and
happiness noted in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
2
Ben M. Tappin and Ryan T. McKay, “The Illusion of Moral Superiority,” Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 8 no. 6 (2017): 624. https://doi-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ 10.1177/1948550616673878 (accessed
June 9, 2018). Also see Shaul Shalvi, Francesca Gino, Rachel Barkan and Shahar Ayal, “Self-Serving Justifications:
Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, no. 2 (April 6, 2015): 126,
https://doi-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ 10.1177/ 0963721414553264 (accessed June 3, 2018).
3
David I. Walker, Michael P. Roberts and Kristján Kristjánsson, “Towards a New Era of Character
Education in Theory and in Pracice,” Educational Review, 67 no. 1 (2015): 87-88.
DOI:10.1080/00131911.2013.827631 (accessed October 26, 2018).
4
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methodologies. The error is a total disregard, even disdain, for the role of God in human moral
development.
That said, there is much to like about Aristotle’s ethics and moral psychology. Aristotle
thinks virtue and happiness are integrally related, and happiness is universally desired. This
makes virtue incredibly important. Aristotle thinks virtue combines practical reason and proper
desires to ensure a person consistently chooses the noble and good. He thinks a proper
upbringing is essential to attaining such character traits and moral reasoning skills. Most of
Aristotle’s claims in this regard are accepted to this day. Sadly, Western history, contemporary
western culture, and recent social science contradict core tenants of Aristotle’s ethics and moral
psychology. The West enjoys the highest standard of living, a plethora of human rights, universal
secondary education with unprecedented access to higher education, and a well ordered civil
society, yet virtue is exceedingly rare. It appears that humans are fundamentally flawed to an
extent that Aristotle failed to appreciate. That flaw cannot be remedied by habituation.
But, virtue is not impossible. In fact, there is evidence that virtue is possible, especially
with the help of a divinely inspired moral transformation. The most obvious and frequent
examples of virtue appear to occur in connection with a relationship with God. Yet Aristotle,
contemporary ethics, as well as contemporary educational methodologies, ignore the obvious
flaw in our moral psychology and ignore the role of God in addressing it. Using the Apostle
Paul, Augustine, John Newton, and Franklin Graham as examples, this dissertation argues that
habituation is inadequate, and to some extent unnecessary, to attain virtue. Instead, a God
inspired moral transformation is the most crucial ingredient in one’s journey towards virtue. Any
upbringing and education that disregards the role of God in our quest for virtue is doing a great
disservice to those it purports to help.
vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For just as man is the best of the animals when completed, when separated from law
and adjudication he is the worst of all . . . without virtue, he is the most unholy and
the most savage of the animals Aristotle Aristotle’s Politics1
This dissertation is motivated by the sober realization that living a virtuous life is
surprisingly difficult and much less common than expected. In fact, virtue seems incredibly
unlikely, maybe impossible, apart from God’s help. That may seem like a very pessimistic
opinion, but consider the content of Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential 1958 article “Modern
Moral Philosophy.” In it she makes several important claims about the state of contemporary
ethics; two are of interest here. One, she notes that the most prominent contemporary ethical
theories are ill-equipped to deal with the notion of a “bad man,” a man lacking virtue.2 How is it
that 2,000 years post-Aristotle contemporary ethical theory cannot explain a “bad man?” She
thinks this is due to the lack of consideration of character, a person’s intentions and motives.3
This observation appears to have been true because there was a subsequent surge in interest in
virtue ethics.4 This dissertation examines virtue and uses Aristotle’s ethics to explore the concept
of character building.
Anscombe’s more important claim is that she thinks there is no point in moral philosophy
until ethicists have an adequate moral psychology.5 By this she means an account of human

Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013),
1253a33-37.
2
G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 33,
no.124 (January 1958): 5.
3
Ibid.
4
Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, “Virtue Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethicsvirtue/ (accessed March 11, 2017).
5
Ibid, 1.
1

1

nature, a definition of a virtuous trait, and what it means for humans to flourish.6 Any adequate
ethical theory must appropriately take into account human nature, human capacities, human
rationality, and human society (family and community). It matters greatly if human infants arrive
in the world morally as a “blank slate,” or with a selfish nature, or with a nature amenable to
moral training. Regardless of the answer to those questions, we must then understand what, if
anything, can be done to produce virtuous adults. All theories of child rearing, moral education,
criminal justice, economics, government, and ethics have to be based on an accurate
understanding of human nature and human moral psychology. Anscombe’s observation, if true,
that after several millennia of human progress we lack these fundamental insights is very
sobering. This dissertation claims that human moral psychology is fundamentally self-interested
and not amenable to attaining virtue apart from God’s help.7
The prevailing conviction in Western society, academia, government, and social work is
that human beings and human society have within themselves the resources to become virtuous.
The presumption is that human nature is such that we are readily trained to be virtuous.
Aristotle’s ethical writings are based on this assumption. Aristotle says proper habituation (a
good upbringing, to include a good education and a moral society) leads to virtue. However,
what if Aristotle, and Western society, have overestimated the power of habituation (upbringing
and education)? At this point in history there appears to be abundant evidence that habituation is
not able to overcome powerful human inclinations to evil. If that is true, then virtue, happiness,
and a healthy society are beyond reach given our current approach to education and socialization.

6

Ibid, 18.
Being self-interested is not necessarily immoral. In fact, I will argue later that we have moral obligations
to take care of ourselves, to provide for our own basic health and welfare. However, when self-interest preempts
important moral obligations to others it makes us immoral. Later chapters will illustrate how unconstrained selfinterest can lead to a host of moral errors and evils.
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This dissertation focuses on human moral psychology and virtue based primarily on
Aristotle’s writings. Aristotle is the focus because his account of our moral psychology and the
path to virtue are still largely accepted today. That said, there appears to be an abundance of
evidence in history, in social science, and in contemporary culture, suggesting the human moral
condition is much worse than Aristotle assumed.8 The evidence suggests that few, if any, human
beings have the ability to become virtuous based on their upbringing and their own efforts. The
currently accepted view, that a good upbringing and a good education will produce a virtuous
person, is extremely problematic. My thesis is that human nature, in particular, our moral
psychology, is fundamentally self-interested, and virtue is highly unlikely apart from a divinely
inspired moral transformation.
Human Nature and Moral Psychology
To speculate coherently about virtue depends on an accurate understanding of human
nature and human moral psychology. As previously noted, Elizabeth Anscombe was frustrated
by the lack of consensus on this very question. She said, “it is not profitable for us at present to
do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy
of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.”9 Exactly what do theories of human
nature and moral psychology tell us? A theory of human nature attempts to describe accurately
the key features of human beings (traits, propensities) that contribute to human behavior. Some
possible traits include: being a social creature; being rational; being able to learn and use a

8

The evidence that will be offered is the ubiquity of immorality in Western society, particularly the United
States. Aristotle, as well as Kant and Mill, thought universal access to education, an improved civil society (better
legal system, human rights) and a widely shared improved standard of living, would lead to a more virtuous society.
However, many standards of measure, war, genocide, divorce, widespread cheating and lying, indicate that modern
society is no more virtuous than the barbarians of Aristotle’s day.
9
G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 33,
no.124 (January 1958): 1.
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language; having a free will; etc. A claim about human nature attempts to capture a reality that is
not directly observable (the fact that humans have a mind, emotions, aspirations, free will, etc.).
Theories of human nature result in claims about human flourishing, human society, and the
human role in the cosmos. In his book about the current views of human nature, Steven Pinker
states that a theory of human nature “is embedded in the very way we think about people.”10
Moral psychology is a subset of a theory of human nature that describes how humans
think and feel in an ethical context. Moral psychology notices possible traits like: having a moral
sense, a conscience; caring deeply about being moral; being outraged by injustice/evil;
experiencing guilt, compassion, etc. Moral psychology is necessarily interdisciplinary. It
involves at least sociology, psychology, biology and philosophy. Moral psychology is not just a
matter for biologists and psychologists. Science focuses on what is, not on questions of value and
what should be. For example, consider Dr. Julia Shaw’s book Evil: The Science Behind
Humanity’s Dark Side.11 Shaw is a senior lecturer in criminology and psychology at University
College in London. She holds a Master’s in psychology and law, and a PhD in psychology. She
says evil is a subjective claim that humans create when they label something so. And she goes on
to claim that “neither humans nor actions should be labelled evil.”12 Shaw’s claim that evil is
subjective and should be banished from our lexicon is not a scientific claim. It is an ethical
claim, and one I believe would be rejected by most people, including most philosophically
educated ethicists. She appears to base her claim on the ubiquity of what is often labelled
immoral/evil behavior. This is not the place to argue her claim, it is mentioned simply to

Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate : The Modern Denial of Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 2002),
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1125724&
site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed February 4, 2019).
11
Julia Shaw, Evil: The Science Behind Humanity’s Dark Side (New York: Abrams Press, 2019).
12
Ibid., 260-261.
10
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illustrate the importance of adding a philosophical and ethical perspective to the work of a
psychologist. Not only is moral psychology an interdisciplinary venture, it is a venture everyone
must undertake in order to coherently address ethics. Aristotle is a prime example.
Aristotle’s ethics rest on claims about the human desire for happiness, the centrality of
human rationality, and the importance of pleasure and pain in human experience. Although these
claims rest on biological and psychological facts, how we value each and how they should
influence our moral judgements is a matter of ethical deliberation. This dissertation claims that
history, current events in Western culture, and contemporary sociological experiments reveal that
humans typically prioritize self-interest over moral obligations. If that is true, then virtue is
unattainable absent a means of changing that trait. Prior to outlining my approach to
understanding our moral psychology I need to clarify a few assumptions.
Preliminary Assumptions
This dissertation is based on several assumptions upon which there is no consensus. This
is necessary because it is focused on one moral issue (human moral psychology), not all of them.
So to begin, the goal is to be open about those assumptions. This inquiry is based on the
following assumptions: there are objective moral facts; all normal humans have the faculties to
discover those facts; all normal people want to be good and have some idea of what that means;
people have the ability to choose their actions, to choose the good or the bad, the right or the
wrong; people ultimately choose whether to pursue virtue or not.13 These assumptions accord
with “common sense” but they are nevertheless controversial. The reader may not share these
moral assumptions, but that does not make this project irrelevant. This dissertation is about

By “normal” I simply mean the vast majority of people that are not clinically pathological or
mentally/emotionally impaired to the point of being clinically diagnosed with a disorder.
13
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whether human moral psychology is in fact amenable to a successful quest for virtue based on
purely human resources. Regardless of what one thinks about the aforementioned assumptions,
the answer to that question is important. The main point will be the claim that we are
fundamentally moral beings that want to be good, but that we typically find virtue beyond reach
apart from God’s help.
What is New About this Thesis?
The debate about moral psychology is old, but the context and available research is new.
Philosophers and theologians have debated moral psychology since Plato and Aristotle circa 370
B.C. Yet, as Anscombe said, there is currently no consensus solution. That said, our insight into
human moral psychology is greater now than ever before. Given recent history, new social
science experiments, explorations in the fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, and
insights gained from modern social research, we are better equipped than ever to evaluate
Aristotle’s moral psychology. Aristotle’s ethical insights are enjoying a revival in both
philosophical ethics and educational methods. What has not been noticed is what appears to be a
disconnect between the recent emphasis on virtue/character and what history and social science
have to say about Aristotle’s moral psychology.
On the one hand, many contemporary educational models emphasize the ubiquity and
importance of character/moral education. Consider the following statements from Dr. Daniel
Lapsley, the Aristotelian Character Education Collegiate Professor of Psychology at Notre
Dame. “Clearly, moral-character education (and moral psychology generally) is enjoying a
remarkable renaissance.”14 He goes on to make two claims about the current consensus in moral-

Daniel Lapsley, “On the Prospects for Aristotelian Character Education,” Journal of Moral Education,
45:4 (2016) 503, DOI: 10.1080/03057240.2016.1236721 (accessed October 26, 2018).
14
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character education. One, “there is consensus, for example that moral-character education is
immanent to education and inevitable even if remanded to the hidden curriculum (and has never
been eliminated from American schools).”15 His point should actually be a cautionary one.
Moral-character education is happening whether it is intentional or not. Our young are being
morally trained, the only question is, what kind of morals are they learning? Two, Lapsley claims
“there is consensus that both virtuous dispositions and the quality of moral deliberation are
desirable outcomes and targets of character education.”16 Educators and politicians realize that
moral-character education is an imperative in a democratic society. “Societies need moral
members. They need children to develop into moral adults. It is not enough for society to be
populated with benign hedonists, as a truly civil society needs citizen to care about the general
welfare and those who cannot advocate for themselves.”17 Of course Aristotle insisted that
successful societies needed virtuous leaders and citizens over 2,000 years ago.
But while many ethicists, educators, and politicians see the need for virtue, they have
failed to consider whether Aristotle’s moral psychology is accurate. Modern education, like
Aristotle, has eliminated all linkage between God and morality. Modern public education, and all
secular child rearing, is based on the assumption that human happiness and virtue is readily
attainable without any link to God.18 The assumption is that education and socialization will

15

Ibid., 502.
Ibid.
17
Wolfgang Althof and Marvin W. Berkowitz, Moral Education and Character Education: Their
Relationship and Roles in Citizenship Education,” Journal of Moral Education, 35 No.4 (December 2006): 496,
DOI: 10.1080/03057240601012204 (accessed October 26, 2018).
18
Apart from a divinely inspired moral transformation, habituation is the most important, maybe the only,
way humans have of cultivating virtue. Barring supernatural transformation, whatever virtue exists today stems from
a person’s genetic inheritance and habituation, with habituation likely having the larger, more important role. My
critique of Aristotle is not focused on his specific method of habituation. It is focused on all methods of habituation
that exclude a role for God. Aristotle’s method had no role for God and contemporary public education has adopted
that same stipulation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether anyone today is habituated specifically
according to Aristotle’s virtues. Although it is likely that many are. But what is clear is that Western society has
16
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produce virtuous, happy adults. But if human nature is not readily made virtuous without a
divine moral transformation, how is secular moral-character education going to succeed? We
now have 2,400 years of history and recent (last 50 years) social science with which to examine
Aristotle’s moral psychology. This dissertation assembles current interdisciplinary information to
argue that Aristotle’s moral psychology is inaccurate. I claim that Aristotle underestimates the
degree to which humans are self-interested and the extent to which their pleasures and pains
mislead them. He also overestimates the efficacy and necessity of proper socialization
(habituation). It turns out that a divine moral transformation is likely required for virtue, and
such a transformation is able to overcome the lack of proper habituation. Given that bold claim,
here is an overview of the dissertation.
An Outline
This dissertation has 7 chapters, this introduction being chapter 1. Chapter 2 clarifies and
defines some key terms. It will distinguish virtue from virtue ethics. It will say more about moral
psychology. And it will survey important definitions of virtue before integrating them into one
for use in this dissertation. Like Aristotle’s work (Aristotle’s Politics), chapter 3 of this
dissertation notes the importance of virtue to happiness and to a healthy society. It includes an
overview of not only Aristotle’s view, but Immanuel Kant’s, and John Stuart Mill’s. This chapter
notes our moral psychology appears to be constructed such that virtue and happiness are closely

almost totally adopted a form of habituation that excludes a role for God. What this dissertation claims is that the
ubiquity of immorality proves that habituation with the exclusion of God is failing. One might claim that if we
habituated precisely the way Aristotle recommended virtue would flourish. That is not obvious. Certainly his
methods have been attempted and not proven to provide extraordinary results. Aristotle claimed that habituation
could change what causes us pleasure and pain. When we look at people who have undergone extensive habituation,
maybe close to what Aristotle recommended (monasteries, military academies, boarding schools) it is not clear
virtue is the result. Sure, some superficial habits/behavior may change temporarily. But it does not seem to change
our preference for self-interest over moral obligations. The fact that Western society has the moral problems it does,
impugns the idea that habituation, without a moral transformation, can succeed.
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linked. Aristotle, for different reasons, believed the same. Chapter 3 does not advance the
argument that our moral psychology is predominantly self-interested, but it emphasizes what is at
stake if we get moral psychology wrong. Chapter 4 examines what Aristotle’s ethics say about
moral psychology, moral and intellectual virtue, incontinence and, most importantly for this
dissertation, habituation. The focus on habituation is due to its crucial role in developing virtue.
Chapter 5 is an interdisciplinary look at the findings of history, our current culture, and social
science to see how Aristotle’s moral psychology holds up. It provides the basis for the claim that
proper habituation is simply inadequate to remedy a corrupt human nature. Chapter 6 explores
the possibility of virtue given the possibility of divine transformation to influence the human
moral condition. Chapter 7 concludes that human moral psychology is fundamentally selfinterested to the detriment of virtue. That condition cannot be remedied by habituation. Any
habituation that lacks respect for divine assistance, or denigrates that possibility, does a great
disservice to our youth and to our society. It is difficult to see how virtue and a just society can
be achieved apart from divine intervention. With that preview in mind, this examination of moral
psychology and virtue begins with a look at key terms.

9

CHAPTER 2
VIRTUE, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & OTHER KEY CONCEPTS
Virtue implies ability and readiness to overcome our inclination to evil on moral
principles. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics1
Discussions of virtue often go astray due to several confusions: confusing virtue ethics
and virtue, confusion between a virtuous person and a virtuous action, and confusion regarding
the meaning of virtue. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify virtue by defining terms and
noting the differences in how virtue is defined. This chapter examines Aristotle’s, Immanuel
Kant’s, and John Mill’s views on virtue. Despite their differences, as ethicists they have much in
common when it comes to describing virtue. This dissertation explores the possibility of
becoming virtuous. Can anyone, based on his own resources, become a virtuous person? Before
engaging on that quest, a clear understanding of virtue, moral psychology, and other key terms is
essential. The first distinction to address is the difference between virtue ethics and virtue.
Virtue Ethics vs Virtue
Virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theories in which virtues are fundamental.2
That is to say, that in a virtue ethic right action is defined as one which a virtuous person would
perform.3 By contrast, a normative ethical theory like consequentialism holds that right acts are
fundamental. It identifies a right act based on its consequences. Consequentialism then defines a

1
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1963), 244.
2
Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, “Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2016), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.standford.edu./archives/win2016/entries/ethics-virtue/ (accessed
March 12, 2017).
3
Miguel Alzola, “The Possibility of Virtue,” Business Ethics Quarterly 22:2 (April 2012): 379, Business
Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 8, 2017).
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virtue as a character trait that leads to performing right acts. In consequentialism right acts are
fundamental and virtue is derivative. Similarly, a duty based (deontological) ethical theory
identifies moral obligations as fundamental. It then defines virtues as character traits that lead to
fulfilling moral obligations. In consequentialist and deontological theories, right acts are
fundamental and provide the basis for defining virtues. In a virtue ethic, virtues are fundamental
and provide the basis for defining right acts. This dissertation does not endorse a particular
normative ethical theory. I am not defending Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Aristotle’s ethics is the
foundation of this dissertation because it includes a substantive moral psychology and offers a
methodology for becoming a virtuous person. Aristotle’s means of identifying a right action is
incidental. Other theorists may agree with most of what Aristotle has to say about what it means
to be a virtuous person, and how character development works without agreeing that right
actions are defined by what virtuous people choose to do.
Both John S. Mill (a consequentialist) and Immanuel Kant (a duty ethicist) place a high
value on virtue. Like Aristotle, they agree that a person’s character, their disposition to do good
(i.e. a right act), is extremely important to them and to society. Kant viewed virtue as the moral
strength of will to fulfill one’s duty.4 Mill thought our hopes of happiness were founded on
inward improvement and virtuous exertion in favor of social interests.5 Aristotle, Kant and Mill
all agree that virtue is about a person’s character traits. In contrast, different normative ethical
theories (virtue ethics, consequentialism and deontological ethics) disagree on how to identify a

4

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 164.
5
Bernard Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1984), 89.
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right action. Virtue is focused on the character and behavior of the individual not on how the
individual identifies a right action.
Virtuous Action vs A Virtuous Person
There is obviously a connection between virtuous actions and virtuous persons, but it is
important not to assume that a person who performs a virtuous action is a virtuous person. As
mentioned, ethical theories identify virtuous actions differently. Aristotle, Kant, and Mill would
all give different explanations of what made truth telling (a virtuous action) right and lying
wrong. Aristotle (Virtue Ethic) would say since virtuous people tell the truth and vicious people
tell lies, truth telling is right and lying is wrong. Immanuel Kant (a duty-based ethic) would say
human reason derives a categorical imperative (a duty) to tell the truth and not to lie, thus truth
telling is right and lying is wrong. And John Stuart Mill (a consequentialist ethic) would claim
that truth telling leads to positive consequences and lying leads to negative consequences, thus
truth telling is right and lying is wrong. But just because an action is right does not mean the
person doing it is virtuous. A right action can be done by a bad person. And a right action can be
done for wrong reasons. The theoretical dispute over how to define a right action differs from
defining a virtuous person.
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill would all agree that a virtuous person is motivated by good
reasons and a good will. When a person is consistently motivated by a good will and good
reasons, they exhibit one or more virtues. A virtue is simply a character trait. That said, there is
an ongoing debate about what constitutes a character trait. John Doris notes that “describing
virtues as behavioral dispositions is only a very partial accounting; virtue is standardly thought to
involve not only what occurs “on the outside” in the form of overt behavior, but also what occurs
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“on the inside” in the form of motives, emotions, and cognitions.”6 Miguel Alzola elaborates on
cognitions by noting they include beliefs, values, and framing capacities.7 Most ethicists would
agree with Aristotle that a virtuous person must know what the virtuous act would be, must
choose it for that reason, and must do so from a firm and unchanging state.8 It is premature to
think that a person is virtuous, or not virtuous, simply based on what they do in one instance.
Much more has to be known about their values, their beliefs, the constancy of their convictions,
their motive for choosing to do what they did, and the possible conflicting values at stake. This is
why it is extremely difficult to know if a person is virtuous. One would have to know them well
enough to know why they do what they do. Additionally, one would have to know them long
enough to know they are consistently virtuous in a range of situations and temptations. Aristotle
seems to be correct in noting that virtue involves a choice and an “unchanging state.”
A virtuous person makes an informed choice based on a strong, enduring conviction.
Suppose a person is checking out of a store after buying a very expensive home theater
ensemble. During checkout the clerk errs by ringing up the purchase and undercharges by over
$100.00. The person checking out notices the error and must decide whether to point it out or
keep the money. In order for the buyer to be counted as virtuous, she must realize that the honest
thing to do is to report the error. Regardless of what she does, if she fails to recognize that the
morally appropriate response is to tell the clerk, she cannot be counted as virtuous. So, if she
reports the error because she feels like belittling the clerk, she is right in pointing out the
mistake, but not virtuous because her motive had nothing to do with attempting to be honest. Or,
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suppose she is deeply conflicted about the decision and decides to be honest in this case, but she
does so because she is also cheating on her income tax return, and she cannot handle the
additional guilt. In this case she is being honest, but her honesty is motivated by her desire to
exploit a more lucrative opportunity. Her honesty is not a firm and unchanging conviction. In
order for her to be virtuous, she must be committed to honesty and be unwilling to compromise it
in all such clear-cut cases (to include her taxes). Understanding whether the buyer is virtuous (a
question of character) is different from determining whether her action was virtuous (whether it
was right or wrong depends on the normative ethical theory: consequentialist, deontological, or
virtue ethics). This dissertation is about what it takes for the person to be virtuous. It is not a
defense of the normative ethical theory, virtue ethics. Nor is it about what makes actions virtuous
(right) or not virtuous (wrong). This dissertation is about the possibility of developing a good
character, becoming a virtuous person. Questions of character and virtue are always based on a
conception of human moral psychology.
Moral Psychology
To think clearly about moral psychology, it will help to consider a few alternative views.
Stephen Pinker identifies three broad, competing views in The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial
of Human Nature.9 I am going to borrow his taxonomy but define each view slightly differently
and more briefly with emphasis on just a few key features. They are: a Christian model, the
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), and a Darwinian model. Pinker thinks the Christian
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model is still quite common but outmoded by contemporary science. However, there are several
elements of the Christian view that are very popular and compelling. They are:
- Human beings are made in the image of God (they have a particular design and purpose
and are not completely malleable)10
- Humans have a moral sense (to include a sense of justice and compassion) and a
religious impulse (to want to know God)
- Humans have a free will. They can choose to do good or evil (they are not completely
constrained by nature or nurture)
- Humans are innately sinners (they are self-centered rather than God-centered, otherscentered, or society-centered)
- Humans can become God-centered through a supernatural spiritual/moral
transformation (this enables them to behave in a way that is God-centered, otherscentered and society-centered)
The Christian model includes several features with which Aristotle would agree. Aristotle held
the view that humans had a purpose, a design. This design implies that humans can function
optimally only in a certain way. When we do function optimally, we are happy. This is very
compatible with the Christian view that attributes our design to God. And, Christians would
agree that we are designed to live and behave in certain ways. Aristotle did not say much
explicitly about humans having a moral sense. However, his theory implies that we can
recognize virtuous people and that when exposed to noble things we will prefer them. The
Christian model goes farther, but again is consistent with Aristotle’s view. Aristotle definitely
thought ethics was about choices and that we could choose the good. That said, Aristotle also
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thought that we needed training (habituation) to ensure we took pleasure in good things. Absent
such training we take pleasure in base things or things which deviate from a healthy mean (what
is optimum). Most Christians agree that we have the ability to choose good or evil. It is not clear
what Aristotle would say about humans being innately prone to evil. He would agree that
barbarians, those lacking habituation, choose base things. But Aristotle might say that is due to
lack of proper upbringing, not due to an innate preference for base things. Aristotle excluded any
role for God in our path to virtue. For many Christians, God has an important role. The Christian
model is quite different from the other models but shares some features with them.
Some Christian claims are consistent with features of the SSSM or the Darwinian model.
Many Darwinians would agree that humans are self-centered and that they have an inherited
nature that is not completely malleable. Darwinians believe we have evolved a very specific
nature and that humans cannot just become something totally inconsistent with their evolutionary
heritage. Some proponents of the SSSM would agree that humans have good moral senses and a
free will. And they would claim that our free will and rationality greatly supersede any
biologically inherited nature. Pinker captures this claim in what I label the SSSM (Pinker called
it the Blank Slate model).
According to many, the SSSM is nearly a consensus in the social sciences.11 The SSSM
claims the following:
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- Human nature is essentially, but not solely, a product of learning and socialization, or is
socially constructed.12
- Human nature is not fixed but quite plastic.13
Adherents to the SSSM typically take a very benign view of human nature. Pinker claims they
are more inclined to the “noble savage” view of Rousseau.14 SSSM adherents tend to attribute
human immorality to social causes rather than individual causes. Some SSSM adherents are total
social constructivists and believe that human nature is completely a creation of social
conditioning. There are a spectrum of beliefs in the SSSM, but all believe that “we have evolved
into a state where we are so much the creatures of our culture that our evolutionary origins can
tell us little or nothing about what we now are.”15 This view is consistent with Aristotle’s view
that habituation is the key to virtue. For the SSSM, social construction is the key to all our
behavior. As you might expect, the Darwinians do not share this view.
Some professionals in the fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology believe the
Darwinian model will eventually become the accepted psychological theory for explaining
human behavior.16 Although they acknowledge a role for the social environment, they believe
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our genetic inheritance plays a crucial role in our behavior. Darwinians typically accept the two
following principles.
- Human nature is essentially, but not solely, the product of natural selection, or is
naturally given.17
- Human nature (human traits or propensities) is not plastic but quite fixed.18
By relying on natural selection, Darwinists do not mean that all one’s behaviors are directly
driven by genetics. Instead, they claim that the human mind has an inherent structure, a specific
information processing system that offers a limited array of successful solutions for things like
kinship, social coalitions, mating, etc. The mind is not, as the SSSM model asserts, a generalpurpose learning and reasoning mechanism that can be molded to support any potential
outcome.19 Of course evolution works extremely slowly, so social conditioning remains the
primary focus for changing behavior. But the evolutionary psychologist would say there are
some behavioral paths that are doomed to failure. For example, perhaps there are some gender
differences between men and women that simply cannot be erased by any amount of social
conditioning. Similarly, it may be that some evolved traits result in narcissistic and
Machiavellian behavior that cannot be totally rooted out by social conditioning. That is important
to know with respect to ethics and virtue.
Human nature and moral psychology place limits on what can be expected morally from
people and what can count as being virtuous. These not only limit what an individual can
accomplish but what can be expected from society and from social conditioning. Elizabeth
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Anscombe and Aristotle both believe that a theory of human nature and human moral
psychology precedes any normative ethical theory and any theory of human virtue. For example,
consider the nature of sexual relations. The Christian model might claim that humans were
designed for heterosexual relations in the context of monogamous marriage. Christians might
further claim that deviations from that are immoral and harmful to individuals and society.
Adherents to the Darwinian model might agree that humans have evolved to be heterosexual but
deny that monogamous marriage is part of our nature. In fact, Darwinians might say that males
are by nature promiscuous. That would not mean men have to be promiscuous, but simply that
such behavior will always be attractive to men. A Darwinian might deny that any amount of
habituation would change a man’s desire to be promiscuous. A Darwinian might be open to
promiscuity prior to marriage and may also be open to different models of marriage, polygamy
for example. Adherents to the SSSM might claim that there is no normative sexual behavior and
that humans are free to choose whatever sexual relations they please. Society may have reasons
for preferring marriage and child rearing, but there might be many modes of family (polygamy,
homosexual marriage, etc.) that are acceptable. Moral psychology is important because it sets the
boundaries of what is possible and what should be normative for humans. Aristotle was right to
pursue ethics in light of human nature and human moral psychology. But for reasons I cannot
explain, Aristotle said little about the role of religion and the role of God.
Religious Influence, A Flawed Nature & Transformation
Another key concept employed in this paper is that of a moral transformation. It is
important to understand what a moral transformation is, why it is necessary, and how it is
distinguished from religious training. Suppose that in the human moral psychology, humans are
aware of both what benefits or pleases them (self-interest), and moral norms and obligations.
19

Suppose further that in the human moral psychology humans naturally prioritize self-interest
over moral norms and obligations.20 Such an innate ordering of priorities I term a flaw in our
moral psychology. This would not mean humans did not want to be moral, but it would mean
that when morality and self-interest conflict, humans would, all other things being equal, choose
self-interest. If this strong preference for self-interest is “built in” to our moral psychology (a
flaw) then virtue, as understood by Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, would not be possible. If humans
innately prioritize self-interest so highly, no amount of habituation could convince them to do
otherwise. However, what could change our “built-in” prioritization is a supernaturally
accomplished moral transformation. God could supernaturally change our moral psychology,
transform us, so that moral norms and obligations could be prioritized over self-interest. Such a
transformation would make virtue possible. A supernatural transformation is not synonymous
with becoming religious.
For the purposes of this dissertation, I want to distinguish religion from relationship. I am
defining religion as all those things (doctrine, ritual, tradition, behavioral norms, etc.) humans
practice in an attempt to satisfy a desire for meaning and significance. Religious training from
this perspective is simply another mode of habituation. Religious training and practice is simply
human effort to govern behavior in a way acceptable to one’s religious beliefs. As human effort,
religion has no more power to change our ‘built-in” moral psychology than any other form of
habituation. Religious effort may include more zeal and thus have more power than other forms
of habituation to modify behavior, but it is still unable to change the human moral psychology.
Relationship is different from religion.
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When a person has a relationship with God, God connects to them in way that spiritually
and morally transforms them. When God connects with a person, God supernaturally changes
that person’s moral psychology to enable spiritual and moral obligations to be selected above
self-interest. This does not mean that a transformed person will be virtuous. It simply means that
a transformed person has the power to be virtuous. A transformed person is disposed to put
moral norms and obligations first. But like all humans, transformed people have habits and
inclinations for pleasure that contradict the disposition to put moral obligations first. Later, I
offer examples of transformation that occur in the context of Christianity. But those examples
include a relationship with God. A relationship with God typically occurs in the context of a
religion.21 But religion, including Christianity, without a relationship, cannot deliver a moral
transformation. Transformation makes virtue a viable option.
How Aristotle Defines Virtue
This dissertation focuses on what makes a person virtuous as opposed to what makes an
action virtuous. Despite significant differences in defining right actions, virtue ethicists,
consequentialists, and deontological ethicists share significant similarities in describing a
virtuous person. Although they may differ from Aristotle in some ways, Aristotle’s description
of a virtuous person is often the foundation from which others start.
1) Virtue, then, is of two sorts, virtue of thought and virtue of character.22
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2) There are five states in which the soul grasps the truth in its affirmations or
denials. These are craft, scientific knowledge, intelligence [emphasis added],23
wisdom and understanding.24
3) Virtue of character is concerned with feelings and actions25
4) Virtue then is (a) a state that decides, (b) consisting in a mean, (c) the mean
relative to us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason, (e) i.e. to the reason by
reference to which the intelligent [emphasis added] person would define it.26
5) But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, towards the
right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best
condition, and this is proper to virtue.27
6) First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide
on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them
from a firm and unchanging state.28

Plenty of books and articles have been written about the above Aristotelian statements regarding
virtue. Hopefully a shorter explanation will suffice to understand Aristotle’s view of virtue.
Aristotle thought virtue was primarily a rational activity, but it certainly included an
important role for our feelings of pleasure and pain. Reference statement #1 above, Aristotle
speaks of two kinds of virtue, virtue of thought (intellectual virtue) and virtue of character (moral
virtue). In statement #2 Aristotle identifies five kinds of intellectual virtues. Intelligence
(phronēsis), also called practical wisdom, is not only an intellectual virtue, but the key
component of moral virtue. In statement #3 Aristotle clearly states that moral virtue includes our
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feelings, our likes and dislikes, the things that cause us pleasure and pain. Statement #4 is
Aristotle’s definition of virtue. He calls it a state; some people would call it a disposition. In
either case it is, from statement #6, a firm and unchanging condition. A virtuous person has a
well-developed commitment to behaving virtuously. This is why we expect virtuous people to be
consistently virtuous, predictably virtuous, and not just occasionally or sporadically virtuous. We
also see in this definition that Aristotle thought a virtue was an appropriate intermediate point
between two vices. Aristotle’s first example is bravery, an intermediate point between rashness
and cowardice.29 This intermediate point, Aristotle calls it a mean, is not an arithmetic mean, but
a response determined by reason (intelligence/practical wisdom) appropriate to that person in
that situation.
The right reasons and the right feelings are key to Aristotle’s definition of virtue. It is the
practical wisdom of a virtuous person that allows her to recognize the right goal, the right way to
attain that goal, and the appropriate response for that person, at that time, in those circumstances
(statement #5). Notice that according to Aristotle, virtue includes having the desire to do the
right thing. The virtuous person does not have to overcome a desire to do the wrong thing. A
virtuous person has developed a noble character that desires to do the right thing. As a result, a
virtuous person knowingly chooses to do the right thing because he recognizes that it is noble
and wants to do the noble deed. It is consistent with his well-developed character (statement #6).
Virtue is not a trait of the young. Virtue belongs to the mature who developed practical wisdom
from training and experience and who have developed a desire and preference for noble things.
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They take pleasure in doing good and are pained by the thought of the bad. Later philosophers
will dissent from parts of this definition, but to a large extent they agree with Aristotle.
Kant’s View of Virtue Compared to Aristotle’s
Immanuel Kant agreed with Aristotle on the role of rationality and developing virtue, but
disagreed about the use of the mean and our ability to train our feelings. Some of Kant’s key
statements follow:
1) Virtue is the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty. –
Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and
in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into
conflict with the human being’s moral resolution;30
2) The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in accordance with a
maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.31
3) Be a man ever so virtuous, there are in him promptings of evil, and he must
constantly contend with these.32
4) There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of
it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.33
5) It follows that we must first of all discipline ourselves. By repeated endeavour
we must stamp out the tendency which arises from sensuous motive. He who
wishes to discipline himself morally, must watch himself carefully; he must at
frequent intervals give to the judge within him an account of his deeds; by
constant practice he will strengthen the moral grounds of impulse, through selfcultivation he will acquire a habit of desire and aversion in regard to what is
morally good and bad. In this way his moral feeling will be cultivated,34

30

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 156.
31
Ibid., 157.
32
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing company,
Inc., 1963), 246.
33
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing company, Inc., 1981), 7.
34
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 246.

24

Statement #1 reveals that Kant viewed virtue as a strong commitment to obey the moral law as
revealed by reason. Unlike Aristotle, Kant does not think virtue is identifying a mean between
extremes.35 Instead, he thinks we rationally derive maxims that we test by determining if they
could be a universal law for everyone to live by (statement #2). The key to virtue for Kant is our
determination to live by good maxims (a good will) even when our inclinations pull us in a
different direction (statement #1 & #4). Unlike Aristotle, Kant does not believe a virtuous person
arrives at the state where there are no inclinations opposing the good maxim (statement #3). It
may seem that Kant and Aristotle have very different views of virtue, but they actually have a lot
in common.
Kant agrees with Aristotle that virtue is a well-developed state of character that makes
decisions governed by reason. Kant recognizes that virtue is about choices. Kant thinks one
choice is a moral maxim that everyone could follow, and which would respect them as rational
persons with free will. However, there are a host of other choices a person might make, many of
which reflect pleasing inclinations. A virtuous person with a strong, good will, would choose the
moral maxim. Kant thinks a virtuous person is one committed to living by moral maxims, just as
for Aristotle a virtuous person lives by practical wisdom (intelligence). For both, the virtuous
person has the rational ability to recognize the noble deed and the power to choose it. For both,
this ability should be an enduring one, not just a sporadic one. For both, virtue is developed over
time by choosing to cultivate a desire for the noble (statement #5). Regarding virtue, Kant and
Aristotle agree more than they disagree, the same will hold true for Aristotle and John Stuart
Mill.
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Mill’s View of Virtue Compared to Aristotle’s
Rationality, our capacity for the nobler feelings, is the key element of virtue from Mill’s
perspective. This resembles the importance of practical wisdom for Aristotle and our ability to
formulate good maxims for Kant. Mill made the following statements relating to virtue.
1) The utilitarian standard … is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the
greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted
whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no
doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is
immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the
general cultivation of nobleness of character,36
2) It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that
some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.37
3) Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites and,
when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which
does not include their gratification. … there is no known Epicurean theory of life
which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and
imagination, and of the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to
those of mere sensation.
4) Education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character,
should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole,
especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct,
negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not
only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself,
consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct
impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the
habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a
large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence.38

Mill thought that nobleness of character included a confirmed commitment to always seek the
good of the whole (statements #1 and #4). Like Kant, he was not necessarily convinced that
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choosing the good of the whole always led to one’s own happiness. In this matter, both Kant and
Mill deviate from Aristotle. But Mill agrees that a noble/virtuous person has been trained to
associate the good of the whole with their own good (statement #4). Virtue is the result of many
years of practicing a mode of conduct with a noble end in mind. These years of practice are
supposed to affect our desires and sentiments so that we want to be virtuous (statement #4). Like
Aristotle, Mill thinks humans are fundamentally rational and not satisfied with purely sensual
pleasures (statement #3). It is our intelligence which directs us to the “higher pleasures” of
feelings, imagination, and moral sentiments (statements #2 and #3). Mill thought a virtuous
person’s perspective included an “indissoluble association” between his happiness and the good
of the whole (statement #4). A truly virtuous person is “unable to conceive” of pursuing her
happiness as opposed to the good of the whole (statement #4). Like Aristotle, Mill thought
humans could be trained, and train themselves, to have a “noble character” which reliably
pursued virtuous actions. For Mill, those actions were consistent with the principle of utility.
Despite some differences with Aristotle, both Kant and Mill agreed with many of Aristotle’s
views on virtue.
Contemporary Views of Virtue
In addition to the classical ethicists (Aristotle, Kant, and Mill), Robert Adams and John
Doris offer two contemporary perspectives on virtue. Robert Adams defines moral virtue as
“persisting excellence in being for the good.”39 As he explains what this means it becomes clear
that he shares many of the perspectives of the classical ethicists. Adams links virtue to an
enduring character trait. He makes it clear that virtue is more than an assessment of what a
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person does, but also what it reveals about who she is. Virtue includes the person’s motives,
feelings, thoughts, and intentions.40 Virtue includes what a person values, loves, wants, cares
about, respects, and strives for.41 Adams goes on to say that virtue is an enduring psychological
state that makes the virtuous person’s actions predictable.42 Virtue clearly involves a person’s
will and the choices that he makes. Adams agrees with Aristotle that virtue can and must be
taught. He has little to say about the specific role of “practical wisdom” or of a “good will.” But
obviously both are required to some extent in order to identify the good and decide to pursue it.
Robert Adam’s perspective is from one who believes in virtue and character, John Doris defines
character from the perspective of one who is skeptical of its existence or power.
John Doris identifies what he thinks classical ethicists mean by virtue as a prelude to his
rejection of the importance of character. Doris believes that “situational factors are often better
predictors of behavior than personal factors.”43 To make his case he first identifies what he
thinks most philosophers mean by virtue and character. Doris calls his conception of character
globalism and defines it by three features: consistency, stability, and evaluative integration. 44 He
defines consistency as character traits being reliably manifested by appropriate behavior across a
diversity of conditions that vary widely in their conduciveness to manifesting the trait in
question.45 For example, consistency would expect an honest person to tell the truth in mundane
circumstances, but also in circumstances when there is much to be gained by lying. A virtuous
person is consistently honest in all circumstances, even those in which he has large incentives to
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lie and could get away with it. Stability is defined as reliably manifesting the appropriate trait
over iterated trials of similar trait-eliciting conditions.46 Stability implies that over time and many
similar circumstances, an honest person tells the truth in each instance. A virtuous person is
routinely honest over time, they have a stable personality. Doris defines evaluative integration as
that feature of virtue which makes it likely that one possess all or most of the virtues to the same
degree.47 If a person is moderately honest, she will likely be moderately compassionate,
moderately generous, etc. Virtue typically extends across one’s character and is not limited to
just one aspect. This last claim, often called the unity of the virtues, does not enjoy a consensus
among philosophers and is not critical to the other features of virtue. The key features of virtue
that Doris addresses in globalism are consistency and stability.
Consistency and stability are attributes of character that connect actions to internal
dispositions. Doris notes that ethicists define virtue to include not only correct and predictable
behavior, but appropriate emotions, motives, and cognitions.48 He agrees that the common
understanding of virtue is that it includes intellectually recognizing a noble outcome,
understanding the appropriate way to achieve it, wanting to achieve it, and then acting
appropriately. Despite doubting the moral psychology associated with virtue, Doris understands
that virtue is typically understood very similarly to what Aristotle described.
A Consensus View of Virtue and Comments
Although the ethicists surveyed differ on an exact definition of virtue there seems to be a
consensus on several features. Below is my take on a consensus view of virtue.
1) Virtue is about being a good person and doing good things
46
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2) Virtue is about intellect, will and emotions as well as actions
a) Virtue includes the wisdom to know the good end state
b) Virtue includes the understanding of how to appropriately achieve
the good end state
c) Virtue includes the desire to achieve the good end state
d) Virtue includes the will to choose to do the right thing to achieve the
good
e) Virtue is consistently and gladly choosing to do the right thing
3) Virtue is a well-developed character that persists in seeking and doing good
4) Virtue is the result of many years of training and practice in recognizing,
seeking and doing good things
The key point to notice about this consensus view is the importance of the intellect, will and
emotions. This gets to the importance of motives and strength of character. A virtuous person is
motivated by the desire to see good prevail; the desire to fulfill moral obligations. A virtuous
person has the will power and strength of character to persist in seeking the good despite any
contravening urges of self-interest or external societal pressure.
A virtuous person is committed to doing good things even when no one else knows, when
there is no recognition or reward for doing so. Think of all the athletes we have never heard of
because they declined to cheat. By refusing to take steroids they could not compete
professionally or could not excel professionally. This ethical stand changed the direction of their
career and their life. Or think of the large number of people who give 10% or more of their
income to charity but no one knows except some clerk in the IRS. These people have a moral
commitment that we simply do not know about or celebrate. They make real sacrifices to do
what is right. To exhibit this kind of moral commitment takes great strength of character. These
are just a few of the factors that make virtue very difficult and very rare. It is even more difficult
to be virtuous in the face of certain hardship.
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A virtuous person does the right thing even in the face of public hostility or mockery.
Think of the courage it takes for a Muslim in Pakistan to oppose the use of blasphemy laws to
punish Christians who defend their faith. Such a person is taking an unpopular, and even
dangerous, stand in order to do what is right. In strict Muslim countries there is intense pressure
to conform to the accepted understanding of the Koran and Sharia law. To publicly deviate from
the majority Muslim position in an Islamic nation involves real sacrifice. Not only does it make
the person unpopular, but also it invites persecution and possibly violence, against the individual
and his family. Multiple Pakistani leaders who defended Christian, Asia Bibi (accused of
blasphemy), paid with their lives.49 Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, was
assassinated by his own bodyguard. The guard was prosecuted and executed but also hailed as a
hero by many Muslims. Pakistan's minister for minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated for
demanding justice for Bibi. The point is that virtue often requires a significant amount of
selflessness. In some cases, it requires extreme selflessness.
The ability to deny self is probably the hallmark of virtue but no single trait or single act
proves one is virtuous. Virtue is hard to identify because it includes motives and because it
extends to all aspects of good and right, not just one. We do not know if the individuals
discussed above (honest athletes, contributors to charity, tolerant Muslims) were indeed virtuous.
We know they did something good in one instance. We do not know why, and we do not know
about other important aspects of their lives. This ambiguity confirms that virtue is difficult to
achieve and difficult to identify. The consensus view of virtue does not include a solution of the
following two disputes about virtue.
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There are two things about virtue that are particularly controversial. First, is a virtuous
person necessarily a happy person? In general, the answer is yes. But that said, there are obvious
instances when the answer appears to be no. When a virtuous person is wrongly imprisoned,
tortured, and executed it seems hard to describe them as “happy.” Or, when a virtuous person is
hit by a drunk driver and paralyzed from the neck down, it is hard to imagine that they are
“happy.” These types of examples led Aristotle to say that happiness required some good
fortune. Aristotle thought a good/happy life would not include such tragedies. Whether virtue
requires good fortune is a debate that need not be settled here, since it does not change what to
expect from the character of a virtuous person. A virtuous person would handle such tragedies
with courage. The second difficulty has to do with the unity of the virtues and consistency.
Can a person be virtuous and simultaneously have a significant vice, or significant moral
failures? Aristotle thought that once a person developed practical wisdom (intelligence), he
would have all the virtues.50 This seems to be the position of many of the Greeks and to have
some support today.51 Given the obvious imperfections and frailties of humans, it seems clear
that no one is perfectly virtuous and all of us make significant moral errors on occasion. Perfect
virtue is an ideal everyone should strive for while understanding that perfection is not to be had
on this earth. Still there do seem to be virtuous people. They are the ones who have acquired the
most important virtues (Adams would say the cardinal virtues) and practice them very
consistently, although not perfectly. Possibly a virtuous person could commit a significant moral
blunder under difficult circumstances. He would acknowledge it, apologize, and not do it again.
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It seems unlikely to claim a virtuous person has a significant moral vice. Persisting in something
clearly wrong is not compatible with practical wisdom and good character. This is another reason
why virtue is so difficult and so rare. Even when a person does some really good things, if they
also have a persistent vice, it seems to disqualify them from virtue. That is why virtue is both a
noble goal and a very ambitious goal.
The Virtuous Person
What would attaining virtue look like? It seems to me that it would be a rare and
wonderful thing. A virtuous person has an enduring character committed to doing the right thing,
her wisdom recognizes the right thing, and she has the desire and will power to do the right thing
regardless of the circumstances. A virtuous person is not a slave of self-interest. Virtue is not
simply doing the right thing. In the vast majority of the mundane moral decisions in life we do
the right thing for self-interested reasons. Taking care of ourselves, our families and those around
us is to our advantage and it is society’s expectation. Being polite, honest, and hard-working is
typically to our benefit. It is normally right to do those things, but doing them because they are to
our advantage is no indication of virtue. Virtue requires the right motives! All the great ethicists
thought virtue required habituation, moral training. Habituation seems necessary, and typically
takes considerable time and effort. Habituation is needed not only to develop the right habits, but
to develop “practical wisdom.” The virtuous person is not perfect, but is routinely able to do the
right thing, for the right reasons, because he wants to. This dissertation is based on this
perspective of virtue. This virtue is inconsistent with any major vice or numerous peccadillos.
Frankly, I do not think there are many people like this around.
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Virtue, Continence and “Decent”
Is there a good state a little short of virtue? Aristotle thought so and described that as
continence. These are people trying to be virtuous but have not been trained adequately to desire
the noble. They choose to do right but have to overcome inclinations to do wrong. They have a
strong will, maybe good friends and mentors, and are on the right track but have not achieved
virtue yet. There is no telling how many people are in this category. I suspect it is not a large
number because few of us have a strong will, good friends, and good mentors. Chapter 5 will
discuss what is going on in our culture and what the social sciences are finding. It looks like
most people are in a category that could be called a “decent” person. A “decent” person is one
who publicly chooses what is socially acceptable. This includes many moral practices: keeping
promises, being polite, occasionally being helpful, obeying the law, treating family members
well, etc. A “decent” person may be religious and keep some religious rules that are typically
good moral rules. Or a “decent” person may support a charity or help with some club. But the
“decent” person has limits.
“Decent” people tend to take care of themselves, even if that means crossing moral
boundaries. It turns out that what “decent” people do in private, at least when they think it is
private, is not always moral. So, it turns out that a lot of “decent” people cheat on tests, falsify
resumes, cheat on taxes, gossip, watch pornography, actually give very little to charity/church,
and pursue self-interest as long as they can maintain an image of moral rectitude. Worse than
that, “decent” people tend to fail badly when put in positions of extreme temptation, more on this
later. Apparently, the vast majority of us fall in the category of “decent” person. We all want to
appear moral, especially to ourselves. But we also want to satisfy as many of our desires as
possible, even immoral desires. So, we are all careful to appear “decent,” but if we can get ahead
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by cheating on the sly, we often do it. And if we encounter a really tempting opportunity, we are
likely to rationalize taking it. Of course, there are “bad” people out there. They are often
“decent” people in terrible circumstances. Many “decent” people just found themselves in
circumstances where the only option for satisfying important desires was to do something
criminal or flagrantly immoral. The only real difference between them and us “decent” people is
the circumstances and temptations they faced. That is not always true. There are some truly
psychopathic people out there. But they are probably pretty rare. Chapter 5 will make the case
that the vast majority of us are “decent” people. “Decent” people are not virtuous, we do
immoral things, and if faced with strong temptations will do really immoral things. Fortunately,
most “decent” people are not faced with big temptations and go through life being “decent.” But
because society is flawed, many of the things we think are decent are actually pretty bad. We are
not nearly as good as we think. When I claim human nature is flawed, I am not suggesting most
people are psychopaths, or consistently evil. I am saying we are “decent.” That is, self-interest
rules. We care more about ourselves than others or society. We are likely to fall in the face of
large temptations. And we often succumb to small temptations, if the cost is not too high. The
contents of chapter 5 seem to confirm this and are therefore quite discouraging. But before we
pursue this argument, it is worth taking note of what is at stake in the quest for virtue.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPORTANCE OF VIRTUE
The ultimate destiny of the human race is the greatest moral perfection,
provided that it is achieved through human freedom, whereby alone man is capable of
the greatest happiness. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics1
The question of whether virtue is attainable is no mere obscure academic controversy.
Failing to become virtuous has tremendous personal and societal implications. Sub-consciously
we all know that, which is why we jealously guard a self-image that includes our righteousness.
Before examining the possibility of virtue, I think it is important to note how much our personal
happiness and our societal success depends upon the widespread attainment of virtue. There are
at least three components to the claim that virtue is exceedingly important: 1) philosophers note
the close relationship between virtue and happiness, 2) social science2 notes that virtue is
essential to a healthy self-image, and 3) social science also notes that the lack of virtue is
destructive to individuals and society. Given the tremendous importance of virtue to personal and
social well-being, it is surprising that human society has not made more progress at
understanding virtue and spent more energy pursuing it. This chapter examines all three of the
aforementioned important implications of virtue.
The Relationship of Virtue to Happiness
Before addressing what ethicists have to say about the connection between virtue and
happiness, it is necessary to note different definitions of happiness. Writing in the Stanford
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Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dan Haybron claims happiness can be defined many ways but most
definitions fall into one of two categories: 1) a desirable state of mind or 2) a life that goes well
for the person leading it.3 With respect to moral theories a “state of mind” account appears to be
an inadequate definition of happiness. Human happiness seems to demand a much richer account
that includes conditions beyond our state of mind and includes the full use of our human
capacities. For example, an independently wealthy drug addict may claim to be happy, content to
spend his life on a chemically induced “high.” This might pass for a life filled with a happy state
of mind. But most people, and certainly most philosophers, would deny that this person is truly
happy. A drug addict is disconnected from the true condition of his own life and is oblivious to a
richer kind of happiness that comes with fruitfully using the time, talents, and resources with
which he has been blessed. Most of the prominent ethicists, like Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, think
some version of the “life that goes well for the person leading it,” also called a “well-being”
theory, is a better account of happiness. Each may offer a slightly different account of wellbeing, but each account of “well-being” offers a richer definition of happiness. Also noteworthy
is that all agree that virtue is absolutely essential to personal and societal happiness.
Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness
Aristotle identifies happiness as the supreme good for a human being. He definitely held
a “well-being” account with a very rich view of happiness. Roger Crisp categorizes Aristotle’s
definition as an “objective list” theory of happiness.4 Objective list theories identify a number of
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constituents of well-being. Aristotle thought the list should include everything that is good in
itself and necessary to fulfill or perfect human nature.5 Aristotle’s list of items necessary for a
happy life include: moral virtue, intellectual virtue, contemplation, pleasure, friends, some
wealth, health, a good family, and some good fortune (no diseases, serious accidents, tragedies,
etc.).6 Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics explaining the relationship between virtue (moral
and intellectual virtue) and happiness. Aristotle thought that happiness most appropriately
described a full life of virtuous activity.7 He defined happiness as “an activity of the soul
expressing complete virtue.”8 In Aristotle’s view, happiness was the direct result of virtuous
activity; it could not be attained any other way. This is because Aristotle has a specific view of
virtuous activity that differs from a simpler moral perspective.
Virtue for Aristotle had to do with excellent human functionality. An excellently
functioning human is characterized by moral and intellectual virtue.9 Aristotle did not limit virtue
to doing morally good things or having morally good motives. Virtue meant living a life
governed by practical and theoretical wisdom. Practical wisdom leads to virtues of character like
temperance, generosity, and bravery.10 Theoretical wisdom leads to intellectual virtues like
wisdom, comprehension, and intelligence.11 A person with these traits will tend to accumulate
and enjoy all the things on Aristotle’s list of constituents of happiness. Happiness is not simply
good fortune, but good fortune added to our own sustained virtuous efforts. Aristotle’s idea of
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virtue is broad and certainly included practicing all the moral virtues of good character. Under
Aristotle’s account of virtue and happiness, personal happiness is impossible without virtue since
happiness is the result of a virtuous life. Aristotle also thought virtue had very important
ramifications for society.
Aristotle taught that a successful community or society could only occur with virtuous
citizens.12 Aristotle believed humans were by nature political and that by nature we live in
community.13 But communities are successful only to the extent they foster virtue in their
citizens.14 Throughout his Politics Aristotle discusses different kinds of regimes, what makes
them succeed and fail, and how they are dependent on the citizens who rule and play various
roles in society. Aristotle thinks communities succeed the same way individuals do, by working
properly according to virtues analogous to those practiced by the citizens.15 When this happens
the citizens are able to become virtuous and happy. Virtuous citizens tend to make the city/state
prosperous and independent. These claims seemed justified to Aristotle based on looking at the
various city states in and around Greece. The social science observations to be noted later will
tend to confirm Aristotle’s philosophical claims. Kant’s views of the linkage between virtue and
happiness are quite different, but the link is still very strong.
Kant on Virtue and Happiness
Kant said that “virtue and happiness together amount to possession of the highest good in
a person.”16 But unlike Aristotle, Kant denied that virtue necessarily led to happiness. Kant
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thought that human beings necessarily wanted happiness.17 But, Kant’s view of happiness was
more limited than Aristotle’s. He did not think happiness could be objectively defined for all
human beings. His view was closer to the “state of mind” view, at least in the sense that Kant
thought happiness was more subjective. Aristotle thought happiness was the product of any wellfunctioning human being. Whereas Kant thought happiness was “the sum of satisfaction of all
inclinations.”18 Because happiness depended on each person’s inclinations, Kant thought it
varied widely and could not be described by any general statement or be the outcome of any
form of government or social policy.19 Kant certainly agreed that happiness was important. But
Kant thought virtue was the most important goal of any person.20 It was clear to Kant that virtue
could often lead to unhappy consequences. But since virtue was the supreme goal of a person, if
virtue required the loss of happiness then so be it.21 Yet, Kant believed that human society was
evolving to a point of both virtue and happiness.
Kant thought that the highest good of the world was for happiness to be distributed to
persons in direct proportion to their morality (virtue). He thought this because of the supreme
importance of virtue and because of the human need for happiness. Kant envisioned a future
world in which humans lived in a just civil society that allowed them to achieve all their
potential to include virtue and happiness.22 He believed that a look at human history suggested a
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gradual improvement in civil society yielding an improvement in the human condition in terms
of both virtue and happiness. The key ingredient for this was not the pursuit of happiness, but the
pursuit of virtue.
If all of us behaved in this way, if none of us ever did any act of love and charity,
but only kept inviolate the rights of every man, there would be no misery in the
world except sickness and misfortune and other such sufferings as do not spring
from the violation of rights. The most frequent and fertile source of human misery
is not misfortune, but the injustice of man.23
Kant believed the key to a just civil society, and subsequent happiness, was virtue. In Kant’s
view, the ultimate key to personal happiness and societal happiness is virtue. In this he does not
differ much from John Stuart Mill.
Mill on Virtue and Happiness
John Stuart Mill thought the fundamental principle of morality was to maximize pleasure,
which he equated with happiness. In his work Utilitarianism, Mill states, “By happiness is
intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of
pleasure.”24 Mill equated happiness with pleasure and thought that from a moral perspective,
virtue was about maximizing everyone’s happiness. Mill did not articulate as sophisticated a
moral psychology as Aristotle. Yet he did not think pleasure and happiness were simply feelings.
He had an idea of character as expressed in his discussion of individuality in On Liberty.
It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men
they are that do it. Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed
in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. … Yet
desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and
restraints; and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced, … It
is not because men’s desire are strong that they act ill; it is because their
consciences are weak.25
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Mill believed “that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.”26
He thought human beings had a dignity and nobility that would lead them to cultivate all their
capacities to include a concern for others. He states his belief in man’s desire for selfimprovement in On Liberty when he endorses the following quote from Wilhelm von Humboldt:
The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates
of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and
most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent
whole.27
Mill was convinced that as individuals grew intellectually, they would appreciate the “higher”
pleasures and become more altruistic. “Furthermore, the utilitarian standard of what is right in
conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned.”28 That might mean
sacrificing my pleasure in order to please a greater number of other people. Mill certainly
thought virtue included both pursuing one’s own happiness and being motivated to pursue the
happiness of others. So, it is not surprising that virtue would be essential for a successful society.
Like Kant, Mill thought human society was progressing and that virtue was key to that
progress. Mill believed that progress was determined by the improvement in man’s intellectual
and moral faculties.29 Mill thought that these improvements to man would come about based on
the alleviation of poverty and improvement of education.
In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy… everyone
who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an
existence which may be called enviable; … if he escapes the positive evils of life,
the great sources of physical and mental suffering – such as indigence, disease,
and the unkindness, worthlessness or premature loss of objects of affection. The
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present wretched education and wretched social arrangements are the only real
hindrance to its being attainable by almost all.30
Mill was convinced that as people progressed socially and intellectually, they could become
more virtuous provided society was intentional about it.
… utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the
happiness or the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with
the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so
vast a power over human character, should use that power as to establish in the
mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness
and the good of the whole,31
To the extent people became virtuous, committed to achieving the happiness of all concerned,
“there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is
immensely a gainer by it.”32 In Mill’s political and social economy, the cultivation of virtue is
foundational to both personal happiness and to a happy society.
History’s three most respected ethicists all thought that there was a very strong
relationship between virtue, personal happiness, and societal success. On that basis they would
all claim that there was no more important personal goal then the pursuit of virtue. Not only is
the pursuit of virtue an essential personal goal, but it is the most important objective of
government and education. From the perspective of these ethicists, undermining virtue is
personally destructive and destructive of society. The importance of virtue is also highlighted by
findings in psychological research.
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Virtue is Essential to a Healthy Self-Image
There is a tremendous amount of evidence for the claim that humans have a deep-seated
need to see themselves as moral and to believe their actions are honorable and fair.33 Before
elaborating on this claim, it is important to note the distinction between “being virtuous” and
“believing I am virtuous.” Virtually everyone believes they are virtuous, yet clearly a large
number of people who believe this are not virtuous. The social science discussed in this section
concerns the universal need for persons to believe they are virtuous. Of course, it is easier to
believe one is virtuous if that is, in fact, the case. However, as we shall see, humans are masters
at justifying as moral, behavior that is clearly immoral. It turns out that people seem fairly
content to be immoral as long as they can convince themselves that they are virtuous and that
others see them as virtuous.34 But disconnects between what one does and what one believes are
a source of cognitive dissonance that make it difficult to maintain a healthy self-image. And a
healthy self-image appears to be a necessary ingredient of emotional health and happiness.
The problem is that there appear to be many instances in which our self-interest and our
virtue lead to opposing courses of action. An obvious example is filing an income tax return. The
IRS estimates that it loses over $400 billion per year in tax evasion.35 Clearly many are instances
of individuals doing something illegal, and immoral, yet presumably feeling justified in doing so.
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Taxes are just one of many examples of instances in which self-interest -- maybe it should be
called unenlightened self-interest -- diverges from the dictates of morality. Other examples
include lying, gluttony, drinking to excess, gambling, sexual promiscuity, being uncharitable,
and being unhelpful. In each of these cases what we want to do conflicts with what we ought to
do. These immoral acts are behaviors ethicists would likely preclude by urging moral virtue.
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill would likely say failure to develop virtues in these areas leads to
unhappiness. Yet, as we shall see, social science indicates that many, maybe most, of us favor
self-interest. Traditional economic models suggest that individuals become unethical when the
benefits of wrongdoing outweigh the costs.36 The economic model suggests that the only relevant
factor in the ethical decision is a straightforward cost/benefit calculation. On the contrary, a selfconcept model suggests a more complex calculation that includes protecting the individual’s selfimage.37 The self-concept model acknowledges that self-interest leads individuals to be
unethical, but it captures the fact that individuals are also interested in virtue and that interest
places limits on behavior. Dan Ariely illustrates this in an experiment he describes in his
bestseller The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty.38
The experiment illustrates that people are motivated to cheat due to self-interest but are
constrained by the need to maintain a virtuous self-image. MIT students were recruited to
participate in an experiment which would pay them for about 10 minutes of their time. The
experiment asked students to examine lists of matrices each containing 12 numbers and find 2
numbers in each matrix that added to 10. The students were then paid for each matrix they solved
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correctly. The experiment was structured so that participants scored their own work and could
report the result without having anyone check it (i.e. they could cheat and get away with it). The
experiment was done numerous times varying the payment for correct answers to see if cheating
increased when the reward was higher. If cheating were simply a matter of cost/benefit, one
would expect participants to maximize their cheating and their profits. But that is not what
happened. Few if any participants cheated to the maximum. Instead, most participants cheated
just a little. In fact, in circumstances that paid the most per false report the participants cheated
less. Why? It seems that when cheating offered the most, it was less attractive because at that
point it would be extremely difficult to rationalize.39 People were inclined to cheat, but they
could only cheat to a limited extent and still maintain the notion that they were virtuous.
Cheating, and still considering oneself virtuous, requires some clever self-deception strategies.
Social scientists have identified three common self-deception strategies that most of us
use to rationalize unethical behavior: motivated attention, motivated construal, and motivated
recall.40 Motivated attention means paying over-attention to evidence of our virtue and avoiding
evidence of our corruption.41 A common example of avoiding evidence of our corruption is
willful ignorance. David Kugel was an associate of infamous Ponzi-schemer Bernie Madoff. As
one of his closest colleagues, Mr. Kugel saw Mr. Madoff’s incredible (fallacious) trading reports.
But Mr. Kugel apparently never questioned Mr. Madoff on those reports. By not confirming the
truth or falsity of the reports, Mr. Kugel could maintain the belief that he was not part of the
fraud, could make a lot of money, and avoid the damage to his self-image that would have
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occurred had he been forced to acknowledge his link to a massive Ponzi scheme.42 Even
someone benefitting from incredible corruption was maintaining a virtuous self-image by
avoiding evidence of corruption.
Motivated construal is a strategy that saves our self-image by framing our unethical
behavior in a morally acceptable way. Social scientists note that people are more likely to be
dishonest when the situation can be described in more malleable ways.43 Experiments show that
people will take a beverage that is not theirs, or office supplies, or tokens, but not take money.
Apparently taking money is hard to justify, but taking other items is easier to rationalize.44 Social
psychological research indicates that people strive to maintain a positive self-image.45 An
important part of the self-image is moral virtue. So, despite making unethical, self-serving
decisions, we are careful to only do those things that we can rationalize as fair or consistent with
virtue.
Another strategy many people employ to maintain a virtuous self-image is motivated
recall. Put simply, people tend to forget their transgressions and only remember their good deeds.
And when remembering transgressions, people recall all mitigating factors that put the best light
on the transgression and forget the factors most damaging to their reputation.46 This strategy
ensures people always think very highly of themselves. It explains why most of us think we are
more virtuous than others.
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These are just a few of the most common strategies for maintaining a positive self-image.
The reason there are so many such strategies that are so commonly used is because considering
ourselves virtuous is central to our self-image. For us to be happy, content with who we are, we
have to be confident of our virtue. So even if that confidence is unjustified, we all engage in a
certain amount of self-deception to ensure we can feel good about ourselves. What this tells us is
that we are moral beings. No healthy person is content to think of themselves as corrupt or evil.
We will go so far as to ignore certain aspects of reality, we describe stealing or cheating as
something other than what it is, or we simply forget certain aspects of events in order to salvage
our sense of virtue. Despite our frequent failures to be virtuous, it is essential to our mental
health and happiness to consider ourselves virtuous. Unfortunately, deceiving ourselves about
reality has self-destructive implications.
Lack of Virtue is Self-Destructive
The findings of social science confirm our premonitions that immorality is eventually
self-destructive. Immorality not only causes great personal harm, but it is destructive of the
social order as well. The data is clear that immorality typically decreases our quality of life and
ultimately the length of our life. This is not to say that science can prove that every immoral deed
results in a cosmic penalty. We have heard the anecdotal evidence of the smoker and boozer that
lives to 100 or the “playboy” that enjoys the parties and illicit sex to a ripe old age; Hugh Hefner
(founder of Playboy magazine) passed away in 2017 at the age of 91. But as we will see, these
anecdotes are the exception to the rule. Prior to looking at some statistics I want to briefly make
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the case that choosing to do things that reduce one’s quality of life or lead to premature death are
immoral.47
As already noted, the most prominent ethicists (Aristotle, Kant, and Mill) held the view
that virtue typically results in well-being or happiness. Of course, there are important exceptions
in which a person’s integrity or truthfulness results in harm. This is typically due to living in an
unjust society in which the authorities do not appreciate honesty. But when it comes to choices
about personal conduct, like eating, drinking, exercise, smoking, drug abuse, promiscuity,
reckless driving, or even suicide, it seems clear a virtuous person would make choices that cause
his own life to go well, and the lives of those around him to go well. Regardless of whether one
takes a virtue ethic approach, a consequentialist approach, or a deontological approach, to right
actions a strong case can be made for having a moral obligation to avoid self-destructive
behavior. For example, consider the difficult claim, that we have a moral obligation not to be
obese. From an Aristotelian perspective the question would be, would a man of practical wisdom
allow himself to get obese knowing the impact on his health, his mobility, his ability to
participate in physical activities, and, in our society, the social disapproval? Unlikely. From a
consequentialist position the question would be, would being obese bring more positive than
negative consequences for all concerned? When we consider the impact to family and to health
care costs in addition to the personal downsides, it seems like an immoral option. The
deontological question is more ambiguous. The question might be, do I have moral obligations to
myself and to others that are adversely affected by being obese? It seems plausible that avoiding
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the health risks of being obese are morally significant. This is especially true if one has a wife
and children. I simply fail to see how any normative ethical theory dismisses the adverse
personal and societal costs of ill health and premature death caused by obesity as morally
insignificant. As the following statistics will show, these health risks are not insignificant.
Virtuous people may not always live longer, but it sure improves your odds. An analysis
of causes of death in the U.S., especially causes of premature deaths, reveals that personal
decisions are the leading cause of premature death.48 Below is a chart of the findings of Ralph
Keeney who analyzed the CDC data on mortality and attributed a proportion to personal
decisions. Scientific analysis shows that many of the important factors leading to premature
death are in our control. Smoking, excessive drinking. excessive weight, illicit drug use,
unprotected sex, reckless/distracted driving, overdoses, poor nutrition, lack of exercise, and
suicide, all have fairly predictable effects on our longevity. The majority of these personal
decisions are also moral decisions.

Ralph L. Keeney, “Personal Decisions Are the Leading Cause of Death,” Operations Research 56 No. 6
(Nov-Dec 2008): 1335. http://www. jstor.org/stable/25580892 (accessed February 12, 2017).
48

50

Deaths in Year 2000, Causes and Contributing Personal/Moral Factors

Cause of
Death

Total
Deaths
in 2000

% Caused
by Personal
Decision

Heart Disease

710,760

45.7

Smoking and excessive weight

Cancer

553,091

66.2

Smoking, obesity, alcohol and unprotected sex

Stroke

167,661

42.8

Smoking, excessive weight and excessive alcohol

122,009

76.0

Smoking

Accidents

97,900

43.9

Excessive alcohol, illicit drugs, distracted driving

Diabetes

69,301

32.9

Obesity and excessive alcohol

Flu &
Pneumonia

65,313

22.9

Smoking and excessive alcohol

Alzheimer’s

49,558

0

Kidney
Disease
Septicemia

37,251

0

31,224

0

Suicide

29,350

100

Complex assortment of factors – ultimately personal

All Other

469,930

22

Smoking, obesity and excessive alcohol

Total

2,403,351

44.5

Lower
Respiratory
Diseases

Contributing Personal Factors

Keeney uses the wealth of scientific analysis of the impact of various factors on the
probability of falling into one of the above categories. For example, the CDC developed a
methodology for determining the smoking attributable deaths for specific diseases. It published
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that data for the years 1995 – 1999. Keeney used that to determine an average % of deaths
attributable to smoking for each disease and applied that to the 2000 data.49 Keeney was able to
get similar information for overweight/obese people and for alcohol consumers. Interestingly,
Keeney discovered that smoking and obesity accounted for 80% of premature deaths due to
personal decisions.50 The following findings from Keeney’s work are significant.
Clearly, we have a great deal of influence on our longevity. In the CDC data, heart
disease is the single greatest cause of death (710,760 of 2,403,351, or 30%). But Keeney’s
analysis says that personal decisions are largely responsible for 44.5% of heart disease deaths.
Personal decisions are more deadly than cancer or any other factor. That is particularly true
regarding premature deaths that occur early in life. For the year 2014, the CDC found that for
ages 10 – 24, 70.7% of fatalities were the result of accident (39.6%), suicide (17.4%), or
homicide (13.7%).51 Clearly individuals do not own all the responsibility in these cases.
Individuals die in accidents caused by others or get murdered in circumstances beyond their
control. But individuals own the vast majority of the responsibility for premature death. Many
accidents are the result of speeding, drinking, texting, or overdose. Suicides are hard to
understand, but with the exception of severe mental illness, they are totally personal decisions.
Even homicides are not totally unpredictable. Certainly, the killer is making the determining
decision (clearly an immoral one). But most homicides are drug-related and/or gang-related. The
victim is typically someone who knows they are in a high-risk situation of their own making.
Between the ages 25 - 44, 45.1% of deaths are due to the same causes (accident (28.2%), suicide
49
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(11.2%), and homicide (5.7%).52 Through the healthiest and most active time of our life, our own
moral decisions have a huge impact on our longevity. Additionally, the habits we develop during
this phase of life regarding smoking, drinking, eating, and exercise will have a significant impact
on the length and quality of the years ahead. Although Keeney’s analysis in 2000 is somewhat
dated, it looks like the significant impact of moral decisions on longevity holds true today.
Causes of Death, 2015 vs 2000
Top 10 Causes of
Death in 201553
Heart Disease

# of
Deaths
633,842

% Difference
from 2000
-11%

Cancer

595,930

+8%

Lower Respiratory
Diseases
Accidents

155,041

+27%

146,571

+50%

Stroke

140,323

-16%

Alzheimer’s

110,561

+123%

Diabetes

79,535

+15%

Flu & Pneumonia

57,062

-13%

Kidney Disease

49,959

+34%

Suicide

44,193

+51%

All Causes

2,712,630

+13%
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The big differences between 2000 and 2015 occur in the number of deaths due to Alzheimer’s (+
61,000), suicide (+ 14,800), and accidents (+ 48,700). The increase in Alzheimer’s is a 61,000
person increase in deaths in which personal decisions are not a factor. The 14,800 person
increase in suicides is an increase in deaths due exclusively to personal decisions. The 48,700
person increase in fatal accidents is likely due to two factors. The biggest jump is likely due to
the large increase in deaths due to overdoses in the opioid epidemic. Overdoses of cocaine and
heroin rank a distant 2nd and 3rd, although still significant. A second reason for the increase in
accidental deaths is likely due to the increased number of people driving under the influence of
drugs, especially in states that have recently legalized marijuana. It looks like the claim that
approximately 44.5% of the deaths every year are related to poor moral decisions still holds true.
What Keeney does not mention is that these factors, and others, degrade our quality of life long
before they affect our longevity.
A lack of virtue not only shortens our life, but it destroys our quality of life. It does not
require a social science study to confirm that smoking, excessive drinking, illicit drug use, being
obese, engaging in promiscuous unprotected sex, or going through a divorce, significantly
decrease our quality of life. Simply a few moments of consideration will confirm that all of us
would avoid these behaviors if we could. Sadly, many of us cannot. Long before a person gets
lung cancer, smoking adversely affects his social life, his work habits, his budget, and his selfimage. Long before a person gets cirrhosis of the liver or esophageal cancer, alcoholism
adversely affects his marriage and family, his social life, his work habits, his budget, and his selfimage. Illicit drug use is a symptom of a person who has problems and is unfortunately
compounding them. Being obese in our society is particularly hard on one’s self-image (being
overweight is not always the result of one’s choices). Unfortunately, one aspect of our media
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driven culture is that it glorifies a slender body shape, especially for women. So, in addition to
the adverse health impacts of obesity, overweight people must deal with the stigma of not
meeting the culture’s ideal body image. Our cultural ideal combined with our failure to avoid
obesity destroys one’s quality of life and eventually shortens one’s life.
A lack of virtue regarding sexual ethics destroys one’s health and the quality of
important relationships. Our cultural obsession with sex and easy access to pornography is
disastrous for those lacking strong sexual mores. Despite the fact that people know more about
sex and safe sex than ever before, we are experiencing an epidemic of sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs), broken relationships, and failed marriages. Many STDs are incurable and many
lead to physical problems and even death. Keeney cites studies indicating that STDs were
precursors to 20,000 deaths in the year 2000.54 Another study suggests that all cervical cancers
are caused by sexually transmitted viral agents in addition to other factors.55 Illicit sexual
relationships, however one defines them, have adverse effects on our physical health, emotional
health, and self-image.
A lack of virtue certainly plays a key role in failed relationships and the resulting reduction in
quality of life. The most critical sign of a failed relationship is divorce. Divorce statistics can be
very misleading, and the probability of divorce varies greatly by education level, age at marriage,
race, and religion. One compelling overview statistic is the number of first marriages that will
survive 20 years. According to a large CDC survey conducted from 2006 – 2010 the probability
of a first marriage lasting 20 years was 52% for women and 56% for men.56 If a person has a
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Bachelor’s Degree, the probability of the marriage lasting 20 years changes to 78% for women
and 65% for men.57 However, the fact remains that for most people the probability of divorce is
significant, and often approaches 50/50. Note that keeping a marriage intact is not the same as
having a happy, successful marriage. It appears that a large number of us do not have the virtue
to love another person and make the most important relationship in our life work. The amount of
unhappiness, stress, and ill health this leads to is well known. The point is that virtue is the most
important factor in avoiding all the very sad consequences for individuals, and society, that come
from failed relationships and divorce. Imagine the increase in quality of life if 90% of all
marriages/families were happy and successful.
How different life would be if we were truly able to be virtuous. Virtue is essential for
individual and societal happiness. Virtue has a key role in a healthy self-mage. Finally, virtue has
a huge impact on our health, our longevity, and our quality of life. Aristotle understood this more
than two millennia ago. Aristotle wrote extensively about virtue and how to attain it. If he is
correct, there is good reason to follow his advice.
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CHAPTER 4
ARISTOTLE’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & HABITUATION
For it is pleasure that causes us to do base actions, and pain that causes us to abstain
from fine ones. Hence we need to have had the appropriate upbringing – right from
early youth, as Plato says – to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for
this is the correct education. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1
Credit Aristotle with the wisdom to provide a moral psychology as the basis of his ethics.
In Aristotle’s works he offers an account of human nature through his description of what he
calls the soul. This account provides a foundation for his moral psychology and his description of
virtue. Although this account lacks contemporary scientific rigor, it offers very perceptive
insights into human nature which are not easily refuted today and are, in fact, often embraced.
The objective of this chapter is to describe and analyze Aristotle’s moral psychology and show
how it supports his definition of virtue. It will include an examination of the role of habituation
in virtue. According to Aristotle, habituation is the key to developing virtue. The adequacy of
habituation rests on Aristotle’s moral psychology and the requisite social structures. It will
become clear that Aristotle’s claims about human moral psychology and habituation are very
compelling, but possibly flawed. His moral psychology assumes that habituation can overcome
any problems generated by our inherent self-interest. That assumption will be challenged in the
following chapter. It appears that most contemporary parents, educators, and ethicists are
assuming Aristotle is correct. The focus now is on exactly what Aristotle has to say about our
moral psychology and the route to virtue.
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1985), 1104b10.

57

Aristotle’s Moral Psychology: The Soul
For the ancient Greeks, to understand what it is to be a human being, especially an
excellent (virtuous) human being, implies an understanding of the human soul. According to
Aristotle, the soul is the governing principle of a living thing.2 It is the soul that holds the body
together, gives it life, and determines what kind of being it is. “When the soul has left it [the
body], it dissolves and rots.”3 The soul is responsible for all the characteristic activity of a living
being. The soul is responsible for nutrition, growth, reproduction, motion, perception, all our
mental faculties, our will, our appetites, desires, and wishes. To understand all the activities of
the human soul is to understand the human being. Aristotle writes a small book, De Anima (On
the Soul), about the workings of the human soul. But Aristotle only relies on portions of it to
undergird his ethical writings.
In his ethical writings Aristotle addresses the soul to the extent it explains our moral
psychology. Aristotle says there are two parts of the soul: the rational and nonrational.4 The
nonrational part of the soul has two parts: the nutritive and the appetitive.5 The nutritive part of
the soul is responsible for growth and is not responsive to reason. It has no role in our ethical
behavior. However, the appetitive part of the nonrational soul is crucial to our moral behavior.
The appetitive part of the soul includes our appetites and desires, our perceptions, our likes and
dislikes, our sensations of pleasure and pain, to include our anticipation of pleasure or pain. Our
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appetites and desires drive us to action, movement. Appetite (epithumia) cannot be shaped to
respond to reason; it is always set upon pleasure (hedone).6 But the non-rational soul includes
spirited desire (thumos) which is set upon pursuing the noble and beautiful (to kalon).7 It is the
spirited desire that appreciates the noble when it experiences it and wants to pursue it. Spirited
desire is the part of the human that wants to achieve the noble and maintain it. But this
appreciation for the fine and the noble must be forcibly cultivated in order to overcome the
appetite for pleasure. This is why young people need a strong social structure (family, mentor,
school, community) that will require them to make good choices. They must be forced to make
good choices for years and reap the fruit of those good choices before the appetitive and spirited
parts of the nonrational soul become synchronized. While the nonrational soul is being
synchronized to take pleasure in the noble, the rational soul is gaining practical wisdom by
learning the benefit of good choices. The rational soul is capable of several intellectual virtues,
but the one crucial to moral virtue is intelligence (practical wisdom).8 Aristotle appeals to the
function of the human being in order to prioritize the activities and excellences of the human
soul.
Aristotle claims that just as a craftsman, a musician, or a sculptor has a particular
function, so the human being must have a function as well.9 And just as these other professions
have a particular skill, so human beings have a particular skill, a unique capability. The human
being’s unique capability is its rationality. Thus, the virtuous soul is one governed by reason, not
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by the functions and desires of the nonrational part of the soul.10 A virtuous person, therefore,
will be one who uses all the soul’s faculties of reason excellently and who displays the
appropriate relationship between the rational and nonrational functions of the soul. There are two
important features of this argument to notice. First, Aristotle argues that “happiness is an activity
of the soul expressing complete virtue.”11 Aristotle’s view is that happiness is the result of an
excellently functioning soul. This excellence of soul is a mature and enduring state. When one
achieves it, she will experience a life that goes well. Aristotle has a holistic view of happiness
that includes the claim that virtue and happiness occur in the context of family and society.12
And its scope extends over an entire life.13 It is not simply a fleeting state of mind or a temporary
run of good fortune. Happiness is the result of virtuous activity that persists over a long time and
over all aspects of one’s life. This is a key part of Aristotle’s claims regarding the soul. Second,
an excellent functioning soul is one in which reason plays the leading roles.
Reason plays the leading role in both virtue of thought and virtue of character.14 The two
most important virtues of thought are practical wisdom (phronēsis) and theoretical wisdom
(sophia).15 Practical wisdom is essential because without it one cannot have moral virtue.16 In
fact, Aristotle says that once practical wisdom is attained, one has all the moral virtues. 17 But
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even more important than practical wisdom is theoretical wisdom. Aristotle claims that
theoretical wisdom, as expressed in contemplation, is the most divine element in us.18 Although
at one point Aristotle describes theoretical wisdom as an intellectual virtue of the soul, in the last
chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics he says theoretical wisdom is part of a divine or transcendent
part of our being.19 He thinks the pursuit of theoretical wisdom in contemplation is the ultimate
pleasure, a divine pleasure, and that happiness is complete when we have moral virtue,
theoretical wisdom, and the leisure to enjoy contemplation.20
Despite the prominence of the intellectual virtues, none of them are attainable apart from
moral virtue. A person with vices, or an incontinent person, cannot attain practical wisdom.21
Although an individual may acquire wealth, education and leisure, without virtue, he will not
appreciate theoretical wisdom, and thus desire contemplation. Consequently, a person without
moral virtue will not be a happy person (have Eudaimonia). Her soul will be dysfunctional. She
will pursue pleasures that are irrational and ultimately destructive of a life that goes well.
Additionally, virtues like temperance, courage, or magnanimity, that ultimately do lead to a life
that goes well, will seem painful to a person lacking moral virtue. Aristotle’s writings indicate
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that weakness of the will (akrasia)22 is a greater problem than noetic weakness. Even when the
deliverances of reason recommend the right action, our reasoning can be corrupted by our
desires, if we have a weak will. Training our powerful desires is why moral virtue is a
prerequisite for intellectual virtue. Thelemic corruption (a weak will) can undermine noetic
competence (practical wisdom). Aristotle is clear about the implications of lacking moral virtue.
Vice & Incontinence
To understand the challenge of becoming virtuous, it is important to consider what
Aristotle has to say about pleasure and pain, and the role they play in vice and incontinence.
Aristotle thought that being base or vicious was common. At one point he says, “The many
[emphasis added], base though they are …are full of regret.”23 It is easy to be less than virtuous.
As Aristotle noted, “there are many ways to be in error … but there is only one way to be
correct.”24 Being correct requires choosing the appropriate response in any given situation.
Aristotle thought the appropriate response was typically a “mean” between two extremes
(vices).25 But in many cases the extremes are attractive. The extremes typically offer a large
amount of pleasure or a minimum of pain. So, a glutton may be attracted by an abundance of
tasty food (lots of pleasure) or a coward may be attracted by safety (no injury or death). “It is on
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account of pleasures and pains that we call men vicious, for pursuing and avoiding the wrong
ones or in the wrong way.”26
Aristotle said that moral virtue was largely about being trained to appreciate the right
things and to despise the bad things.
We must take as a sign of someone’s state his pleasure or pain in consequence of
his action. For if someone who abstains from bodily pleasures enjoys the
abstinence itself, then he is temperate, but if he is grieved by it, he is intemperate.
Again, if he stands firm against terrifying situations and enjoys it, or at least does
not find it painful, then he is brave, and if he finds it painful, he is cowardly.
Pleasures and pains are appropriately taken as signs because virtue of character is
concerned with pleasures and pains.27
Aristotle was well aware of our propensity to act based on the anticipation of pleasure or pain.
The role of pleasure in his ethics is extremely important.
Besides, enjoying and hating the right things seems to be most important
[emphasis added] for virtue of character. For pleasure and pain extend through the
whole of our lives, and are of great importance [emphasis added] for virtue and
the happy life, since people decide to do what is pleasant, and avoid what is
painful.28
Aristotle is clear about the importance of pleasure to virtue and happiness. He knows pleasure
and pain are powerful motivators. He does not think that we can be virtuous if we have not been
trained to experience pleasure and pain in the right things. The malleability of our desires is an
essential claim of Aristotle’s moral psychology, the human being can be changed, and trained to
take pleasure and pain in the appropriate activities. The key roles of pleasure and pain become
obvious when Aristotle addresses incontinence.
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Incontinence illustrates the power of our desire for pleasure and our aversion to pain. The
incontinent is one who does the wrong thing knowing that it is wrong. Aristotle said, “the
incontinent person knows that his actions are base but does them because of his feelings.”29
Socrates had taught that incontinence, so defined, was impossible. It was inconceivable to
Socrates that one could truly know that something was bad and yet decide to do it. He thought
instead that a person did a bad thing wrongly thinking that it was a good thing.30 There is great
debate on whether Aristotle ultimately agrees with Socrates on this issue.31 The outcome of that
debate is not crucial to our understanding of virtue. The point is that despite the power of reason
and knowledge, people appear to do the wrong thing anyway. Socrates thought we were
mistaken to think so. He said, “we two agreed that there was nothing more powerful than
knowledge, but that wherever it is found it always has the mastery over pleasure and everything
else.”32 But Aristotle’s response to Socrates’ position was that “this argument, then, contradicts
things that appear manifestly.”33 In other words, he thought it was obvious that there were cases
of incontinence, i.e. when a person did what she knew to be wrong.
On the traditional view, our desires are so powerful they corrupt our knowledge, making
us act in ignorance. Norman Dahl attempts to explain this by claiming the incontinent has not
“integrated her knowledge into her character” and thus succumbs to desire.34 The exact mode in
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which desire trumps knowledge is not as significant as the fact that it can. In our contemporary
culture, where we see all sorts of human dysfunction and addiction (smoking, drinking,
pornography, drugs, gluttony, gambling, sexual perversion, etc.), it appears commonplace that
people do what they know they should not do. Some of these things are simply base and admit of
no mean (adultery, theft, murder, drunk driving, unnecessary abortions, and drug addiction).35
Others are clear deviations from a healthy mean (chain smoking, alcoholism, pornography,
gluttony, excessive gambling, etc.). Aristotle may have been mistaken in his description of how
incontinence happens, but he is certainly right that it does happen. He describes the incontinent
as a person who knows, at least in some sense of the word, that he is choosing wrongly. Aristotle
also appears to be right about the importance of our desire to experience pleasure and avoid pain.
It is the desire for pleasure, or to avoid pain, that corrupts the deliberative process. Aristotle’s
moral psychology states that pleasure and pain are of the utmost importance in ethics. Aristotle
says that learning to experience pleasure in the right things and to be pained by the wrong things
is the essence of a good upbringing. This is why habituation, including proper training starting in
early childhood and continuing throughout life, is absolutely essential.
Habituation: The Foundation of Virtue
In Aristotle’s moral psychology, moral development precedes the intellectual virtues, and
habituation plays an indispensable role in this moral development. Aristotle observed that young
people and untrained adults naively pursue pleasure and shun pain. Not having learned to pursue
the noble and fine things in life, they are short-sighted and uninformed in their pursuit of
pleasure. Worse, this condition cannot be corrected by mere instruction or argument. An
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untrained person must be compelled to choose the noble and fine in order to learn to appreciate
it. Shaping what one takes pleasure and pain in can be done with children and youth, but is much
harder, or even impossible, with adults.
Now if arguments were sufficient by themselves to make people decent, the
rewards they would command would justifiably have been many and large… In
fact, however, arguments seem to have enough influence to stimulate and
encourage the civilized ones [emphasis added] among the young people, and
perhaps to make virtue take possession of a well-born character that truly loves
what is fine; but they seem unable to stimulate the many [emphasis added]
towards being fine and good. For the many naturally obey fear, not shame; they
avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful. For since
they live by their feelings, they pursue their proper pleasures and the source of
them, and avoid the opposed pains, and have not even a notion of what is fine and
hence truly pleasant, since they have had no taste of it.
What argument could reform people like these? For it is impossible, or not easy,
to alter by argument what has long been absorbed by habit [emphasis added]. 36
Here Aristotle restates the crucial first step in ethical education, learning by experience to
appreciate the fine and noble. The truly civilized have “tasted” of the “fine” and thus know what
is “truly pleasant.” This early, moral education is critical for shaping the non-rational part of the
soul and for developing practical wisdom.
Notice some important observations that Aristotle makes in the above quotation.
Arguments and instruction are only effective on the “young” and the “civilized.” Once a person
becomes an adult, especially an older adult, habit is powerful. One would not only have to
overcome habit, but the adult would lack the practical wisdom that would have accompanied
experiencing the pleasure of doing virtuous things. Without habituation we lack the practical
wisdom of knowing that virtue is really more pleasurable than vice and leads to a good life.
Proper habituation is what Aristotle means by being civilized. A civilized person has learned by
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experience to appreciate the fine and noble in life. A young civilized person might respond to
argument and/or education and choose to practice virtuous living. Sadly, Aristotle notices that
the “many” are not in this situation. The many are not civilized. Hence, they only respond to
painful penalties for choosing poorly. It is unlikely for an uncivilized adult to get on the path to
virtue. The many must be governed by strict laws because they lack practical wisdom and are in
the habit of simply seeking pleasure.
Analogous to learning virtue is learning music.37 An indispensable element in learning to
be a musician is listening to music, hearing the tune, rhythm, beat, and harmony. Once the
student has experienced various musical pieces and styles, then music theory makes sense. The
appreciation of music begins with experiencing good music. Aristotle thinks virtue is learned the
same way. Once a person experiences the pleasure of the noble, she is then ready to understand
the argument for why the noble is good and should always be pursued. That is why Aristotle, in
the previous quotation, thinks it is the civilized ones, the ones who love what is fine, who may
respond to argument. The civilized ones are those who have been exposed to the noble and love
it. They are now capable of appreciating an argument on behalf of the noble. But the many, who
just know their appetites, are not able to appreciate an argument on behalf of the noble. They
have no experience of the pleasure of being noble and doing what is fine. This is why habituation
(ethismos) is absolutely essential.38 But habituation is just beginning when one is exposed to the
noble and the fine.
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Aristotle does not think it is just one experience, or even several experiences, that makes
a person appreciate virtue. Instead, it is the cultivation of habits and reaping the fruit of those
habits that prepares one for virtue.
Arguments and teaching surely do not influence everyone, but the soul of the
student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like
ground that is to nourish seed. For someone whose life follows his feelings would
not even listen to an argument turning him away, or comprehend it [if he did
listen]; and in that state how could he be persuaded to change? And in general
feelings seem to yield to force, not to argument. Hence we must already in some
way have a character suitable for virtue, fond of what is fine and objecting to what
is shameful.39
A person does not discover the pleasure of honesty by telling one truth any more than one
experiences the pleasure of being able to play the piano after one lesson. It takes years, maybe
decades of being honest, of being loyal, of being hard working, before one appreciates and
enjoys the benefits of these virtues. Just like it takes years, maybe decades, of practicing the
piano and taking lessons before one can just play music and appreciate its qualities and enjoy
playing it. The habit of practicing, in addition to the physical and mental habits that allow
playing and reading music, are cultivated through years of discipline, much of it enforced. As
one approached adulthood, which Aristotle thought was sometime after 21, then a person would
have developed an appreciation of the fine and noble and the initial experiences that lead to
practical wisdom.40 Once a person has the habit of practicing, and the habitually acquired skills
to play, it becomes likely that an adult might now enjoy being a musician and appreciate it
enough to continue practicing and playing. It is only after habituation that one can appreciate the
intellectual case being made for the noble and how to attain it.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179b24 – 29.
Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics, 1336b22. Carnes Lord’s footnote on this statement suggests it is a reference
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Just as the body is prior in birth to the soul, so is the irrational part to that having
reason. This too is evident, for spiritedness and will, and furthermore desire, are
present in children immediately on their being born, while reasoning and intellect
develop naturally in them as they go along. Hence in the first instance the
superintendence of the body must necessarily precede that of the soul; next comes
that of appetite; but that of appetite is for the sake of intellect, and that of the body
for the sake of the soul.41
The path to virtue must continue on through adulthood. This is why Aristotle not only insisted on
a good upbringing, but on a society with proper social norms and a proper legal system.
Since virtuous citizens are the key to a successful society, Aristotle thought that the most
important duty of the legislator was to ensure the proper upbringing of the next generation. “That
the legislator must, therefore, make the education of the young his object above all would be
disputed by no one.”42 Aristotle thought the community and the city should have important roles
in training the young. You get an idea of the degree of their involvement when you see some of
his recommendations to the legislators.
the legislator should banish foul speech from the city more than anything else43
unseemly paintings or stories also must be banished44
younger persons [must] not be spectators either of lampoons or of comedy45
Aristotle spent considerable time considering the role of music in a proper education. His initial
thoughts are instructive. He thinks music is indeed important and says “nature itself seeks, … to
be occupied in correct fashion but also to be capable of being at leisure in noble fashion. For this
is the beginning point of everything.”46 When Aristotle talks about inculcating an appreciation
for the fine and the noble, he includes every facet of life. For Aristotle, virtue is not just about
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what we commonly think of as moral issues, it is about a life that is going well in every respect.
Once a person understands the fine and noble in every aspect of life, then one can appreciate
practical wisdom. It is after appropriate habituation that the process of acquiring practical
wisdom really begins. For young people in their 20s, there are likely still many more years of
practicing virtue ahead before one could really be virtuous.
Developing a truly virtuous character, one that chooses the good because she recognizes
it and wants it from a “firm and unchanging state,” is the result of a lengthy training process.
Habituation is a process that begins under thorough moral training, especially from ages 7 to
puberty and puberty to 21.47 Aristotle thought those years were the parts of youth the legislator
should be most concerned with. But it did not end there. “It is not enough to get the correct
upbringing and attention when they are young; rather, they must continue the same practices and
be habituated to them when they become men.”48 There are important, distinct, elements of our
soul that we must get in harmony.
There are three objects of choice - fine, expedient and pleasant – and three objects
of avoidance – their contraries, shameful, harmful and painful. About all these,
then, the good person is correct and the bad person is in error, and especially
about pleasure.49
The process of getting the fine, the expedient, and the pleasant to align requires both habituation
and practice using one’s own practical wisdom. The expedient, also the good for the individual,
is the object of mature reflection (practical wisdom).50 It will require many more years of
practicing virtue before one has the experience, maturity, practical wisdom, and desire for the
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noble that make virtue a pleasure. Only after these years of being virtuous will it be possible to
choose the good because one recognizes it as the good, wants it because it is good, and does so
from a firm and unchanging state.51 Becoming virtuous is something only accomplished when
one’s parents and community are both virtuous and intentional about raising one to be virtuous.
And even then, it is unlikely, unless one adopts their commitment to virtue and persists in it until
maturity (somewhere around 30 or 40 years old). Virtue is rare because it also requires good
fortune. One has to be materially successful, not suffer any serious illness or injury, not die
prematurely, have a good family, and have the opportunity to contribute to a good community.
Virtue is neither natural nor common, it is not easily attained, even when sought out.
Aristotle’s Ethics – Some Praise and Some Questions
Aristotle’s explanation of what virtue is, and how to get it, has many strengths. As
previously discussed, Aristotle seems on the mark when he suggests that virtue includes
recognizing the good, wanting the good, and choosing the good from a firm and unchanging
state. There seems to be a consensus on the importance of good motives. Additionally, he is also
on the mark when he suggests that a good upbringing, habituation, is critically important to
becoming virtuous. The likelihood of a person recognizing what is virtuous and then choosing to
persist in practicing it through their teens and 20s without the benefit of a good upbringing seems
incredibly remote. Aristotle is certainly right when he says we all enjoy good food, good drink,
and sexual relations, but we do not all enjoy them in the right way.52 We all seek pleasure, but
only those who have been trained know how to seek pleasure in noble and fine ways. A good
upbringing, habituation, seems virtually indispensable to that project. Additionally, Aristotle
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seems correct when he says the young must be compelled to develop virtuous habits. Our
aversion to the difficult and painful and our preference for the easy and pleasurable is extremely
powerful. Indeed, it seems like it will take many years of intentional training to develop good
habits in the young. As Aristotle suggests, that will require not just parental input, but input from
schools and the community. That said, Aristotle’s reliance on habituation to mold our moral
perspective seems too optimistic.
Is Aristotelian Habituation Realistic?
Post Aristotle, how close has Western society come to achieving Aristotelian habituation?
And is such habituation possible for contemporary society? When Aristotle wrote, only the
wealthy elite of the Greek city-states could afford a good education. Most inhabitants of the
world were considered barbarians and were not even candidates for virtue. Even the elites, like
Aristotle, were not paragons of virtue by contemporary standards. Slavery was the norm and
women were typically not educated and considered second class members of society. Humility
and self-sacrifice on behalf of the poor and marginalized was not part of virtue. Justice as
understood by Aristotle was likely very different from what we would consider justice. Ethical
training today would purposely be very different than what Aristotle recommended.
About 800 years after Aristotle, Christianity swept through Western society and much of
Aristotle’s ethics were merged with Christian virtues. As Western society progressed it became
far more egalitarian then Greek society. So, today Western society celebrates human rights and
equal rights before the law for all races and genders. Western society has some level of
commitment to the poor and marginalized and it enjoys universal access to education. Perhaps
most scholars would say Western society is ethically far superior to ancient Greek society and
that contemporary Western children, on average, get much better ethical training than the vast
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majority of children in Aristotle’s day. From that perspective, Western society has implemented
Aristotle in a way vastly exceeding what Aristotle probably thought possible. Yet it is not clear
contemporary society provides the rigorous ethical training Aristotle thought necessary for
virtue.
It is not clear that the majority of youth in Western society really get rigorous training in
moral virtue. Few children have the strong social structure (parents, school, community) required
to instill the virtuous habits required to appreciate the fine and noble. This training would have to
persist way into one’s 20s. This training would have to explicitly instruct in the virtues: bravery,
temperance, generosity, mildness, truthfulness, and justice.53 In the U.S., there appear to be few
family – school - community combinations that agree on what virtue is and are committed to
teaching it. Possibly Amish communities, or orthodox religious families, joined to religious
schools and associations, raise their children with the kind of habituation Aristotle had in mind.
Their training would likely have to be completed at a religious college, military academy, or elite
school with a strong focus on character (not our Ivy League schools). The majority of youth in
Western society do not get rigorous moral training at school.
In Can Virtue Be Taught? Amelie Rorty notes that Western schools have severe
limitations in regard to promoting virtue. She says, “since liberal democratic education confines
itself to aims which all citizens can be presumed to accept, it leaves the education of the specific
abilities required to realize diverse conceptions of the good to the private sector, to individuals
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and their associations.”54 Our public schools respond to the confusion in our society. In
addressing the question, can virtue be taught? Elizabeth Minnich responds like many Westerners,
“I would know, or think I did, whether virtue can be taught had I a philosophical position
specifying what sort of thing it is that we wish to teach.”55 When it comes to knowing what
virtue is, a lot of Westerners simply have no idea. Even when people think they know,
contemporary society is so diverse in its ethical perspectives, that there simply is no social
consensus on many important issues.
This lack of a social consensus is critical because Aristotle notes that social
reinforcement is crucial for many years into adulthood. Some observers think our society can
provide such reinforcement. In Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People,
Lawyer Lynn Stout claims that unselfish, prosocial behavior can be encouraged by our social
context.56 In particular she has in mind that tort, contract, and criminal law can be important
contributors to such a social context.57 Stout has a good point that laws play an important role in
identifying and encouraging prosocial behavior. However, her notion of “good” is far from
Aristotle’s, and most people’s, notion of virtue. Keeping the law, while prosocial and “good” in
some sense, is not synonymous with virtue. The traits that make one virtuous: courage, honesty,
sexual prudence and fidelity, kindness, generosity, responsibility, industrious, etc. are not
impacted by the law. Additionally, there are many laws that people break with little fear that they
will be discovered: cheating on taxes, stealing from the office, failing to get a building permit for
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a renovation, violating copyrights on music and video, etc. Contemporary law is simply too easy
to keep on the one hand, and too easy to break in some instances, to have a significant impact on
one’s ethical development. If a person is going to pursue virtue in adulthood, it will take much
more encouragement than the law offers. This makes the possibility of an Aristotelian
habituation questionable.
In some aspects, today’s habituation of our youth is far ahead of Aristotle’s vision.
Certainly, the fact that all children in the West are educated through secondary education, is far
superior to what ancient Greek society accomplished. Access to college education is much more
available today than in Aristotle’s time. Most historians would likely agree that Western political
and judicial institutions are morally superior to those of Aristotle’s time. However, it is not clear
that many of our children get the kind of focused ethical training Aristotle had in mind. This
makes it hard to say how often, if at all, Aristotle’s recommendation for habituation is met in
contemporary Western society. However, the real question is not how closely we approximate
Aristotle’s specific vision of habituation. The real question is, can habituation of any kind, minus
the help of God, really make us virtuous?
Would Aristotelian Habituation Work?
It is doubtful that habituation, even if acquired much like Aristotle recommended, would
suffice to enable virtue. Aristotle acknowledged that habituation cannot change human nature.
He said, “for if something is by nature [in one condition], habituation cannot bring it into another
condition… Thus, the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature, but we are by
nature able to acquire them, and reach our complete perfection through habit.”58 It seems
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eminently possible that the human psyche is inherently self-interested. Humans may be wired
such that self-interest has a higher priority than moral obligation. It is not uncommon to see a
young person raised in what appears to be an excellent environment, maybe the same one as a
fairly obedient sibling, yet spectacularly fail to be virtuous. This raises the question of whether
virtue requires another ingredient that Aristotle has overlooked. The simple parable of the
prodigal son provides an illustration that is all too familiar to many of us. Apparently both sons
were raised in a good environment by loving parents. Yet one son rejected all the instructions of
his parents and led a wild life that squandered his wealth. The other son apparently lived
according to his parent’s instruction, but was not virtuous, he was frustrated and ungrateful. A
person Aristotle might describe as continent. The prodigal comes to his senses, experiences a
radical spiritual and moral transformation, and returns home happy to live according to the
instruction of his youth. We do not learn the future of the “continent” son, but it seems that
without such a moral transformation, he will not become virtuous. Aristotle claims that
habituation can change what a person takes pleasure and pain in and thus give them a desire for
virtue. But is it true that if humans are innately self-interested creatures, that habituation can
change that?
As stated earlier, it seems possible that we all innately value self-interest more than moral
obligations. We certainly want to be virtuous. It is important to our self-image and to our
reputation. But if self-interest and a moral obligation conflict, especially when the cost/benefit
ratio highly favors the self-interest option, it appears the vast majority ditch the moral obligation.
This claim will be examined closely in the next chapter. That chapter considers history and social
science to note that virtue is astonishingly rare. Additionally, it is not clear that habituation is the
key ingredient to virtue.
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Habituation may not be the determining factor in becoming virtuous. Many adults testify
to growing up without adequate habituation, but as adults experience a radical moral
transformation. Possibly the world’s first notable autobiography, Augustine’s Confessions, is one
of many such accounts. Prior to his conversion, Augustine lived simply as a man of the times.
Those times were no more moral than ours, they included drinking, sex, and professional
rivalries. At age 32, Augustine experiences a religious conversion that includes a moral
transformation. He reads from Paul’s Epistles, “Not in reveling and drunkenness, not in lust and
wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, arm yourselves with the Lord Jesus Christ,
spend no more thought on nature and nature’s appetites.”59 He goes on from there to become a
Catholic priest and bishop. Fast forward from Italy, 386 AD to Philadelphia 2003 where Jon
Kelly, inner city drug dealer, thief, and murderer is convicted and sent to jail. In solitary
confinement he is given a New Testament which he is inspired to read for 18 consecutive hours.
He stops “at Hebrews 3:15, If you hear His voice, do not harden your hearts.” At that point, Jon
experiences a religious and moral transformation. He pleads guilty to third degree murder and
robbery. Jon is paroled after 6 years and is now married and planting a church in western
Chicago.60 Over the course of history, examples like this likely exist in the billions. People who
grew up without proper habituation, yet became virtuous. Aristotle thought that only habituation
could mold our moral psychology towards virtue, but that does not appear to be true. Not only
that, but Aristotle may be wrong about the ability of habituation to appropriately mold our moral
psychology. These are the issues I examine next.
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CHAPTER 5
CRITIQUING ARISTOTLE’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & HABITUATION
Mankind’s history is the gold standard of evidence of the species’ cruelty and murderous
constitutional predisposition. Steven James Bartlett The Pathology of Man1
This chapter presents three criticisms of Aristotle’s moral psychology and habituation.
The first criticism notes that Aristotle’s ethics seem unlikely, because he cannot explain why
virtue appeared to be possible only in the Greek city-states. It is elitist. This made virtue entirely
dependent on moral luck, i.e. the good luck to be born into a wealthy family in a Greek city-state.
The second two criticisms are aimed at showing that Aristotle fails to account for the innate
power of self-interest. Universal human behavior appears to indicate that when moral obligation
requires actions not in our self-interest, we choose self-interest. Aristotle claimed that habituation
provided the basis for virtue. But he did not account for the inability of habituation to change our
innate commitment to self-interest. Consequently, the second criticism notes that Aristotle
cannot explain the human historical record and contemporary moral decay. Aristotle did not
foresee the continued universal problem of immorality in contrast to the continued scarcity of
virtue. This happened, despite the fact, that Western society would thoroughly embrace his
ethical teaching. Nor did Aristotle recognize that every society attempts to employ habituation to
instill virtue in its population. Finally, the third criticism notes that Aristotle’s theory cannot
explain why social science cannot detect many virtues in Western culture. Western culture
largely accepted Aristotle’s ethics and attempted to use education and social mores to habituate
the youth. Despite that, Western societies suffer from the same moral maladies from which all
other cultures suffer. These criticisms undermine Aristotle’s claim that our moral psychology is
1
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amenable to becoming virtuous through habituation. The first criticism points out that since
Aristotle’s moral psychology is a universal claim about human nature, it only makes sense that
all societies are to some extent pursuing virtue and happiness along the lines he recommended.
Aristotle is Too Elitist, Making Virtue Reliant on Moral Luck
Alasdair MacIntyre points out a paradox in Aristotle’s ethics; it claims to be both
universal and parochial.2 Aristotle’s moral psychology purports to describe the psyche of all
human beings. The excellent operation of the soul that produces virtue is necessary for all
humans. The preeminence of rationality, the attractiveness of the noble if exposed to it, the desire
for pleasure and ultimately for happiness, and the necessity of habituation, is presumably true
everywhere for all time. Yet, according to Aristotle, virtue was only realizable, and being
realized, in the Greek city-state.3 It seems highly unlikely that human beings across the globe, all
with the same moral psychology, had little or no insight into virtue, happiness, and the
importance of habituation. All people and cultures, according to Aristotle’s own theory, desire
happiness. It seems axiomatic that people everywhere attempt to be virtuous in the sense
Aristotle describes, i.e. to behave rationally, to be attracted to the noble, and to seek pleasure and
avoid pain. To the contrary, Aristotle writes off non-Greeks, barbarians, slaves, and even the
Greek lower classes, from the possibility of virtue.4 This was a mistake.
All human beings have a moral psychology that makes virtue possible. And it seems
obvious that all cultures are pursuing happiness, some with more success than others, and
passing down their formula for doing so through habituation of the young. After all, how many
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other means are there of training the young? Aristotle’s ethics are incredibly well thought out,
well-argued, and provide wisdom on ethics and human psychology that remain pertinent to this
day. Yet, Aristotle’s commendation of practical wisdom, moral character, and habituation are not
unprecedented and not atypical of other societies. This is why Aristotle’s insistence that virtue
was accessible only to Greek aristocrats is elitist and simply false. A corollary criticism of
Aristotle’s claim is that, were his claim true, virtue would be purely a matter of moral luck.
Elitism Leads to Reliance on Moral Luck
A key component of virtue is choice; virtue is typically not considered a matter of luck.
A theory that makes virtue dependent entirely on luck seems flawed. But that is exactly what
Aristotle’s theory appears to do. Thomas Nagel identified four ways by which a person’s
assessed virtue is determined by moral luck. He listed them as: 1) constitutive luck, 2)
circumstantial luck, 3) causal luck, and finally 4) effects [results] luck.5 By luck he means that a
person’s moral assessment is significantly affected by factors beyond their control. Constitutive
luck has to do with the kind of person we are, our inclinations, capacities, and temperament.
Aristotle’s notion of habituation is a prime example of constitutive luck. Most of habituation has
to do with the moral training one receives prior to adulthood. This moral training affects the
things we take pleasure and pain in, as well as our perspective on what a virtuous person (a
person with practical wisdom) would do. Habituation changes who we are and how we respond
to circumstances.
This critical early foundation of proper habituation is not the result of choice, but purely a
result of the circumstances of one’s birth and upbringing. From an Aristotelian perspective, a
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morally impoverished upbringing almost certainly condemns one to living in a state other than
virtue. Aristotle did not think a young adult that lacked the appropriate moral training had much
chance of choosing to gain practical wisdom or of choosing to emulate a mentor possessing
practical wisdom. When you consider the investment the U.S. places in primary and secondary
education, you can see that most Americans agree. The first impulse people have for solving
poverty, unemployment, crime, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, etc. is to invest in primary and
secondary education. A large number of people believe a good education is the key to a good
life.
Yet we know that proper habituation is not just academic information. Proper habituation
includes a work ethic, social skills (good friends & clubs), teamwork (sports, good coaches), and
moral instruction (sex & drug education & much more). Early proper habituation (from family,
community, schools, and church) is very important, but to a large extent imposed on the young.
In that sense, it is the result of constitutive moral luck. From Aristotle’s perspective, the crucial
difference between a barbarian and a virtuous Greek, or even a common Greek laborer and a
virtuous Greek, was the family into which they were born. On Aristotle’s account, virtue is
accessible only if one is lucky enough to be a male born into a wealthy Greek family that resides
in a well-run Greek city-state. If habituation plays the key role Aristotle claims, then virtue is
limited to those with constitutive moral luck. But, Aristotle recognized it took even more luck
than that.
There are a host of life events (circumstances) that have a significant impact on our
assessed moral status. These events constitute circumstantial luck. One such event is simply the
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privilege of living long enough to amend errors and bad choices.6 Since virtue, under the best of
circumstances, takes time, one needs the good fortune not to die young. How many people have
driven a car while drunk and survived? Very lucky. Others did not get the chance to fix that
mistake, because they did not survive. Another event includes our location or change of location.
One’s access to good education, good friends, and good influences of various kinds (at work, in
the community, good churches, good clubs, good mentors, etc.) are often the result of chance.
Other events include inspiring experiences, recovering from a severe illness or accident, the
death/funeral of a friend, a wedding, the birth of a child, a great book, the love of a friend, etc.
Sometimes events can be destructive. Many attest to having their lives ruined by winning the
lottery, or inheriting a fortune, or becoming famous. Circumstantial luck plays a key role in
Aristotle’s ethics, because he thought a long life, good health, wealth, good family, and friends
were an essential part of a virtuous and happy life. Obviously, much of the aforementioned is
purely a result of circumstantial luck. But it is not clear that habituation in a wealthy Greek
family in a well-ordered Greek city-state, and good luck are the primary ingredients of virtue.
Aristotle’s elitism and the relation of habituation to luck are mistakes; they reveal a
blindness to the fact that other societies, other races, and other classes of people were also
pursuing virtue and happiness. Other societies may not have articulated it in the same way, and
they may have disagreed on the exact moral virtues to pursue, but they were on the same journey
and using habituation to raise their youth. For this reason, the historical record of all societies is
relevant to the truth of Aristotle’s claims. All persons and all societies share the same moral
psychology. All persons seek happiness, and all societies want to be well-ordered and successful.
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All cultures strive to pass on their values to the next generation through a process of habituation.
And, most cultures agree to a large extent on the virtues to pursue.7 Courage, truthfulness,
temperance, and justice are not unique to the Greek city-state or to Western society. Given the
universality of the pursuit of virtue, happiness, and a well-ordered society, it is remarkable that
over the centuries following Aristotle, history demonstrated a severe dearth of virtue.
Mankind’s Historical Record – Plenty of Vice, Little Virtue
In the 2,000 plus years since Aristotle, the track record of human beings provides ample
reason to question Aristotle’s moral psychology and the power of habituation. The historical
record indicates that humans pursue self-interest over moral obligations. Humans will resort to
whatever it takes, including violence, to get what they want. Our history is replete with examples
of immoral individuals, immoral societies/countries, revolutions, civil wars, slavery, corruption
and sexual abuse. And, to top it off, the 20th century featured two world wars and several
genocides. The horrors of the 20th century occurred due to the behavior of the most enlightened,
most well educated, and wealthiest societies in all of history. Aristotle would have expected
much better from Western societies. These tragedies bring us to the present, where our culture
seems as depraved as any. Our society is plagued with lying, cheating, stealing, sexual
immorality, divorce, abortion, suicide, drug abuse, homelessness, and many other ills that
progress was supposed to eliminate. This data contradicts what Aristotle, and many others,
thought would happen.8 An increase in the human standard of living, increasing education, and a
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more enlightened society should have ushered in more virtue. The evidence appears to indicate
that modern persons are no more virtuous than the denizens of ancient societies. Most of those
inhabitants, the “many,” Aristotle included among the barbarians. The historical record is so
dismal that psychologist Steven Bartlett claims that human evil is normal, our psychological and
cognitive constitution is pathological.9 It is perhaps possible to look at contemporary Western
society and think that it is vastly superior to past societies because it is much more egalitarian
and there is little risk of violence to the average person. War has not affected the inhabitants of
most Western societies for the last 50 years. But that again appears to be moral luck more than
anything else. There are good reasons to believe that Westerners are capable of as much violence
and genocide as anyone else. If our psyche is fundamentally flawed (fundamentally selfinterested), no amount of progress or habituation cannot overcome it.10 Violence, in particular
war and genocide, is an unmistakable indication of moral failure. History indicates we are not
eradicating it.
Pervasive Violence
Violence is one of the clearest indications of a moral breakdown. Yet, there are good
reasons to believe that human beings resort to violence when important self-interests are
threatened. This is true despite any kind of habituation. Whether one takes a Darwinian or a
theistic perspective, both accounts of human nature and history include pervasive violence from
the beginning. If the product of evolution, our nature is one shaped by the brutal and unavoidable
truth that the fittest survive and reproduce. And for creationists, even a man created in the image
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of God is depicted as a “fallen” creature as evidenced by Cain’s murder of his brother Abel. The
eldest child of the two most perfect and informed parents in human history killed his younger
brother out of envy. One could hope that a few thousand years of ‘civilization’ might have
refined human nature, but there is scant evidence for that. Killing others for personal gain is
clearly a moral failure, yet it is routine everywhere and at all times.
There are innumerable examples of unjustified human violence to cite, but perhaps one of
the most interesting and compelling is the example of Genghis Khan and the Mongol empire.
This is not ancient history; Temujin (later known as Genghis Khan) lived from about 1162 to
1227. This is well after the spread of both Christianity and Islam, both of which penetrated
Mongol culture. Yet the Mongols, in pursuit of wealth and power, conquered more of the world
than any empire in history (over 12 million square miles, from East Asia to Eastern Europe and
the Middle East).11 It is difficult to know the extent of the loss of life and carnage caused by the
Mongols, but many historians place it around 40 million deaths. They may have killed around
75% of the population of what is now Iran. Some think the world population decreased by as
much as 11% due to their conquests.12 The Mongols were ruthless and brutal. If a besieged city
surrendered, the killing might be limited to the men of the garrison. The city would nevertheless
be plundered, women raped, and choice specimens enslaved. If the city resisted, upon defeat, all
inhabitants (male, female, elderly, and children) would be executed. This procedure involved
assigning three to four hundred persons to each soldier whose job it was to execute each of his
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captives. This often included beheading.13 This is a tame description of the horror of the Mongol
invasion. What is of interest here is how an entire society of people could be convinced to treat
other human beings in such a cruel way for simply the purpose of self-aggrandizement.
With respect to moral psychology, the question is, what would lead a person and a
society to do what the Mongols did? After all, the Mongols were not defending themselves from
marauding invaders, revenging past injustices, or fleeing an uninhabitable homeland. They just
wanted what other people had and did not mind taking it. Aristotle would simply write this off as
the natural behavior of barbarians. He would say this has no implications for his understanding
of virtue and simply illustrates the result of a complete lack of proper habituation. But it seems
fair to say that philosophers post-Aristotle rejected the view that the male citizens of the Greek
city-states were the only humans with insight into virtue, happiness, and proper habituation. And,
let us not forget that Alexander the Great (possibly tutored by Aristotle) was a very aggressive
conqueror himself. Mongol society did not achieve the intellectual level of the ancient Greeks;
plenty of cultures fell short of that. But it is far from obvious that such an intellectual
shortcoming should preclude any understanding of virtue and the moral obligation not to rape,
pillage, murder, and destroy your neighbors. A much more plausible explanation is that human
nature (specifically our moral psychology), not just Mongol nature, is quite likely to visit
violence upon others if it can get away with it (i.e. our self-interest preempts any moral
obligations). It does not take a PhD in history to realize that humans of all societies and cultures,
persons of every kind, those raised with excellent habituation and those with inferior habituation,
behave much like the Mongols. Just fast forward to Europe of the 20th century.
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Europe of the 20th century is the most advanced civilization on earth, it is well-educated
and post-enlightenment, it has eliminated slavery, it is embracing universal suffrage and human
rights, yet it is on the brink of two of the most bloody and barbaric wars in human history. World
Wars I and II provide an irrefutable rebuke to any who think human nature and human society
are either healthy or improving. The death, destruction and utter waste of human and material
resources is astounding. The soldiers of World War I may not have personally executed men,
women, and children, but that does not mean they were not brutal. Just read some of the accounts
of life in the trenches, enduring an artillery barrage, suffering a gas attack, and charging across
no-man’s land into barbed wire and withering machine gun fire. It boggles the mind; it seems
unbelievable. Tens of thousands of men were killed in a day.14 And for what? Why did the welleducated, refined, aristocratic elite of Russia, France, England, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary,
and the Ottomans send a sizeable part of an entire generation of young men to horrific deaths?
The causes seem to boil down to nationalism, imperialism, and economic competition.15 None of
these justify the 40-some million who were killed (about 20 million) and injured (20 million).16
That does not even take into account the economic resources expended and the destruction that
accompanied the war. Of course, hind sight is 20/20, but it is inconceivable that the leaders and
populations of those countries could have thought that all the major powers of Europe would

HistoryNet Staff, “Costliest Battles and Campaigns of World War I,” https://www.historynet.com/
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engage in a conflict and the losses in blood and treasure would not be exorbitant. The fact
remains that a sizeable number of people in all those countries participated or contributed to the
war effort in some significant way. It is hard to see how a war of this magnitude and horror
squares with the idea that these countries had significant numbers of virtuous men and women.
Where were the leaders, elites, or simple citizens trying to prevent this tragedy? Even more
stunning is the fact that the generation that suffered the most in this war will be leading these
same nations into World War II.

World War II Military Deaths - 25,246,530
Japan, 2,120,000

Others, 1,422,500

Italy, 301,400

Soviet Union,
10,700,000

Germany,
5,533,000

China, 3,800,000
France, 217,600
United States,
416,800
Britain/Commonwealth, 575,000

Poland, 160,000

Less than one generation after the “war to end all wars” the very same nations that suffered the
horrors of World War I embark on an even more horrible encore. What World War II lacks in the
horror of trench warfare and gas attacks it will compensate for with genocide, treacherous
amphibious landings, indiscriminate aerial bombardment, fire bombing, and the first use of
nuclear weapons. World War II is likely the most lethal and costly war of all time. One of the
more sobering truths about World War II is the incredible civilian (non-combatant) death toll.
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Although death tolls vary from 55 million to over 70 million (the estimate below totals over 72
million), the shocking reality is that about two thirds of the deaths were civilian deaths.17
Some of the civilian casualties are due to the genocidal treatment of Jews and the
execution of Russian/Slavic prisoners of war. But there were horrific civilian casualties in China
as well. Japan waged a brutal war with China that included the sort of atrocious behavior that
occurred in the “Rape of Nanking.”18 The point here is that the violence and brutality, to soldiers
and civilians alike, was not unique to the Nazis. Certainly, the Holocaust is an evil of unique
historic proportions. But, as will be shown later, genocidal behavior is not unique to the Nazis. In
addition to the Holocaust, there was plenty of other brutal, evil behavior. The killing, maiming,
and abuse of civilians which occurs in all wars, occurred in World War II as well and in
unprecedentedly immense proportions. Contemporary society can say all it wants about the
“barbarian” Genghis Khan, but modern man has proved to be just as brutal.

World War II Civilian Deaths - 47,322,200
Japan, 1,000,000

Italy, 153,100
Germany,
1,760,000
France,
350,000

Others,
8,450,600

Soviet Union,
12,400,000

Poland,
5,440,000
China,
16,200,000

Britain/Common
wealth,
1,568,500
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When one considers the historical record, it looks like societies are becoming more violent and
deadly. The chart below shows the increasing size and activity of the military in the major
European powers from the 12th to the 20th century.
Summary Figures by Century for France,
England, Austria-Hungary and Russia19
Army’s
Century

Casualties
Strength

1101-1200

1,161,000

29,940

1201-1300

2,372,000

68,440

1301-1400

3,867,000

166,729

1401-1500

5,000,000

285,000

1501-1600

9,758,000

573,020

1601-1700

15,865,000

2,497,170

1701-1800

24,849,000

3,622,140

1801-1900

17,869,800

2,912,771

1901-1925

41,465,000

16,147,550

The chart indicates that human relations are getting worse, not better. Despite the so-called
barbarism of “primitive” societies, it is modern societies that appear less tolerant and more

Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 548. under “Summary
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of Germany in the Austria-Hungary empire prior to 16th century and out of it afterwards. Thus totals are
overestimated in the earlier centuries and underestimated in the later centuries. Of course the 20th century will show
an even more significant increase once World War II is factored in.
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deadly. This poses severe challenges to Aristotle’s theory on virtue and habituation. The
societies of the 20th century responsible for the two world wars were the societies in which an
Aristotelian would expect to find the most virtue. These were the most “civilized” societies,
sporting the best educational systems, the highest commitment to basic human rights, the most
economically and politically organized nations, the wealthiest nations with the most time for
reflection and contemplation. The inheritance of many of these nations included a Christian
tradition infused with Aristotelian ethics. These societies placed great value on character,
wholesome homes, and education. Certainly, the ruling classes had access to most of the
ingredients of virtue, to include proper habituation, as Aristotle conceived of it. Yet these very
people led the citizens of Europe and North America down a trail of unparalleled death and
destruction. Very few people resisted this trend. In fact, some of the most terrible consequences
of the war (the deaths of Jews, Russian and Polish prisoners and civilians, and Chinese prisoners
and civilians) happened due to the corrupted moral sensibilities of a large number of people.
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Genocide
Genocides20
Location

Time

Deaths in Millions

Zunghars – Western
Mongolia
Ottoman Empire

1755-1758

.48 - .6 M 80% of Zungharian Oirats

1915 - 1922

0.8 - 1.5 M 75% of Armenians in Turkey

Ukraine/USSR

1932 - 1933

1.8 – 7.5 M More than 10% of population

Nazi Controlled
Europe

1939-1945

4.2 – 6.2 M 78% of Jews in region

Cambodia

1975 - 1979

1.7 – 3.0 M 21-33% of population

Rwanda

1994

0.5 – 1 .0 M 70% of Tutsis

The violence of man is not limited to what is done by militaries in conflict; it exhibits
itself in genocidal attempts to simply eradicate entire racial or cultural groups. It is hard to
imagine anything more inconsistent with virtue than to participate in, or tolerate, genocide.
World War I included the Armenian genocide and World War II included the genocide of Jews
now called the Holocaust. Some of the civilian deaths in World War I were the approximate 1
million Armenians killed by the Ottoman Turks.21 The Armenians were killed because they were
suspected of being a disloyal population (Christian) in a Muslim country (Turkey). Likewise, the
Nazis blamed the Jews for undermining Germany, indeed the whole world, in various ways. The
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defamation went so far as to label them sub-human and thus worthy of extermination. The Nazis
killed around 6 million Jews.22 Most readers are familiar with the unspeakable brutality with
which the Germans treated the Jews and others they deemed unfit to live.
The killing of Jews reflects a very widely based moral failure across most of Europe. It
was not simply the work of a handful of wicked SS (protection squad) members. Rounding up
millions of Jews from all over Europe, transporting them, and executing them took the active
participation of large numbers of German soldiers and police, as well as the cooperation of the
citizens of Germany, Poland, Italy, France, Austria, and numerous other countries. It is a mistake
to think that wars and genocide are the product of a few “bad apples.” The fact is that Jews were
turned in by their neighbors and other members of their communities. They were often arrested
and turned over to the Germans by local police forces.23 Sometimes other Jews betrayed them.24
In all probability, millions of people, from many European countries, were complicit in the
genocide of the Jews. The most sobering fact revealed by the extensive analysis of the
perpetrators of war crimes is the finding that they are psychologically “normal.” Initial post war
studies expected to find a psychopathic “Nazi personality.”25 Instead, what emerged after time
was the disturbing fact that “Nazi leaders were not the rare and spectacular personalities of
popular imagination. Such individuals roam the street of any city and can be found inhabiting
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any profession deciding the affairs of business, government, and industry.”26 The most
significant lessons we learned from the Nazis are that evil is real and that all of us can succumb
to it in the right circumstances.
People we all would expect to be virtuous can be surprisingly immoral in difficult
circumstances. This was convincingly described in Christopher Browning’s book Ordinary
Men.27 Browning’s key point is that police battalions played a key role in the killing of Jews in
Poland. These police battalions were not manned by highly trained and indoctrinated SS troops
or German Army troops. The reserve police battalions were often manned by males too young or
too old to be in the regular army or even the regular police battalions.28 These police battalions
received full military training but were raw recruits with little or no military experience. In the
case of Browning’s reserve police battalion 101, they were typically middle-aged family men of
working and lower middle-class backgrounds from Hamburg Germany.29 They were sent to
Poland not knowing what to expect and with no idea of, or preparation for, the task of killing
unarmed civilians, elderly and children, male and female. The vast majority of these men,
between 80% and 90%, simply followed orders when asked to murder innocent unarmed
civilians.30
The question becomes, how is it possible that ordinary human beings, from whom we
expect some measure of virtue, could so easily become cold-blooded killers? It is even worse
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than that. The men and women who ran concentration camps not only killed Jews, gypsies,
Russian prisoners of war, and others, but they tormented them, starved them, beat them, and
tortured them.31 Near the end of the war, when it was clear Germany would lose, they took their
prisoners on death marches. They marched men and women barefoot through snow, starving,
with inadequate clothes, sleeping exposed to the elements, and shot them when they could not
keep up. Some of this was done even after orders from Himmler to stop killing the Jews.32 A
variety of explanations are proffered: the heightened antisemitism in Germany, deference to
authority, group conformity, desire to support one’s comrades in a difficult job, and reluctance to
deliver a moral reproach.33 But it seems like ordinary human beings would have sufficient virtue
to see that none of those reasons, or even all of them together, justifies killing a harmless person,
let alone a child, an old woman, or an entire family. There is no reason enough, unless our moral
psychology is flawed to such an extent that we devise rationalizations to overcome moral
inhibitions and instead indulge self-interested desires. Indeed, that is what the recent historical
record seems to indicate. Any society, any group of people, almost any person, can resort to
genocide in the right circumstances.
The point of this brief glimpse of the history of the violence endemic to all human
societies is that virtually all humans are capable of, and willing to perform, violence in certain
circumstances. Fighting, killing, and murder are not limited to certain races, cultures, religions,
nation states, or pathological persons. The human moral psychology is prone to violence, even

31
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New
York: Vintage Books, 1996), 17-19.
32
Ibid., 356.
33
Browning, Ordinary Men, 184-185, 192-193. Daniel Goldhagen disputes the claim that there are multiple
social-psychological factors leading to genocide. He claims that Germany had a uniquely virulent, exterminationist
strain of anti-Semitism that infected all Germans. This made it possible for the vast majority of Germans and
German institutions to willingly and enthusiastically participate in Hitler’s “final solution.”

95

genocide, if it appears advantageous. Individuals who have never participated in a violent or
murderous act may think they would never do so. But the historical record does not support that
conclusion. The historical record indicates that humans caught up in social conditions that make
violent behavior advantageous will engage in it with very rare exceptions. And contra-Aristotle,
it does not matter if a person was brought up in the remote parts of Mongolia or Hamburg,
Germany, she can be induced to murder. Violence is rare for most people, and people can easily
conclude they are not that bad. But this is just a case of moral luck. Violence aside, our behavior
in the temptations of every-day life confirm our commitment to self-interest, despite any
habituation to the contrary.
The Banality of Lying, Cheating, and Stealing
Habituation to the effect that lying, cheating, and stealing are immoral is probably
ubiquitous in our nation, and most nations. That does not seem to deter the vast majority of
people. In a May 2017 Gallup poll, 81% of respondents rated the current moral condition of the
U.S. as fair or poor and 77% (a recent high) said it was getting worse. There are lots of reasons
to think so. The title of David Callahan’s 2004 book, The Cheating Culture, obviously indicates
corruption is a cultural problem, not something limited to a certain segment of society. Many of
his examples undercut Aristotle’s view that habituation enables us to overcome a propensity to
make immoral decisions. Take Henry Blodget for example. Henry was the oldest of three
children who grew up on Manhattan’s Upper East Side. His father was a successful banker and
his mother an elementary school teacher. They sent Henry to an exclusive, elite boarding school,
Phillips Exeter Academy, for his secondary education. Henry was an excellent student and tennis
player and was accepted to Yale where he majored in History. After graduation, he taught
English in Japan and then taught tennis as he worked on a memoir of his experience in Japan. He
96

hoped that would lead to a career in journalism. In 1997 he met his wife to be, an aspiring
teacher, who graduated from Berkeley with a PhD in film studies. They have two daughters.
Henry appears to have a good relationship with his father; at one time they were ranked
nationally as doubles partners in the Super-Senior Father/Son Tournament.
When journalism failed to work out for him, Henry took corporate finance training and
demonstrated a faculty for using technology. He was excellent at financial analysis, especially
using and understanding spreadsheets. He became famous when he predicted that Amazon,
which was then losing money, would see its stock price increase from $240 to $400 per share.
Within one month of that prediction it was selling for over $500. Henry became seen as an
internet oracle, and Merrill Lynch made him a star analyst with a huge reputation on Wall Street
and television. And this is when Henry confronted some very difficult ethical decisions. Merrill
Lynch was not only doing financial advising based on analyzing stocks, it was also deeply
involved with investment banking, underwriting, and the sale of companies. Corporately, Merrill
Lynch had a conflict of interest. It was ethically bound to give objective stock market advice. It
was also facilitating the sale of companies and underwriting the purchase of companies based on
their stock prices. So, Merrill Lynch had a strong interest in companies maintaining their stock
prices, and continuing to sell shares, even when market reality was dictating a declining stock
price. Merrill Lynch employees, like Henry Blodget, were pressured to hype companies and
promote their stocks, even when they knew market forces dictated the opposite.
A clear example of Henry’s ethical dilemma and moral lapse involved the proposed
acquisition of Go2Net by InfoSpace. In 2000, Merrill Lynch was representing Go2Net, which
was hoping to be acquired by InfoSpace. For the sale to succeed, the share price of InfoSpace
needed to remain high. However, InfoSpace was not succeeding, and its share price was
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declining, and Henry Blodget knew it. In his private emails, Henry called InfoSpace a “piece of
junk.”34 Yet, Henry continued to promote InfoSpace to the public. Just one Merrill Lynch
customer, Debases Kanjilal, lost $500,000 on InfoSpace stock when the NASDAQ cratered in
2000, because he held on to the stock based on Merrill Lynch’s and Henry Blodget’s
recommendation.35 Normally, this is just the standard risk of playing the market. But, in this
case, Merrill Lynch and Henry had clearly acted unethically by giving advice they knew to be
inaccurate in order to protect Merrill Lynch’s investment banking interests. Merrill Lynch and
Henry Blodget faced prosecution and settled out of court. Merrill Lynch paid $100,000,000 and
Henry paid $5,000,000.
Henry clearly acted unethically despite what appears to be an excellent Aristotelian
habituation. Henry came from a well-educated and intact family. He was given an elite
education. Henry was a history major, not a business major. Henry did not leave Yale for Wall
Street; he left Yale to teach English in rural Japan. Henry showed no signs of excessive ambition
or greed. Henry’s success in finance made him less vulnerable to corporate pressure. He had a
good salary, a good reputation, and he likely could have insulated himself from the investment
banking side of Merrill Lynch. Yet Henry’s apparent possession of some of the best habituation
our society can provide did not make him virtuous enough to avoid lying to millions of people.
And these were not inconsequential lies. Some people lost hundreds of thousands of dollars,
others lost their retirement savings. Henry lied when it gained him relatively little and cost lots of
other people a tremendous amount. The point here is similar to the point of the book The
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Cheating Culture. David Callahan writes, “there was nothing uniquely immoral about Henry
Blodget.”36 He was faced with significant temptations to cheat and he succumbed. There are
many people who do not tell lies as consequential as those of Henry Blodget. But maybe that is
not because they are not liars, but because they did not face the temptations that Henry Blodget
did.
With respect to moral psychology, the key point that many authors make is that we will
all lie, cheat, or steal in some circumstances. David Callahan is one of many to chronicle the
pervasive lying, cheating, and stealing throughout society. Parents are diagnosis shopping for a
psychiatrist that will say their child has a learning disability so they can get more time on their
SAT. And there are psychiatrists that will do it.37 Lying on resumes is rampant; some estimate
that 50% contain outright falsehoods.38 Doctors accept kickbacks for prescribing drugs.
Professional sports are being corrupted by performance enhancing drugs (several professional
baseball players estimated that at least 50% of their peers were using steroids).39 Numerous
corporations (WorldCom, Enron, Xerox, Merrill Lynch, and Qwest Adelphia) and corporate
auditors (KPMG, Arthur Andersen) are either bankrupt or suffering tremendous losses due to
corruption.40 Retail firms lose $50 - $60 billion per year, mostly due to theft from their own
employees.41 And amidst all the concern over deficit spending and debt, U.S. citizens cheat on
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their income taxes to the tune of almost half a trillion dollars annually.42 Most professors and
students know that plagiarism is a major problem in academia. And there are significant
concerns about the validity of research published in reputable journals. Regardless of where one
falls in the debate over global warming/climate change, there is little doubt that the credibility of
the scientific community has been called into question. The fact is that moral failures are so
ubiquitous that we fail to notice many of them, especially our own. This cannot be explained by
saying the vast majority of citizens in Western society suffer from inadequate habituation. On the
contrary, the vast majority have parents, teachers, coaches, and other mentors that reinforce
ethical norms. Yet self-interest prevails anyway. Perhaps our bondage to self-interest is nowhere
more apparent than in the high failure rate in marriage.
Lack of Love and Commitment
If there is one place you would expect love and virtue to prevail, it would be in the
context of marriage. The West still embraces the ideal of marriage for life. That is what our
upbringing leads us to want and to expect. Most people solemnize marriage with costly weddings
and take public vows, “till death do us part.” If there is any relationship in which love and virtue
should flourish for a lifetime, it is marriage. There are plenty of good reasons to make marriage
work. It is the safest place, physically and psychologically, to enjoy sexual intimacy. It is the best
environment in which to raise children. Those who marry tend to be more social, healthier, better
educated, and have more engaging jobs.43 Finally, those who marry are more satisfied than those
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who remain single.44 As noted earlier, divorce statistics can be very misleading, and the
probability of divorce varies greatly by education level, age at marriage, race and religion. Yet
the data is clear that divorce is increasing and that by the time one hits 60 about 45% of your
generation will have experienced divorce or separation.45 And interestingly, divorce is increasing
most in the age group that Aristotle would likely least have predicted it, among the mature, ages
40 – 60.46 Although the divorce rate for those in their 20s is decreasing, this is not because they
have more stable relationships. Instead, young people are declining to marry, and many
cohabitate as an alternative. This does not lead to union stability, but to more instability. But that
instability does not show up immediately in divorce statistics. It will show up later because
promiscuous individuals and cohabitating couples tend to divorce more.47 The high divorce rate
reflects a significant deficit of virtue and the triumph of unenlightened self-interest.
Divorce is not a moral peccadillo; it is one of the more significant moral failures possible.
A divorce is not simply a failure to keep a mundane legal requirement, like failing to get your
car’s required annual vehicle inspection. Divorce has significant moral implications for all
concerned, especially if there are children involved. Divorce is clearly an emotional and financial
trauma for the couple. Breaking up a relationship that was intended to be permanent is
undesirable and costly. And the divorced individuals have a much higher chance of divorcing
again.48 The impact on children is more severe. Children who experienced divorce typically have

44

Ibid. See 4. Summary and Conclusions.
Sheela Kennedy and Steven Ruggles, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Count: The Rise of Divorce in the United
States, 1980-2010,” Demography 51, no.2 (April 2014), 595, Springer on behalf of the Population Association of
America, http://jstor.org/stable/42920014 (accessed May 18, 2018).
46
Ibid., 594.
47
Ibid., 596.
48
Susan L. Brown & I-Fen Lin. “The Gray Divorce Revolution: Rising Divorce Among Middle-Aged and
Older Adults, 1990-2010,” Journal of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Science 67(6), (9
October 2012): 731, doi:10.1093/geronb/gbs089 (accessed May 18, 2018).
45

101

lower rates of university education and higher rates of unemployment.49 They are less often
married and more often divorced or separated.50 Children of divorce are more likely to smoke
daily and consume alcohol at a hazardous rate.51 These unfavorable traits persist well into
adulthood.52 None of these unfavorable repercussions of divorce is surprising. Divorce is a moral
failure because it harms all persons concerned and society at large. When a couple cannot make
it work, at least one person, and likely two, has failed somewhere along the line to behave
virtuously. But, just as in the other sections of this chapter, it is not clear that all those still in
their first marriage occupy the moral high ground. Marriages stay together for a variety of
reasons, many of which have nothing to do with the virtue of the participants. Marriages that are
unhappy and dysfunctional stay together with many of the same repercussions as divorces. Some
marriages succeed for cultural, religious, or educational reasons that have nothing to do with the
virtue of the participants. Many of us are just plain lucky with respect to marriage. We could just
as easily have married someone whose behavior would have overstressed whatever virtues we
had, resulting in divorce. It is just not clear that many people are virtuous enough to avoid or
withstand the circumstances that lead many to divorce. If more than 40% of people cannot make
marriage work, than there is good reason to believe that human nature is indeed flawed. The
virtue deficit becomes even more apparent when we consider the absolute scarcity of selfsacrifice.
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Inability to Sacrifice Self
One of the most admired features of virtue is self-sacrifice, but few people can do it. For
Kant and Mill, self-sacrifice was a necessary ingredient for virtue. Kant thought virtue required
sacrificing one’s own interests in order to fulfill a moral duty. Mill thought virtue required
sacrificing one’s own interest for the sake of the interest of all concerned, the greatest good for
the greatest number. Even Aristotle acknowledged that “enlightened” self-interest included
rejecting many selfish inclinations. Possibly one of the best indications of virtue in this regard is
how an individual handles their time and money. It is one thing to express concern for the poor
or needy, and it is quite another to give one’s time and/or money to alleviate that need. The
United States is in several measures the wealthiest country on the globe. The poor in the U.S.
enjoy a standard of living that most people in the world consider middle or upper class.
Correspondingly, the middle and upper class in the U.S. enjoy a standard of living that is simply
out of reach for the vast majority of the world’s population. Under those conditions, one might
expect there to be a host of virtuous citizens in the U.S. that donate a significant percentage of
their time and income to charitable causes. By the world’s standard, citizens of the U.S. are quite
generous.53 But the world’s standard is a very low bar.54
The fact is that Americans are not all that generous. It is hard to make the case that for the
wealthiest people on the planet to give a penny or two on the dollar to charity is self-sacrificing.
For many years, average individual giving as a share of disposable personal income has held
pretty steady around 2%.55 That takes into account a significant share of Americans that give
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little or nothing and those few who give a lot. Some of those who do give may give a percent or
two more than 2%. The share of Americans who give 10% of their income or more is likely 5%
or less.56 But, if you took them out of the equation, average giving goes from around 2% down to
about 1%.57 The point being that of those Americans who give, the vast majority give 2% or less
of their income to charitable causes.58 This has led some to postulate the “small world”
hypothesis that a large portion of prosocial behavior is due to a small proportion of the
population. One study found that 9% of Canadian adults account for 80% of volunteering and
18% of Canadians account for 80% of all charitable gifts.59 A similar phenomenon holds true for
the U.S.60 Now someone may say, Americans and Canadians give a portion of their income to
the needy through their taxes. True. But let’s remember that taxes are not voluntary; Americans
complain about taxes; Americans minimize their taxes; and a lot of Americans cheat on their
taxes. Self-sacrifice is what we do voluntarily, because we want to help somebody else. Most of
us pay taxes because it is a legal obligation, and we expect some benefits as a result.
Since an important aspect of virtue is one’s willingness to voluntarily sacrifice for
others, it becomes clear that the U.S., and all other countries, are remarkably short on virtue.
Statistics that have remained fairly steady for decades indicate that the vast majority of citizens
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of the U.S., and most wealthy nations, give very little to charitable causes.61 Certainly, some give
a nominal amount, and some small number give a significant amount. But the number who give
sacrificially is a very small percentage of the population. In many cases, those who give are
incredibly wealthy; it is not clear they are making a sacrifice. After all, giving 10% of your
income when you make less than $50,000 a year is very different from giving 10% when you
make $5,000,000 annually. The amount of your income which might be considered “disposable”
is very different. We have to remember that virtue consists in why people give, and how much
they really want to give. Some people give for selfish motives, and some give because of social
pressures. It is impossible to know what motivates a person, so there is no point in making
judgments about those who give. But if some people do give significant amounts for the wrong
reasons, then the number of virtuous people out there is indeed very small. Of course, Aristotle
did not think self-sacrifice and helping the poor was a virtue. But Western society, influenced by
Christianity, has long thought self-sacrifice and helping the poor was an important part of virtue.
We live in a society where people like Mother Teresa are heroines. Americans chose Mother
Teresa as the most admired person of the 20th century.62 Self-sacrifice is a virtue that is strongly
encouraged in Western society. Yet, passing on this virtue through habituation seems to be very
ineffective. Habituation has not put much of a dent in our pervasive self-interest.
This second criticism has noticed the lack of virtue in various important areas: human
tendencies to violence (war and genocide); the ubiquity of lying, cheating, and stealing; the
inability to make marriage work; and the absolute rarity of self-sacrifice. These represent a very
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important, but small sample. Imagine the statistics on alcohol abuse, drug abuse, pornography,
pedophilia, the sex trade, persecution of various minorities, etc. Certainly, some of this is due to
poor habituation. But all societies deplore most, if not all, of the aforementioned vices, and
attempt to habituate their youth to avoid them. Aristotelians cannot plausibly claim either that no
one gets proper habituation, or that those that who do are typically virtuous. Lack of virtue is
simply too pervasive. If some elite group of well habituated, virtuous people were out there, we
would all know about them. No, the historical record is very clear. Human beings routinely resort
to immoral means to procure their desires. The appearance of virtue is more often than not, the
result of moral luck. Put any person in very tempting circumstances, like those of Henry Blodget
or the men of the 101st Reserve Police Battalion, and they will likely fail morally. That is not
only the historical record, but it appears to be the findings of contemporary social science as
well.
Social Science Struggles to Find Virtue
The findings of social science have led many to conclude that Aristotelian character traits
(virtues) rarely, if ever, exist.63 Numerous social science experiments seem to indicate that
circumstances are far superior predictors of behavior than expected character traits.64 One classic
example tested people’s response to a young woman in a mall who drops a folder full of papers
directly in their path as they emerge from a phone booth.65 This test was conducted in a busy
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suburban shopping mall. In each case, the young woman, the paper dropper, was an experiment
assistant. The callers were random people. The variable was that some callers would find a dime
in the coin return slot of the phone booth and other callers would not. The experiment was
designed to see the impact of finding a dime on whether the caller emerging from the phone
booth would help the woman pick up her papers. The results were startling.
Helped
Found dime
Did not find dime

Did Not Help

14

2

1

2466

Simply finding a dime made a tremendous difference in whether or not people decided to help
the young woman. If helping another person is the product of a virtuous character, then finding a
dime should not have an impact on whether one helps or not. But if most people do not have a
developed character trait for helping (or any other virtue), then circumstances will determine
what a person does. It appears here that circumstances did dictate the outcome, and finding a
dime made people feel “good” and thus helpful. This simple experiment is just one of a
multitude that many social scientists look at as they attempt to verify character traits and virtue.
This work has been going on for decades, and some have concluded that “there is a large body of
experimental evidence which is incompatible with the widespread possession of folk moral
virtues and vices.”67 Situationists, like Gilbert Harman, think “there is no evidence that people
differ in character traits. [Instead] they differ in their situations and in their perceptions of their
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situations.”68 A slightly different perspective is held by philosopher Christian Miller. He thinks
people have “Mixed Traits.”69 These traits are not consistent enough to allow attribution of
virtues or vices. He claims that “most people have a variety of Mixed Traits as part of their
character and not a variety of virtues or vices.”70 Miller, like Doris and Harman, is compelled by
the empirical evidence to deny that most people are virtuous. Yet, he thinks it makes sense to
talk about character and to cultivate a better character.71 My point is not to debate this issue, but
simply to note that virtue is so rare that numerous social scientists and philosophers have
concluded that virtues and vices, for all practical purposes, do not exist. Despite this dim view of
our moral psychology, social science reveals some interesting facts about us.
Social Science and Virtue
Social science is extensively examining moral behavior and has identified numerous
significant features of human moral psychology. Here are four of them with implications for
virtue. First, and perhaps the most important finding, is that everyone wants to be virtuous. This
feature of our moral psychology indicates that we are moral creatures and our virtue is very
important to us.72 The vast majority of people operate under moral constraints, not just purely
cost/benefit calculations. We care about our public reputation and our own self-image.
Experiments indicate that even when we can lie or cheat with impunity, we will likely lie and/or
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cheat to some extent, but few do so flagrantly.73 People constrain their lying and cheating,
because they cannot justify flagrant immorality and maintain a healthy self-image.
This leads to a paradox, because while everyone wants to be moral, the second finding is
that immoral behavior is ubiquitous.74 As noted previously, there is plenty of immoral behavior
being committed by almost everybody. And do not be fooled by those who appear to be moral.
We are all experts at hiding both our indiscretions and our motives. As we learned earlier, all of
us are prone to behave very differently under different circumstances. It is easy to condemn a
Tiger Woods or a Mickey Weinstein, but there are a lot of men out there who would do the same
given the same circumstances and opportunities. So how can that happen if everyone is so
concerned about their public image and self-image?
The third important finding of social science is our ability to rationalize our behavior and
burnish our self-image.75 Since lying, cheating, and stealing are common, yet everyone wants to
be moral, the trick is to justify, deny, or explain whatever lying, cheating, or stealing we do such
that we maintain our moral self-image. Amazingly, “people can continue to feel honest, even
when lying a lot, as long as they have a justification for their unethical acts.”76 This has led to the
discovery of numerous strategies for justifying immoral behavior: describing actions
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ambiguously, self-serving altruism, moral licensing,77 and self-deception.78 To take just one
example of self-deception, consider the case of Lance Armstrong.
Lance Armstrong was a superstar professional cyclist who won the Tour de France seven
consecutive times from 1999-2005. Despite very numerous public claims of his integrity,
Armstrong was banned from all sanctioned Olympic sports for life in 2012 for numerous
offenses regarding performance enhancing drugs. He likely viewed his actions as not cheating,
since it was widely known that the overwhelming majority of cyclists were doing the same
thing.79 However, that does not change the fact that he was cheating and that his cheating led to a
host of other immoral actions. He violated his contract with the U.S. Postal Service. He coerced
his teammates, doctors, and support staff to cheat and facilitate his cheating. He lied to the world
very publicly and boasted about his “innocence.” He berated, and harmed the careers, of those
who got in his way. His desire to succeed in a sport that had a culture of cheating led him down a
very ugly and immoral path.
Armstrong was likely able to justify this wicked behavior by deceiving himself. He likely
told himself that he was justified in his actions because of what everyone else was doing. The
important thing to note here is not how bad Lance Armstrong was. It is not clear he was any
worse than the vast majority of other cyclists. He was simply the most notorious, because of his
amazing success. Apparently, it was the rare, and consequently unsuccessful, cyclist that did not
cheat. The vast majority of people in like circumstances to Lance Armstrong did just what he
did; they just were not as good at it. For most of his career Lance Armstrong was a cheater, yet
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he cultivated an image of an honest, hard-working athlete. He was lying to us and to himself, a
common mistake.
Another aspect of rationalizing our behavior and burnishing our self-mage is that we
come to believe our own rationalizations. Numerous studies indicate that “a substantial majority
of individuals believe themselves to be morally superior to the average person.”80 Although selfenhancement is a common phenomenon, the magnitude of self-enhancement is greatest in the
moral realm.81 Interestingly, this generous self-assessment does not extend to others. Although
most of us think we are a paragon of virtue, we do not think other people are as virtuous.82 That
makes our self-enhancement all the more irrational. On the one hand, we have a low view of the
virtue of others, yet on the other hand, we view ourselves as an exception to that judgement.
Typically, when we do not know another person well, we project on them our own
characteristics. Thus, since we have a very high opinion of our own morality, barring other
information, we should assume others are just as virtuous. But we do not. Instead, we maintain a
high opinion of ourselves and expect much less from others. In practice, this makes sense since
there is some risk in trusting the wrong person. However, when responding to a survey it does
not make sense, since one would normally project onto others one’s own traits. In fact, that is
what we do in areas like agency and sociability.83 But in the moral realm, we irrationally assume
our own moral superiority. This illusion of moral superiority leads to significant errors in
judgement.
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Burnishing our self-image leads us to overestimate our ability to be virtuous in tempting
circumstances. Overestimating our own virtue is why we tend to think what happened in Nazi
Germany could not happen in our society. But there are numerous studies out there that indicate
we do not have the moral strength we imagine. The famous Milgram experiment is often thought
to demonstrate that what happened in Nazi Germany could happen anywhere.84 The experiment
tested a person’s willingness to administer electric shocks to another person as part of study on
learning and memory. The person delivering the shock was told that the shocks would increase in
intensity and become extremely painful, but not cause permanent damage. The shocks increased
in voltage from 15 to 450 volts by pulling one of 30 levers. The last three groups of levers were
labelled: Extreme Intensity Shock; Danger: Severe Shock; and XXX. In reality, the person
receiving the shock was acting when showing signs of extreme distress and subsequent
unresponsiveness. The point of the experiment was to see when a person’s moral commitment to
refrain from inflicting suffering on a helpless, non-threatening person would lead them to
disobey the instructions of the researcher. Most people exposed to the Milgram experiment
predict disobedience pretty early on.
The Milgram experiment starkly illustrates the disconnect between our moral predictions
and our actual moral behavior. Prior to the experiment, 14 seniors in the Yale psychology major
were polled on what they expected the results to be. These students predicted that only 3% of the
subjects would continue to administer shocks after reaching 195 volts, Very Strong Shock. In
fact, every subject persisted to at least 300 volts, Intense Shock. And 65% persisted all the way
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to 450 volts, XXX.85 Milgram also queried 110 respondents (Psychiatrists, College Students, and
Middle Class Adults) as to how they thought they would respond to the experiment. Their
predictions are shown in the following table.
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experiment with results from 0 – 92.5%. But the results typically supported his conclusions.
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Predicted Responses to the Demand to Shock “Learners”
Shock

Description & Voltage

Psychiatrists

College Students

Middle-Class

Level
1
2
3
4

Level
Slight
Shock
15
30
45
60
Moderate Shock
75
90
105
120
Strong Shock
135
150
165
180
Very Strong Shock
195
210
225
240
Intense Shock
255
270
285
300
Extreme
Intensity

(39)
2
1

(31)

Adults
3 (40)

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

315
Shock
330
345
360
Danger: Severe
25
375
Shock
26
390
27
405
28
420
XXX
29
435
30
450
Mean maximum shock level
Percentage Predicting Defiance

1
1

1
6
1
4
4

4
3
1

7
1
1
3

1
14

3
12
1
6

2
9
2
3

2
2

1
1
1
1
1

1

3

21
22
23
24

8.2
100%
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9.35
100%

9.15
100%

The five respondents (2 Psychiatrists and 3 Middle-Class Adults) in the Slight Shock row
actually predicted they would decline to give any shocks. Only 25 respondents said they would
give shocks over 150 volts. All respondents predicted they would disobey instructions to give
shocks above 300 volts.86 But these predictions greatly overestimated the moral resolve of people
participating in the experiment.
As previously stated, 65% of participants persisted to 450 volts despite moral doubts. In
the baseline experiment #1 every single participant (40 participants) went to 300 volts.87 Subjects
persisted through extreme nervousness and stress: sweating, trembling, biting their lips, and
groaning. The difference between what we predict we will do, and what we actually do, is stark
and shocking. The most surprising result of this experiment is the “sheer strength of obedient
tendencies” exhibited by the subjects.88 The obedience persisted despite obvious moral qualms.
People are typically highly obedient to authority of any kind, even when it is morally
problematic. That is why many conclude from the Milgram experiment that what happened in
Nazi Germany is possible elsewhere in relevantly similar circumstances. Despite our lofty
estimation of our own virtue, social science experiments indicate that we are quite easily
convinced to violate our moral standards.
Another experiment found similar results when testing our willpower regarding sexual
temptation. This experiment asked participants (all male) a variety of questions in three areas:
how appealing they found various sexual activities (for example sex with a minor); their
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willingness to engage in morally questionable activities to obtain sexual gratification (for
example slipping their date a drug); and their willingness to engage in unsafe sex (for example
lack of any birth control).89 The questions were initially asked in a benign, clinical environment.
The respondents were asked again, much later, under conditions that were both private and under
sexual arousal (stimulated by pornography). The results were significant, although not totally
surprising. When highly sexually aroused, respondents made very different choices. People who
initially expressed a commitment to safe sex abandoned that commitment when sexually
aroused. When aroused, moral commitments to respecting a date’s “no” response often
evaporated, as did the conviction to not using excess alcohol or drugs to persuade a date. But the
most significant result was that “people seem to have only limited insight into the impact of
sexual arousal on their judgments and behavior.”90 Although this experiment was limited to men,
it reinforces the finding that we tend to overestimate our virtue. We think we are virtuous, i.e.
that we have the willpower to live up to our moral commitments. But when faced with
circumstances that include internal or external pressures to violate those moral commitments, we
crumble fairly easily. Not only do we overestimate our virtue, but we underestimate the
significance of our moral failings.
The fourth finding of social science is that what we consider peccadillos are in reality of
great consequence. It is not the few bad apples that withhold tens of thousands of dollars from
the IRS that harm our nation so much, it is the hundreds of thousands of people cheating the IRS
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InterScience www.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1002/bdm.501 (accessed December 2, 2017). The subsequent
description of the experiment and its findings come from this article.
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out of a few hundred dollars each.91 Widespread minor cheating not only adds up to more money
lost, but creates a culture of cheating. We see this same phenomena in insurance fraud ($24
billion annually)92 and in employee theft ($600 billion annually).93 Those “small” ethical lapses
result in major implications for society. It is the same with performance enhancing drugs in
sports. Just a handful of cheaters is bad, but when players think everyone is cheating, it creates a
culture in which cheating seems OK and necessary to be competitive. What Lance Armstrong
experienced in professional cycling now seems to be taking over professional baseball. The
common “small” ethical indiscretions can ruin a person’s life and can damage an entire
enterprise (sport, business, tax policy, etc.).
Social science seems to confirm the following four findings: 1) everyone wants to be
virtuous, but 2) immoral behavior is ubiquitous, which leads to, 3) people routinely rationalize
immoral behavior and burnish their self-image, and finally, 4) we fail to see that “small”
indiscretions have large impact. Social scientists have no problem discovering that we are moral
creatures. We want desperately to be moral and go through significant mental effort to maintain a
healthy self-image and reputation. But social scientists just do not find much evidence of reliable
virtuous conduct. The power of circumstances to bring out our self-interest is amazingly
ubiquitous and effective. And it is not clear that habituation overcomes it. Regardless of one’s
upbringing, education, and training, self-interest preempts moral obligation in the right
circumstances. This fact again raises the issue of moral luck.
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Moral Luck
To a significant extent, one’s assessed virtue is dependent simply on the circumstances of
life. How would my life have been different if instead of being a member of the U.S. military, I
had been an officer in the German military of World War II? That is hard to answer, but
contemporary research suggests I would have done just what most members of the German
military did. I disagree with authors like Thomas Nagel and Robert Hartman who think the
German citizens of the World War II era were uniquely evil as compared to citizens of other
countries.94 Of course, they did vastly more immoral deeds when they participated in the
Holocaust. But this was likely the result of circumstantial bad luck. It is not obvious that many,
or even most, citizens of other countries would not have done the same in those circumstances.
To the extent citizens of other countries would have done the same in those circumstances,
indicates that they were not more virtuous, just morally lucky. The citizens and soldiers of
Germany deserve the judgement they received. But contemplating the impact of circumstances
should make us humble about assessing ourselves as more virtuous.
Moral luck is important because to a significant extent, many of us maintain a moral selfimage or a moral reputation not because we are virtuous, but due to moral luck. Many who
appear to be virtuous have simply been lucky to have a good upbringing, good circumstances,
and little temptation. Had those circumstances been different, their behavior might have become

Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 50
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and also confuse legal accountability with moral assessment. Most people perceive the Germans of World War II to
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very immoral. Social science has produced a significant amount of data that suggests few people
are virtuous enough to withstand very tempting circumstances. Moral luck should not lead to
skepticism about morality and virtue. It should make us skeptical of our own virtue. For
individuals and society to flourish requires virtue. What we learn from moral luck is how frail we
are and how vulnerable we are to yield to self-interest. The paradoxes of moral luck should make
us even more wary of proclaiming our own virtue or anyone else’s.
Analysis of the Human Moral Track Record
The historical record and social science undermine Aristotle’s claim that virtue is
achievable with good habituation. Aristotle acknowledges that habituation cannot change human
nature, including our moral psychology. It looks like the human moral psychology includes a
preference for self-interest over moral obligation, thus humans are prone to immoral behavior.
Around the world, habituation, is the primary means of instilling virtue. No culture is busy
raising liars, cheaters, cowards, murderers, gluttons and fornicators. Yet despite efforts in all
societies to instill virtue, there is good reason to be skeptical about the possibility of achieving
virtue. Sure, there are plenty of people who perform good deeds. Larissa MacFarquhar chronicles
the stories of many of them in her book, Strangers Drowning.95 But in practically every case, it is
clear the very people doing amazing good deeds are often very dysfunctional and immoral in
other areas. They are not virtuous. Sure, there are plenty of people who appear to live decent
lives. But, do they consistently do the right thing, for the right reason, because they want to,
based on a firmly established desire to seek the good? Would the people who appear to be moral,
really persist in virtue under very tempting circumstances? Considering the examples of Henry
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Blodget, Lance Armstrong, and the men in the 101st Reserve Police Battalion, it seems more
likely that the vast majority of us would crumble if our purported virtue were really tested. If
there really are a number of virtuous people out there, how do we explain the condition of the
modern world, especially the culture of Western society: war, poverty, religious persecution,
corruption, human trafficking, suicide, preventable diseases, crime, family dysfunction, evil
regimes (Venezuela, North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, etc.), child abuse, pornography, lying,
cheating, etc.? Even people who have avoided the obvious vices are not immune to more subtle
ones. As illustrated by the statistics on giving of time and money, we know that the wealthiest
populations in human history are making relatively insignificant efforts to help those in need, to
include people in their very own communities. If virtue exists, and I believe it does, it appears to
be rare, and even then, it is to a greater or lesser degree frail and inconsistent.96 It is not clear that
the few that are virtuous are so mainly because of good habituation. It looks like Aristotle’s
process for becoming virtuous is inadequate. It remains to consider what needs to happen for
virtue to be possible.
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CHAPTER 6

MORAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF VIRTUE
But God commands some things which we cannot do, in order that we may know
what we ought to ask of Him.1 Augustine
Is virtue possible? And if so, how? Aristotle insists it is and that habituation and practical
wisdom are the key. I have offered reasons to think that virtue is rare, and that habituation is
inadequate. Aristotle would likely agree that virtue is rare. But his theory would lead us to
believe that it is much more attainable than it appears. This chapter defends my claim that virtue,
while rare, is possible. But it also explores how that is so given the inadequacy of habituation. If
our moral psychology is flawed in a way that habituation cannot overcome, how is virtue
possible? Aristotle fails to address the possibility of God accomplishing a moral transformation.
Aristotle did not think God really acted in human matters, so he would not have considered that
option. Apparently, he had not witnessed a “barbarian” being radically changed and becoming
virtuous. Such transformation testimonies are common today, which indicates that moral
transformation is possible, as is virtue. This chapter will chronicle the lives of four very famous
people who experienced a spiritual and moral transformation. They will illustrate the problems
with Aristotle’s theory of habituation and reveal the important role of a moral transformation. Of
course, the claim that these four are virtuous people is debatable. The difficulties of defending
that claim are discussed next.
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Why Virtue is Rare and Hard to Verify
Virtue is rare because we are morally flawed, and it is not clear that habituation can
remedy that. Virtue is hard to verify for three reasons: one, no one is perfect; two, motives are
hard to discern; and three, because what counts as virtue is controversial. When one tries to
identify a virtuous person, you realize how rare they are and how difficult it is to “prove” they
qualify. There is only one Jesus, everyone else makes moral mistakes. So, to begin we must
accept human imperfection. The reality is that even a virtuous person had, and likely has, moral
imperfections. For a virtuous person those are likely few and far between, but they still exist. So,
the four individuals highlighted in this chapter are not perfect. What commends them is that they
all eventually chose a life of service to others; they appear to have overcome self-interest. They
also became persons who appeared able to love family, friends, and others. Whatever moral
flaws they had seemed overcome for the most part. That is a good start, but what about their
motives?
Since motives are almost impossible to discern, it takes a long, consistent track record to
have any confidence about motives. Aristotle, and others, thought that virtue consisted of doing
the right thing, for the right reason, because one desired the right outcome. Most people are
careful to conceal selfish motives because they harms one’s reputation. This makes it extremely
difficult to know whether a person is acting based on the appropriate motivations and feelings.
Aristotle thought that virtue was only possible for the mature, probably someone in their late 30s
or 40s. It is only then that we can tell if a person is consistent over the long term. Three of the
four people highlighted in this chapter are historical persons. It is a matter of public record that
they stayed true to their standards. Larissa MacFarquhar identifies several very dedicated,
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idealist, people in her book Strangers Drowning.2 One very impressive couple is Julia Wise and
Jeff Kaufman. Here is a young couple who have given away nearly 50%, anywhere from
$68,000 to $168,000, of their income for 6 years.3 They are committed to making the world a
better place and they are very intentional about giving to charities they believe will do that. Some
of the ones they recommend are the: Against Malaria Foundation; Effective Altruism
Community Fund; and the Schistosomiasis Control Initiative.4 Wise and Kaufman seem like
virtuous people, but we know relatively little about them, and they are quite young. Are their
characters stable and mature? Will their marriage last? Do they live by all the virtues? Will their
current conduct last? When one attempts to identify a virtuous person, it becomes clear that it is
very difficult to know. What we can know is that there are very impressive people out there
doing amazingly virtuous things. But we would have to know a lot more, maybe know them very
closely, probably personally, for some time before we could have much confidence in their
virtue. Even then, my judgement of that might be very different from yours.
The third problem with identifying a virtuous person is that standards of virtue differ. It is
interesting that Mother Teresa, despite being the 20th century’s most admired person, had
detractors. Several academics from Canada criticized her for what they claimed were "her rather
dubious way of caring for the sick, her questionable political contacts, her suspicious
management of the enormous sums of money she received, and her overly dogmatic views
regarding, in particular, abortion, contraception, and divorce."5 In fact, Western society is
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tremendously conflicted about moral-character training due to the tremendous confusion about
moral norms. The book Can Virtue Be Taught? edited by Barbara Darling-Smith is a classic
example. Here we have the collected wisdom of numerous respected philosophers who attempt,
but fail, to be optimistic about moral education.6 Virtually all of them think virtue is real,
attainable (they seem to think they have it), and can be taught, to some degree. Yet there is no
consensus on how this might be possible and they express skepticism of the idea that any real
content to virtue can be taught in the public realm.7 The book is a perfect illustration of the fact
that Western society has no consensus about how to inculcate virtue.8 So you might not agree
that the four people I have chosen are examples of people who became virtuous as a result of a
moral transformation. But I think their record demonstrates that something quite powerful
happened to them and the result was a life of consistent public service. That is a credible
testimony. Before considering the four, a few words about a supernatural moral transformation.
Why a Supernatural Transformation?
If our moral psychology is inherently flawed, then a supernatural intervention is
essential.9 If people, by nature, care more about self-interest than about moral obligations, then
no amount of moral training (habituation) can change that fact. If virtue requires some measure
of self-sacrifice, and such self-sacrifice is against our nature, then virtue is impossible. The claim
that virtue requires us to do things that we are by nature unable to do is not a preposterous
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claim.10 Anselm and Duns Scotus develop this claim in a simple and clear way. They assert that
the human will has two inclinations: an affection for justice and an affection for advantage.11
Humans have an affection for doing what is good and what is right, the affection for justice. This
is what makes us desire to do something that is good for someone other than ourselves.12
Humans also have an affection for happiness, the desire to get what pleases them, the affection
for advantage. This is what drives us to do only those things that benefit us.13 These affections
reside in the human will. They imply a free will because we are not necessarily bound to do one
or the other.14 Ideally, the affection for justice would prevail over the affection for advantage.
This is what Anselm and Duns Scotus thought prevailed prior to the Fall of mankind. Anselm
describes it as man preserving his “rectitude,” the ability to “will what God wills,” i.e. the good
and just.15 Sadly, after the Fall, we lost our rectitude. We no longer have the power to follow the
affection for justice reliably. That does not mean that we never do good/right actions. It simply
means we do them when we think it is to our advantage to do them. Since it is often the case that
‘honesty is the best policy’ and keeping social mores is good for our reputation, we will often do
good things. But we will not do them when they are clearly to our disadvantage. This problem is
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severe because once the priority of justice is lost, we do not have the power in ourselves to
restore it.16 Once it is decided that advantage preempts justice, the affection for advantage has no
affection in the will to put justice back in its place of priority. Rectitude, the ability of the
affection for justice to preempt the affection for advantage, can only be restored by God. 17
Although this description of human moral psychology comes from a Christian perspective, one
does not have to be a Christian, or believe the Bible, to see that this seems to be a very accurate
picture of human nature.
The history and social science previously reviewed align nicely with this view of human
moral psychology. All humans strive to maintain a moral reputation and self-image. And people
do good things to the extent it pleases them and allows them to maintain this self-image. The
motivation for this stems from the fact that they have an affection for justice. We have a
conscience; we recognize the good and right and have a desire to do it. However, as
demonstrated in the previous chapter, our affection for justice is often preempted by our
affection for advantage. Given the appropriate amount of temptation, the vast majority of us will
choose advantage over justice. And habituation does not change this fact. That is why Aristotle’s
moral psychology is flawed. Aristotle made two mistakes. One, he underestimated our
commitment to self-interest (affection for advantage) and overestimated the power of habituation
to overcome it. Two, he failed to take into account the role of God in restoring our “rectitude”
(our ability to choose justice over advantage). There is ample evidence that God enables us to
overcome the affection for advantage and thus progress towards virtue. Of course, it is

16
Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (New York: Oxford
University Press Inc., 1998), 188.
17
Ibid.

126

controversial to offer examples of moral transformation and virtue, but history is replete with
them and the following four are particularly well documented.
The Most Famous Transformation - Paul
The Apostle Paul provides perhaps the most famous moral transformation example in
history and also provides a challenge to Aristotle’s claims about habituation. Paul likely had an
upbringing that meets Aristotle’s standard for a good habituation. Paul’s Jewish name was Saul,
possibly after the most famous member of the tribe of Benjamin, King Saul. He was probably
born around 1 A.D. in the city of Tarsus in a province then called Cilicia located in what is now
Turkey. Saul’s family was part of the Jewish diaspora living among a non-Jewish population
(Gentiles). Saul was raised by a strict Jewish household that belonged to a sect called Pharisees.
The Pharisees were fervent about Jewish nationalism and lived in strict obedience to the Law of
Moses. Saul was certainly circumcised on the eighth day after his birth, likely associated mostly
with other orthodox Jews, and was well-educated, especially in the Jewish scriptures. We know
this because Saul’s family were also Roman citizens. They were probably Roman citizens
because they were prominent, wealthy residents of Tarsus. Saul’s father was likely a master
tentmaker because that was the trade Saul also practiced. This wealthy, working, background
accounts for Saul’s excellent education, work ethic, and practical insight.
Saul was not only offered an outstanding education, but he excelled in it. He spoke both
Aramaic (a derivative of Hebrew), Greek, and some Latin.18 His synagogue taught him the
Hebrew texts, and he learned to copy the scriptures perfectly onto his own scrolls. His father
probably presented him with his own copy of the Greek translation of the Old Testament (the
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Septuagint) since the readings in the synagogue were offered in the language of the culture
(Greek). By his thirteenth birthday, Saul had mastered the Jewish scriptures and was ready for
advanced education. Apparently, his father sent him to Jerusalem where Saul was instructed by
the prominent rabbi Gamaliel. Saul was at the top of his class and soon became a member of the
Sanhedrin. Being a member of the Sanhedrin was about as high as one could go in Jewish
society. Members were the equivalent of judges, senators, and spiritual masters.19 The Sanhedrin
was supreme in all religious matters and in what self-government the Romans permitted of the
Jews.20 This was instrumental in Saul’s future since as a representative of the Sanhedrin he
would spearhead the persecution of the new Jewish sect called Christians.
Saul’s upbringing is probably about as close as one could come in that day to what
Aristotle would call good habituation. Saul was raised in an intact family, a home, a community,
and a school dedicated to the highest order of moral, social, religious, and political behavior.
This was a very structured environment that ensured only the best that society had to offer to
Saul, and he embraced it with a whole heart. He excelled in every aspect of the requirements
placed upon him. Saul says of himself, “If anyone else has a mind to put confidence in the flesh,
I far more: circumcised the eighth day, of the nation of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew
of Hebrews; as to the Law, a Pharisee; as to zeal, a persecutor of the church; as to the
righteousness, which is in the Law, found blameless.”21 Saul’s credentials were impressive.
Admittance at a young age to the Sanhedrin typically required an impeccable educational,
religious, and social resume, including marriage. Saul had it all. But zeal for these things
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overcame his compassion for his fellow Jews. Saul says of himself, “I used to persecute the
church of God beyond measure, and tried to destroy it; and I was advancing in Judaism beyond
many of my contemporaries among my countrymen, being more extremely zealous for my
ancestral traditions.”22
Saul was outraged by the “blasphemy” of the Christians and dedicated himself to their
destruction even if that meant jailing them, torturing them, or killing them. The historian Luke
tells us that at the stoning of the first Christian martyr (Stephen) the executioners “laid aside their
robes at the feet of a young man named Saul.”23 And, “Saul was in hearty agreement with putting
him to death.”24 Luke goes on to say that “Saul began ravaging the church, entering house after
house; and dragging off men and women, he would put them in prison.”25 Later, in Luke’s record
of Saul’s defense before King Agrippa, he will quote Saul saying, “not only did I lock up many
of the saints in prisons, having received authority from the chief priests, but also when they were
being put to death I cast my vote against them. And as I punished them often in all the
synagogues, I tried to force them to blaspheme; and being furiously enraged at them, I kept
pursuing them even to foreign cities.” Attempting to force Christians to blaspheme probably
included having them flogged, receiving the forty stripes save one. Or, Saul may have had them
beaten with rods. These were incredibly painful and shameful punishments, usually reserved for
hardened criminals. In any case, he was quite willing to exact very cruel treatment of both men
and women. The people he was treating so cruelly were usually fellow Jews whose only crime
was believing in Jesus. For the most part, these were otherwise observant Jews. As is typical of
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all of us, Saul rationalized his behavior as being not just acceptable, but morally praiseworthy.
He surely considered himself a virtuous man.
On his way to Damascus to arrest more Christians, Saul discovers that he is not a virtuous
man but, in his own words, is instead the chief of all sinners.26 According to Luke’s account,
Jesus appeared to Saul and spoke to him saying, “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?”27
Subsequently Saul believes in Jesus, is filled with the Holy Spirit, and is baptized. This radically
transforms Saul into Paul who is to become an Apostle. It is after this radical transformation that
Paul is able to recognize that he was a blasphemer, a persecutor, and a violent aggressor.28 Paul’s
transformation is indeed miraculous. It is not just miraculous because of his encounter with
Jesus, but because of the radical change in his beliefs, his occupation, his speech, and his
conduct. His whole life is changed! Instead of defending Judaism against the blasphemous
Christians, he becomes the most prolific promoter of Christianity. Instead of flogging and
imprisoning Christians, he is beaten numerous times, flogged (5 times), stoned, and imprisoned
for spreading Christianity. Paul proceeds to become the largest contributor to the New Testament
(14 books out of 27).29 He makes three major missionary journeys establishing numerous
churches in Asia and Europe.
In addition to his altered priorities, Paul has an altered attitude. He is not motivated by
pride or anger. Instead, he is motivated by love for God and for people. Paul’s writings indicate
his devotion to the people he ministered to; they do not reflect anger or pride. He was
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unconcerned about his own welfare or status and was instead willing to suffer anything on behalf
of Jesus and on behalf of the church. Paul writes, “but whatever things were gain to me, those
things I have counted as loss for the sake of Christ. More than that, I count all things to be loss in
view of the surpassing value of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whom I have suffered the loss
of all things, and count them but rubbish in order that I may gain Christ.”30 Not only does Paul
love those who become Christians, but he loves the Jews who now hate him. He says of them, “I
have great sorrow and unceasing grief in my heart. For I could wish that I myself were accursed,
separated from Christ for the sake of my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh, who are
Israelites.”31 These are the words of a man who has had a life altering transformation. How does
one explain the transformation of a self-aggrandizing, Christian hating, 30-year-old Jewish
zealot, into the seemingly virtuous Apostle Paul?
Paul, Virtue, and Habituation
Paul illustrates a challenge to Aristotle’s view of virtue and the role of habituation. On
Aristotle’s account, Saul should have been a virtuous man. From a first century orthodox Jewish
perspective, perhaps Saul was a virtuous man. There were no objections to the Mosaic moral
code. But the treatment of Christians by the Jews was probably morally problematic, even by
first century standards. Luke’s account of the trial of Stephen indicates that it ended in mob
action, not an orderly verdict and sentencing. The torturing of men and women to get them to
reject Jesus is not something sanctioned by the Mosaic Law. As Paul reflects on these things
after his transformation, he is convinced that he was a violent blasphemer. Yet from Aristotle’s
perspective, Saul was perhaps a classic example of good habituation and a man of practical
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wisdom. He was not only successful as an individual but was in a position of religious, social
and political prominence because of that success. However, Saul had major moral flaws in his
character: pride, anger, hatred, and violence. These character flaws manifested themselves in his
passionate persecution of Christians wherever he could find them. Saul’s pride, hatred, and
violence were not going to be eradicated by continuing down the path of “practical wisdom” and
habituation as experienced in his religious community. Saul was only going to be morally
transformed and go down a path towards true virtue as the result of a spiritual and moral
transformation.
After his transformation, Saul’s character changes and he becomes someone now called
Paul. Saul hated his enemies and zealously pursued them to torture and punish them. But when
Paul thinks of the Jews who are now persecuting him, he is not angry. Nor is he interested in
punishing or threatening the Jews. Instead, he says, “my heart’s desire and my prayer to God for
them is for their salvation.” Paul loves the very people who reject him, flog him, stone him, and
put obstacles in his way. Nor is Paul proud. At times he appears to boast when he defends his
apostleship. But he is frank about his sinful past and refers to himself as “the very least of all
saints.” Saul was confident of his social and religious position. He acted as a representative of
the chief priests and had the authority to arrest and punish Christians. But Paul describes himself
as “afflicted in every way, … perplexed, … persecuted, … and struck down.”32 The pride, anger,
hatred, and violence that characterized Saul is replaced by humility, patience, love, and selfsacrifice in Paul. This transformation could not happen on the path of habituation and “practical
wisdom” that Saul was on. It took a supernatural spiritual and moral transformation to change

32

II Cor. 4:8-9.

132

Saul to Paul. A God-inspired transformation is something Aristotle never conceived of, and it is
a major flaw in his ethical theory. Augustine’s story will reveal this flaw from a different vantage
point.
From Wisdom Cult to Saint - Augustine
Augustine travels a very different path than Saul and presents a different challenge to
Aristotle’s views of habituation and virtue. If Saul had what Aristotle might consider good
habituation, Augustine’s upbringing was somewhat lacking. Born about 350 years after Saul
(354 A.D.) in Thagaste, North Africa (modern Souk Ahras, in Algeria), Augustine’s parents did
not share the religious zeal of Saul’s parents.33 Augustine’s mother (Monica) was a devout
Christian and exposed Augustine to many Christian teachings. Throughout his life she prayed
fervently for Augustine to embrace Christianity. Augustine’s father (Patricius) was not a
Christian and had little interest in Augustine other than ensuring his education and upward social
mobility. Monica and Patricius, believing that a classical education was the key to Augustine’s
social and economic success, were totally committed to his secular education.34 Thus, young
Augustine grows up with stern discipline regarding his education but little discipline regarding
his moral life. In his Confessions, he says of his childhood
Pilferings I committed from my parents’ cellar and table, either enslaved by
gluttony, or that I might have something to give to boys who sold me their play,
who, though they sold it, liked it as well as I. In this play, likewise, I often sought
dishonest victories, I myself being conquered by the vain desire of preeminence.35
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He was sent to the near-by town of Madaura at about age 12 and spent 4 years there. It provided
an excellent education, but also gave license to discover everything a pagan culture in a
university town had to offer.36 He returned to Thagaste for a year at age 16 because his father
was accumulating enough money to send him to Carthage to continue his education. Idleness for
an adolescent is not a good thing, and this year proved problematic for Augustine.
Augustine reflects on two aspects of this year in Thagaste with sadness. First, he begins
his bondage to lust. He describes himself as being “unable to discern pure affection from unholy
desire.”37 This lust “dragged away my unstable youth into the rough places of unchaste desires,
and plunged me into a gulf of infamy.”38 Second, Augustine succumbs to a desire to steal simply
for the sake of enjoying the forbidden. He and his friends decide to steal great loads of pears
from a nearby orchard. They eat some but throw most of them to the pigs.39 Upon reflecting on
these events, Augustine seems to criticize his parents. They failed to discern his temptations and
help him deal with them. He thinks they refused to consider marriage because they thought it
would impede his education.40 Regarding his activities with friends, they just seemed to be
oblivious. Yet Augustine admits that these moral failures were his own. They reflected his will
and his desires. Despite Monica’s concern for Augustine’s spiritual life, she seemed unaware of
the importance of moral education and discipline during his youth. Instead, Monica and Patricius
pinned all their hopes on his secular education. As a result, at age 17, they sent him to Carthage
for more schooling.
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The next 5 years in Carthage would solidify Augustine’s bondage to lust and social
success. His first major commitment is to a concubine who will be his partner for the next 13
years and bear his son. Augustine is quite honest that this was not a marriage; it was a concession
to the flesh. In all his writings, he never mentions her name, and when the prospect of a
‘respectable’ marriage appears, he abruptly dismisses her. His second major commitment is to a
sect called the Manichees. This religious commitment was preceded by a philosophical
awakening spurred by the reading of Cicero’s The Hortensius.41 This book contained a strong,
compelling exhortation to pursue truth and wisdom, otherwise known as philosophy. Augustine
was so gripped by this message that he altered his career aspirations away from law and towards
academic pursuits. At the time, philosophy and wisdom were often intertwined. Augustine
considered the Bible as a possible source of truth and wisdom but rejected it. He found the
scriptures to be too simple and crude.42 Instead, Augustine was impressed by the “wisdom” of
the Manichees. Although the founder, Mani, considered himself an apostle of Jesus Christ, the
Manichees had different scriptures and were not considered Christians. In fact, the Manichees
were a small group shunned by pagans and Christians alike.43 When Monica found out
Augustine was associated with them, she initially kicked him out of her home. Of the many
different teachings of the Manichees, one was most helpful to a man struggling with various
temptations. The Manichees thought that the evils associated with our bodies were caused by an
evil force in the world for which we were not responsible.44 Thus relieved of responsibility for
any moral failings, Augustine continued his pursuit of lust, academic success, and social status.
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For the next decade Augustine pursued academic honors, financial gain, and a respectable
marriage, but found faith instead. Augustine gradually grew disillusioned with Manichaeism. He
was selected a professor of rhetoric in Milan and there came under the influence of its bishop,
Ambrose. Ambrose was able to convince Augustine that the scriptures contained much more
wisdom and power than he had imagined. And although his mother was arranging a socially
advantageous marriage, Augustine was being increasingly drawn to Christ. As Augustine reflects
on this period of his life, he discusses the internal conflict in his heart. He provides a perfect
illustration of the two inclinations of the will described by Anselm and Duns Scotus. On the one
hand, he is continually drawn to faith in Jesus, to a renunciation of selfish desires, especially his
lust. But on the other hand, he greatly desires the acclaim of men and the company of a woman.
Augustine is torn and appears helpless to decide. At one point in the Confessions, he writes the
following:
Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. For I was afraid lest Thou
shouldest hear me soon, and soon deliver me from the disease of concupiscence,
which I desired to have satisfied rather than extinguished.45
But he continued to hear God calling him. In the midst of his conflict, he was told of the
Egyptian monk, Antony. Antony accidently heard the scripture being read that says “Go and sell
that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow
Me.” Upon hearing this, Antony was converted and devoted himself to Jesus and a monastic
lifestyle.
Similarly, Augustine was weeping under heavy conviction of his lifestyle and heard some
children in play say, “take up and read, take up and read.” Augustine felt led to go right to the
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scripture he had available and read the first passage he should find. It happened to be Romans
13:13-14, “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and
envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the
lusts thereof.”46 At this point Augustine writes, “No further would I read, nor did I need; for
instantly, as the sentence ended--by a light, as it were, of security infused into my heart--all the
gloom of doubt vanished away.” From that moment on, Augustine not only believed in Jesus, but
was given the power to pursue Him appropriately. “Within a few months, Augustine had
abandoned his marriage, his public position, his hopes of financial security, and social
prestige.”47 This spiritual and moral transformation gave Augustine the power to pursue a
monastic lifestyle of service to the church and its people. It initiated a journey that would make
him a popular bishop, a defender of the Catholic faith, and a prolific Christian author whose
works remain inspirational to this day. How did the self-centered, immoral, 32-year-old
Augustine transform into the seemingly virtuous bishop of Hippo and servant of God and His
people?
Augustine, Virtue, and Habituation
Augustine’s life presents another challenge to Aristotle’s view of virtue and the role of
habituation. From Aristotle’s perspective there was little hope, if any, that Augustine would
become a virtuous man and certainly not a celibate monk. His entire upbringing was designed to
make him a lawyer, a man financially and socially successful. Augustine was in bondage to lust
and the company of a woman since his teen years. He was proud and determined to achieve
financial security and the acclaim of men. These were the things his parents had driven him
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towards for his whole life. Yes, his mother had always urged him to embrace Christianity, but he
had rebuffed her, attached himself to a cult, and even lied to her to escape her presence.
Augustine dismissed the woman he had lived with for 13 years, and who had borne his son, at
the mere prospect of marrying into a higher class. It was clear that his career and status were the
overriding priority of his life. If, in his early 30s, Augustine has a well-developed character, it is
one of unconstrained lust, as well as devotion to academic and social status for his own benefit.
His flawed character and vices do not mean that Augustine was a criminal or wicked in a
host of socially unacceptable ways. In his time period, his behavior was quite normal. It is so
today. But it is not virtuous. Augustine is miserable because he is convicted that his behavior
violates what he knows to be right. To treat someone the way he treated his concubine, and
mother of his son, is clearly immoral. This was not a minor, passing mistake. He used her for 13
years knowing all along he would dismiss her when she became inconvenient. Augustine had an
inclination to justice, to treat his concubine and his son well, to marry, but it violated his stronger
commitment to advantage. His academic success was driven by his desire for preeminence and
upward social mobility. There is nothing wrong with a desire to excel or to be prosperous. But
there is a problem when pride and envy motivate us, because then we tend to ignore any
inclinations to justice that might prove un-advantageous. This is why Augustine remembers
stealing from his parents, cheating at games, and stealing pears. These were very clear examples
of violating his inclination to justice to satisfy his inclination to advantage. Augustine’s
upbringing was void of the kind of moral training needed to attain virtue.
From an Aristotelian perspective, 30 years of this kind of behavior should have made a
life of virtue impossible for Augustine. Yet Augustine’s life was transformed almost
instantaneously. Augustine’s inability to live according to the inclinations to justice was
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dramatically changed once he decided to follow Jesus. Augustine did not instantaneously
become virtuous. But he did instantaneously have the ability to live according to the inclination
to justice in ways that were impossible before. It probably took years for Augustine to be truly
comfortable with celibacy and with the financial limitations of the priesthood. It also probably
took years for him to develop the disciplines of serving the church. But these unselfish choices
were now possible, whereas before they were impossible. Certainly, Augustine was now
habituating himself towards virtue. He saw things with a wisdom he did not have before and he
now had the power to follow the inclinations of justice. As a result, he was now developing
‘practical wisdom’ and learning the pleasures that come from living justly. This was something
Aristotle never predicted, nor understood to be possible. Augustine had overcome a very
deficient habituation without human coercion or long habituation in a different direction. Moral
transformation made virtue a possibility for Augustine despite not having the ingredients
Aristotle thought were essential.
The Power of ‘Amazing Grace’ - John Newton
Like Augustine, John Newton grew to adulthood without the benefit of good moral
training. Unlike Augustine, John lacked even a good education. From an Aristotelian
perspective, his eventual debauchery made virtue out of the question. He was brought up in the
life of a seafaring man, which was largely destructive from a moral perspective. As in
Augustine’s case, Aristotle’s moral perspective cannot really explain the amazing transformation
of John Newton.
On July 24th, 1725 John Newton was born to Captain John Newton and his wife
Elizabeth. Like Augustine’s mother, Monica, Elizabeth was a devout Christian. But unlike
Monica, Elizabeth was well educated and dedicated to the spiritual and moral upbringing of her
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son. Unfortunately for Elizabeth, her impact, though strong, was brief. She died of tuberculosis
when John was just six. Captain John Newton was at sea when his wife passed and was at sea
most of his son John’s life. Captain Newton quickly remarried and had three children by his new
wife, Thomasina. This put son John on the fringe of the family, and he was largely on his own
from a young age.48 Young John Newton was sent to boarding school at age eight, but his formal
education was short lived as his father took him to sea at age eleven. Captain Newton’s influence
was by his seafaring example and through giving his son John numerous career opportunities.
Young John oscillated between religious interests and the coarseness of a sailor for much of his
adolescence. But eventually bad company, his own rebelliousness, and selfishness led him
towards a complete apostasy from the faith his mother had attempted to pass on.
John Newton discusses this oscillating journey in his autobiography An Authentic
Narrative. He says of his youth, “I had little concern about religion, and easily received very ill
impressions. But I was often disturbed with convictions… I began to pray, to read the
scriptures…[but] I was soon weary, gradually gave it up, and became worse than before: instead
of prayer, I learned to curse and blaspheme, and was exceedingly wicked.”49 Over time, John’s
behavior became increasingly wicked and irresponsible. Despite his father’s efforts to place him
in promising employment, John either failed to show up at all or behaved so rudely and
irresponsibly that his superiors soon came to despise him. This poor judgement would cause him
untold trouble. At age 19, he neglected to turn up to an important job appointment his father had
arranged and instead remained at the home of a family friend. He stayed there because he was in
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love with their daughter, Polly. However, while walking aimlessly near their home he met a
British press gang and was immediately drafted into England’s navy.50 His father again
interceded on his behalf, by getting him assigned as a midshipman, a sub-officer in training. This
rescued him from the extremely arduous, dangerous, and harsh discipline of a seaman. But, in
keeping with the pattern of his life to date, John ruined this opportunity.
Not only did John perform in a sullen and disrespectful way, but he was foolish enough
to be absent without leave and finally to desert. These are the most serious crimes a member of
the Royal Navy can commit and could have resulted in the death penalty.51 Instead, John was
publicly flogged and degraded in rank. As if the flogging was not bad enough, being demoted to
seaman ensured his life would be made miserable by the great number of seamen he had treated
poorly when he was a midshipman. His brief career in the Royal Navy was a disaster on all
counts. He proved to be a wicked and vindictive person, who estranged himself from peers and
superiors alike. He was untrustworthy and unpleasant. He was by this point a confirmed atheist, a
noisy blasphemer, and a careless and disobedient sailor. He says this of himself, “I not only
sinned with a high hand myself, but made it my study to tempt and seduce others upon every
occasion: nay, I eagerly sought occasion sometimes to my own hazard and hurt.”52 But John
Newton was not done, he would become even more debauched.
John Newton’s moral descent continued and before long he entered the slave trade. He
was fortunately exchanged out of the Royal Navy to a commercial vessel. It took him little time
to become despised by his new captain and peers. They were happy to be rid of him and allow
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him to partner with a man in the slave trade in Africa. John initially became a slave trader, one
who lived in Africa and made money by slave hunting, capturing, buying, and selling. This
included developing a moral callousness toward the gruesome exploitation of slaves. They
separated families, harshly punished any who resisted, and kept the slaves chained in cells.
Traders exploited the female slaves sexually, i.e. raped them at will. Many traders, including
John Newton, gained an interest in charms, necromancies, amulets, and divinations.53 The white
traders enjoyed a life of wealth and moral license they could never have experienced in their
home countries. At this point in his life, John Newton had few principles to keep him from
taking the maximum advantage of the situation. He might have remained in Africa except for the
providential encounter with a commercial vessel captained by a man with instructions from his
father to bring John home.
John’s trip home on the merchant ship, Greyhound, proved a turning point in his life.
Two events would set the stage. One, he was given “first-class” passage. This provided time to
read. As fate would have it, one of the only books available was The Imitation of Christ by
Thomas à Kempis. Reading this had him in a more spiritual frame of mind when disaster struck.
The second event was a terrible storm that so damaged and disabled the ship that it appeared
ready to sink. At least one crewmember was swept overboard and lost, along with most of their
cargo and supplies. The crew had to constantly pump water out to keep the ship afloat. As it
became clear that their chances of survival were incredibly bleak, John’s mind turned to the
prospects of meeting his maker. Despite his limited exposure to Christianity, he knew that he
could not expect divine salvation. He abandoned atheism and began to pray and ask God for
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mercy. That mercy did not appear forthcoming. The Greyhound was still many days from shore,
they could not survive any more rough seas, and they were nearly out of food. If a storm did not
end them, starvation might. These fearful times led John to read the scriptures and to continue to
pray. He was especially encouraged by the parable of the prodigal son. The parable clearly
illustrated God’s mercy and willingness to forgive even the vilest sinner. So, John prayed for that
forgiveness. This led to the spiritual and moral transformation that changed the course of John’s
life. And, in what seemed like a miracle, the Greyhound made land.
John Newton’s transformation was in some sense immediate, but in another sense
gradual. Some things changed immediately. He stopped swearing and started churchgoing. He
began to study the scriptures and took Communion. But he also continued in some sins. He did
not yet have any objections to the slave trade and took a position as first mate on a slave ship.
This would expose him to temptations that he was not yet prepared to overcome. That said, John
Newton now had a very powerful hunger for intellectual and spiritual food.54 He began to
develop disciplines of reading and prayer that would build considerably on the transformation
that had begun. Over the course of the next decade John Newton would marry, he would captain
slave ships for 6 years, he would take a job on shore, he would grow spiritually and morally, be
mentored by many Christian men, and finally resolve to be ordained. It would take him another 6
years to be ordained. During that time, he wrote his autobiography (An Authentic Narrative). It
would be published the same year he was ordained (1764 at the age of 39). In the subsequent
years, John Newton became a best-selling author, a much-loved pastor, a famous evangelical
preacher, a leader in the abolitionist movement, and the writer of the most sung, most recorded,
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and most loved hymn in the world (Amazing Grace). “No other song, spiritual or secular, comes
close to it in terms of numbers of recordings (over three thousand in the “United States alone),
frequency of performances (it is publicly sung at least ten million times a year), international
popularity across six continents, or cultural longevity (234 years old and still going strong).”55
How did the reprobate John Newton become the seemingly virtuous John Newton whose
achievements earned him a monument in Westminster Abbey?
John Newton, Virtue, and Habituation
The transformation of John Newton, a confirmed reprobate at age 23, is difficult to
account for from an Aristotelian perspective. Young John spent the most formative years of his
life lacking in both moral training and education. His seagoing life, ages 11 – 23, was completely
destructive of moral principles. It is this period of life, from Aristotle’s perspective, when moral
training is most crucial. John got some positive education and moral training, from birth to age
six, from his mother. This training proved powerful and was, through much of his life, a part of
his conscience, convicting him of his need for God and forgiveness. Nevertheless, it did not
prevent him from embracing atheism, immorality, and eventually occult practices in Africa. Nor
did his early training prevent him from being rebellious, vindictive, grossly disobedient, and
irresponsible. John Newton had nothing going for him from a moral perspective when, at age 23,
he found himself sailing for England on the Greyhound.
Although still young, from Aristotle’s perspective, he is an adult with none of the
practical wisdom or habituation necessary to begin or sustain a journey towards virtue.
Additionally, there is no external force: no school, no religious community, and no family, with
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any authority in his life. There is nothing from a secular perspective that has any hope of
redeeming John Newton from a morally bankrupt life. It is certainly true that marriage and
religion are powerful motivators. But there is no reason to think either of them, separately or
together, can account for Newton’s transformation.
John Newton had been in love with Polly and around the Christian religion much of his
debauched adolescence and young adulthood. Polly was not a devout Christian in her youth or at
the beginning of their marriage.56 There was nothing about their relationship, before or after his
transformation, that motivated his newfound desire for the scriptures and Christian mentors.
Despite various periods of religious activities during his formative years, Newton was never
enthusiastic about a relationship with God. Prayers and scripture reading were part of a fleeting
religious discipline, not the product of a grateful and worshipful heart. Religion, which merely
reflects simple human inclinations, has no power to change carnal desires and a rebellious spirit.
John Newton had no moral training as a young man that provided an experience of satisfaction
from having done the right thing. He had no reason to think that pursuing an inclination to justice
would simultaneously satisfy his inclination to advantage. Instead, all his experience was of
pursuing his own self-interest (the inclination for advantage). Although his self-centeredness
often had disastrous consequences, John had no reason to think that responsible or altruistic
behavior would have a more pleasing outcome. Furthermore, pleasing himself was his major
motivator. Aristotle thought that minus good habituation there was no probability of virtue in the
future. As a result, the Aristotelian perspective cannot account for the radical change in John
Newton.
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By the time he is ordained at age 39, the character of John Newton bears no resemblance
to John Newton of age 23. He is in a happy, successful marriage. He has humbly been pursuing
ordination for 6 years. He is humbled and elated to take a curate’s position in Olney. Instead of
concerns for wealth, and disputes with superiors and peers alike, he is focused on his duties to
his parish. He is embarking on a journey of over 40 years of service to parishioners, friends, the
abolitionist movement, and the church at large. When he died The Times (of London) said of
him, “His unblemished life, his amiable character both as a man and as a Minister and his able
writings are too well known to need any comment.”57 Newton would offer a more candid
appraisal in his own epitaph.
JOHN NEWTON
ONCE AN INFIDEL AND LIBERTINE
A SERVANT OF SLAVES IN AFRICA
WAS
BY THE RICH MERCY OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR
JESUS CHRIST
PRESERVED, RESTORED, PARDONED
AND APPOINTED TO PREACH THE FAITH
HE HAD LONG LABOURED TO DESTROY.58
Despite his seemingly hopeless start, John Newton appears to have become a virtuous man. His
own testimony is that it was only possible by amazing grace.
A Rebel Without a Cause – Franklin Graham
If anyone had everything going for them in terms of habituation, it was Franklin Graham.
His parents, Billy and Ruth Graham were devout Christians of impeccable moral standards. Both
were devoted to their children and provided for their every need as best they could. Although
Billy would often be absent, Ruth was totally dedicated to the spiritual and moral training of
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Franklin and his siblings, and Ruth Graham was a formidable mother. Daughter of medical
missionaries in China, Ruth spent her first 17 years in Asia. “They were exposed to everything
from monsoons, sandstorms, and epidemics to bandit attacks and civil war.”59 Ruth attended high
school in Pyongyang, Korea (now North Korea). She met Billy at Wheaton College in Illinois.
Ruth was a strong, determined, smart, well educated, capable woman. Billy, Ruth, their extended
family, their church and ministry family, and their financial resources meant that Franklin would
get plenty of moral, spiritual, and academic training. Aristotle could hardly have anything to
complain about regarding Franklin’s habituation. But as we trace his life, it will be clear that it
was not the excellent habituation that determined Franklin’s character.
William Franklin Graham III was born on July 14, 1952 in North Carolina. Being the
first-born son of the world’s most prominent evangelist is both a blessing and a curse. Franklin
was blessed to be part of a loving, well-to-do family. He had three older sisters and would later
have a younger brother. His mother probably qualifies for sainthood. She loved, led, and
protected the family in Billy’s absence. The curse was that everyone knew who Franklin Graham
was and had high expectations of him, including following in his famous father’s footsteps. Such
expectations are not only an impossible burden but are stifling. Knowing that Franklin, and all
the children, faced incredible scrutiny, the Grahams did their best to maintain some privacy and
raise their children well.
Billy and Ruth acquired 150 acres of heavily wooded mountain land outside Montreat,
North Carolina that backed up into a thousand acres of Asheville reservoir’s watershed. Ruth
supervised the construction of a large, log home on the property they called Little Piney Cove.
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Little Piney Cove provided a wonderful setting for a young boy to grow up in the outdoors;
Franklin enjoyed hunting, fishing, and motorcycle riding. Although outdoor adventures may
have been Franklin’s passion, Billy and Ruth had more important priorities. Church attendance
was a given, as were evening devotions, prayers before meals and prior to leaving for school, and
scripture memory. The Graham children were not required to become theologians, but they were
certainly familiar with the Bible. They were trained to be polite, honest, and hard working. They
were also expected to be good students. These were all good things, but of course not necessarily
to Franklin’s liking.
Early on, Franklin rebelled against the plans his parents had for him. Franklin’s rebellion
was not a total rejection of his parents and their values. It was more like an insistence that he
could be his own person and that included doing some things of which they disapproved. One of
the early, disappointing choices Franklin made was to smoke. His parents forbade it, and he
knew that, but decided he would do so anyway. Smoking is difficult to disguise, so to make it
possible Franklin also had to be a liar. Early in life, Franklin decided he would make his own
decisions, and if that required disobeying his parents, his teachers, or the law, he really did not
care. If doing so required lying, he did not mind that either. There were a couple of other areas
where Franklin parted ways with his parents. One, he did not mind getting into a fight over what
he considered an injustice and he also did not care much are about getting above average grades
in school. As a result of his mediocre academic performance, his parents enrolled him in an elite
Christian boarding school in New York: Stony Brook School for Boys.
The choice of Stony Brook tells us what Billy and Ruth were trying to do. The school
was founded in 1922 with the motto, “Character before Career.” The school mission statement
says it “exists to challenge young men and women to know Jesus Christ as Lord, to love others
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as themselves, and to grow in knowledge and skill, in order that they may serve the world
through their character and leadership.”60 These were all things that Franklin probably agreed
with, but he did not agree with leaving Little Piney Cove and having to put up with Stony Brook
rules. As a result, Franklin’s grades were average, and he tried to stretch the rules as far as he
could before getting reprimanded.61 He expressed his independence by covertly smoking and
drinking, and although the staff suspected it, they were unable to catch him and expel him.
Franklin suspected his days at Stony Brook were numbered, so he convinced his parents to
withdraw him prior to graduation and send him to the public high school near Montreat. Being
back in North Carolina did not change the rebellious spirit Franklin had developed. He got into
fights. He crossed the law by speeding and fleeing from the police. He barely avoided expulsion
from high school. Franklin’s rebellious behavior began to have consequences. The high school
discovered he was one credit shy of what was required to graduate. Given his average grades and
lack of a degree his father called on a friend to allow him into college. As a result, Franklin
ended up at LeTourneau College in Texas in the fall of 1970 at age 18.
Again, Billy and Ruth were doing all they could to keep Franklin on the right path.
LeTourneau was a Christian school dedicated to producing professionals who integrate their faith
with their work. It also emphasized Christian virtue. Franklin brought his rebellious spirit with
him, but met men there who were older, mature, and devout Christians. Franklin also took a
summer job with his father’s ministry (Billy Graham Evangelistic Association/BGEA) leading
tours to the Middle East. He worked with Billy’s friend Roy Gustafson. Roy was a dynamic
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Bible teacher with a passion for mission work. Roy became a close friend of Franklin’s and
introduced him to two amazing missionary women running the Annoor Sanatorium for Chest
Disease in Mafraq, Jordan (Eleanor Soltau & Aileen Coleman).62 Franklin was drawn to the
adventure of traveling in the Middle East and to the remarkable work and faith of the
missionaries he met there. Although Franklin had not embraced the faith of his parents and
continued his rebellious ways, he was developing some respect for the Christians he was meeting
at LeTourneau and through the BGEA.63
It was becoming clear to Franklin that he had to make a choice. He could continue his
rebellious ways, or he could attempt to take the path his parents and other Christians he respected
had chosen. Franklin says of himself at this key juncture, “The sinful life I was living was not
satisfying me any longer. There was an emptiness – a big hole right in the middle of Franklin
Graham’s life – a void that needed to be filled. The truth was, I felt miserable because my life
wasn’t right with God.” But Franklin also recognized that it was not simply a matter of changing
his behavior. The struggle he was having was much deeper, and he knew a passage of Scripture
that captured his dilemma.
For that which I am doing, I do not understand; for I am not practicing what I
would like to do, but I am doing the very thing I hate. … For I know that nothing
good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh; for the wishing is present in me, but the
doing of the good is not. For the good that I wish, I do not do; but I practice the
very evil that I do not wish. … I find then the principle that evil is present in me,
the one who wishes to do good. … Wretched man that I am! Who will set me free
from the body of this death? Romans 7:15, 18-19, 21, 24
Despite his upbringing, his education, the influence of family and friends, the social pressure of
working for the BGEA, Franklin could not be virtuous. He needed help, and he knew where to
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look for it. One night, alone in a hotel room in Jerusalem, Franklin’s inner turmoil came to a
head; he knelt by his bed and poured out his heart to God asking for forgiveness and help.64 God
was pleased to transform Franklin’s heart; he now had the power to pursue God’s plan for him
and the virtue associated with it.
Franklin’s transformation took some time, but the change was immediate. He gave up
smoking first and gave up drinking later. He married, and he began seeking theological training
and experience with humanitarian aid mission work. Franklin went on to become one of the
founders and Director of World Medical Mission65, the CEO and President of Samaritan’s
Purse,66 and the CEO and President of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.67 Now he
devotes his life to both humanitarian missions and the gospel mission. Despite a busy schedule,
he maintains a happy marriage and his ministries have been scandal free. Critics complain about
his wealth, but as the CEO of major charitable organizations with a world-wide impact, his
compensation is not extravagant. Both he and his father could have built up much larger fortunes
if that was their goal. People may debate whether or not Franklin Graham has become a virtuous
man, but he does appear to be a viable candidate.
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Franklin Graham, Virtue, and Habituation
If one assumes that Franklin Graham is a virtuous person, the question becomes, was it a
result of his habituation and the development of practical wisdom, or was it another factor,
specifically a supernaturally inspired spiritual and moral transformation? Aristotelians might say
Franklin was never really off the path leading to virtue. After all, he was hardly most people’s
idea of the prodigal son. He was not squandering his family’s wealth and he was not involved
with flagrantly immoral behavior (sexual promiscuity, drugs, drunkenness, gambling, crime,
etc.). He had problems graduating from schools, but he was not a complete delinquent. The fact
that he had a liking for tobacco and alcohol does not mean that either were causing him to be
dysfunctional. Additionally, Franklin was working for the BGEA doing good things and hanging
around with good people. Some might say that at 22 he was still young and simply had not
arrived at virtue yet. But such an analysis would be based on an inadequate understanding of
Franklin, habituation, and virtue.
Habituation requires being convinced to practice the right thing, developing both a liking
for it and the judgement to recognize it. One is virtuous when one understands the right thing to
do in the circumstances and chooses to do the right thing from a desire to do so. For much of
Franklin’s life prior to 22, he had rejected many of the things his parents and teachers had told
him. He saw little value in education, he became addicted to cigarettes, he became a regular liar
to hide his disobedience, and had no desire to change those self-destructive habits. The fact that
his behavior was well within the social norms of our society does not mean he was on the road to
virtue. Until his transformation, he had absolutely no inclination to change his behavior and his
personal and academic deficiencies made him an unlikely candidate to play a key role in any
Christian mission organization. This was problematic since he lacked both the vision and skills
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for any other particular profession. His character was not badly flawed by the prevailing social
standards, but he was not on the path to virtue. Minus his transformation, Franklin would not be
who he is today, and it is not clear whether he would have developed into a virtuous man.
Franklin’s plight prior to his transformation is a problem for Aristotelian virtue ethics.
Given Franklin’s habituation, rebellion and disobedience should not have been a problem. By
age 22, Franklin should have embraced his parent’s teachings on moral, social, and even spiritual
issues and should have been pretty happy about it. Why not? Had he embraced all those things,
Franklin would have had a much better relationship with his parents, he would have had a good
college degree, he would have been learning about missions and evangelism, and had his choice
of career/ministry paths. Plenty of people, organizations, and businesses would have been glad to
give a sharp Franklin Graham a nice position. Instead, at age 22 prior to his transformation,
Franklin’s future was anything but clear. Additionally, he had vices in his life that could have
proven very problematic, especially in the circles he was working. As if that was not enough,
Franklin was not happy. He was not even meeting his own moral expectations. To make matters
worse, there was no obvious mechanism for changing this trajectory. Franklin had no educational
or professional aspirations at this point. No persons or institutions were in a position to help
Franklin change the rather bleak path on which he found himself. What changed everything for
Franklin was not his habituation or any practical wisdom he had acquired during his youth, but a
spiritual transformation that changed his heart. After that transformation, he had the ability to
curb inclinations that were desirable in some sense, but not conducive to a life of ministry. Post
transformation Franklin was busy helping others instead of “creating his own identity.”
Interestingly, by pursuing his passion for helping others, he created his own identity. Not only
did he create his own identity, but it has many of the marks of a virtuous man. Franklin Graham
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is yet another example of how achieving virtue is possible, but the key ingredient is not
habituation.
Transformation, Virtue and Moral Luck
The possibility of moral transformation changes the prospects for virtue and the
implications of moral luck. A divine moral transformation is available to everyone. Such a
transformation makes virtue possible for anyone. This goes a long way in defusing the claims
about constitutive moral luck and circumstantial moral luck. A spiritual/moral transformation
changes who we are and can overcome past experiences and training. Both Augustine and John
Newton had upbringings/habituation that made them unlikely candidates for virtue. Not only had
their temperament been shaped, but their experiences had shaped them in a way that made it
unlikely they would have either the character or the practical wisdom to be virtuous. Yet both
overcame their past to develop strong moral character and the wisdom to achieve great good.
John Newton’s circumstances placed him in the middle of England’s debate on slavery.
Slavery was an issue his past might have crippled him from seeing clearly. Rather than justify his
past actions or deny the evil of slavery, Newton was able to admit his own guilt and use his
knowledge of the slave trade to expose its cruelty. A moral transformation can enable a person to
withstand very difficult circumstances. Paul illustrates this as well. He had to endure incredible
persecution for his Christian missionary work. It is doubtful that his upbringing was responsible
for his courage and character in those situations. Although Newton and Paul faced challenging
circumstances, they seem to have been infused with the strength to do the right thing. Both Paul
and John Newton had been made able to overcome self-interest. The reality and power of
transformation defuses much of the moral luck objection and skepticism of moral responsibility.
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What about……?
There are two common objections to the claim that a spiritual/moral transformation is
necessary for virtue. The first objection asserts that there are clearly virtuous people in the world
that deny a spiritual transformation. There are several observations to make about this claim.
First, that may be true. There are very few virtuous people out there, but it is possible that some
of them have managed to arrive at that point on their own power. Interestingly, when it comes to
giving a significant amount of one’s time or income to charity, the vast majority of people who
do that are religious.68 But there are some, like Julia Wise and Jeff Kaufman that give
sacrificially, but are not religious.69 Second, as previously noted, it is hard to tell if a person is
virtuous. We are often unable to distinguish a “decent” person from a virtuous person. Motives
are very hard to discern. Again, as previously noted, there is a significant difference between a
person who does a good deed and a virtuous person. If it is the case that people are by nature
selfish, then it is hard to see how that can be changed by mere habituation or will power.
In Larissa MacFarquhar’s book, Strangers Drowning, she offers short biographies of
people who do amazingly good things. Yet, it is not clear that any of them are virtuous people.
That statement does not deny how admirable their accomplishments are. It simply notes that a
person can be extraordinary in many ways, yet still have significant character flaws and be
unhappy. Doing some number of good deeds does not necessarily imply a life that is “going
well.” Saul seems to fall in this category. He was doing things that his contemporaries and his
social group really admired, yet he was not virtuous. It is not clear that many people, if any, can
be virtuous without God’s help.
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The second, and more serious objection, regards the multitude of people who claim a
spiritual/moral transformation, but are clearly not virtuous. Sadly, everyone has seen examples of
this. In the press currently are truly depressing examples of leaders in both the Catholic Church
and the Southern Baptist convention who are guilty of sexual immorality of the worst sort. How
does this happen if they have been spiritually transformed? The first thing to consider is the
possibility that they have not been spiritually transformed. There is a great distinction between
belonging to a church and observing religious rituals and being supernaturally transformed.
It is a grave mistake to assume that a religious person, or a person making a religious claim, has
indeed been changed by a relationship with God. Typically, being transformed leads to
belonging to a church and observing religious practices. But being religious is no guarantee of a
spiritual transformation. Both Saul and Franklin Graham are examples of this. Both were
religious, but neither was initially spiritually/morally transformed.
A second distinction to point out is that spiritual transformation is not just a single event.
A transformation is a life-changing event, but its work is not completed at that moment. It took
years of nourishing his spiritual life for John Newton to have his character altered. Similarly,
Paul, Augustine, and Franklin Graham had to mature over years before they became the virtuous
persons we know them to be. This maturation process is neither certain nor perfect. Virtue takes
time and practice; Aristotle was right about this. Some people do not stay on the path to virtue
and end up succumbing to vice. Even those who mature to virtue are not then perfect. All people
remain fallible. The fact that some fail, or stumble, does not change the fact that many succeed.
For a spiritual transformation to be successful, one has to constantly nurture one’s relationship to
God. Failure to do so makes one vulnerable to the still active inclination to advantage.
Remaining aware of and nurturing a spiritual/moral transformation is the key to attaining virtue!
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CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A good man always knows his limitations.
Inspector Harold “Dirty Harry” Callahan, Magnum Force1
This dissertation denies Aristotle’s claim, and the view in post-Aristotle Western society,
that human beings have within themselves and their community all the resources required to
attain virtue. Aristotle’s ethics state that proper habituation lays the foundation for virtue.
Aristotle believed that our moral psychology was amenable to developing virtuous habits.
Western society, to include contemporary education policy, embraces that view. However,
despite the attempts of Western society, indeed all societies, to properly habituate the next
generation, immorality appears to be the norm. Apparently, our moral psychology is “hardwired” to prioritize self-interest (the inclination to advantage) over moral obligation (the
inclination to justice). As a result, in circumstances where self-interest and moral obligation
conflict, people are likely to choose self-interest. History, contemporary events, and recent social
science appear to confirm that fact. Habituation cannot change our moral psychology. If our
moral psychology is flawed in this way, it has tremendous implications for us personally and for
society.
The Importance of Virtue
Aristotle thought virtue was eminently possible and absolutely indispensable to the
flourishing of the individual and society. He appears to be right about that. The course of history,
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the teachings of the most prominent ethicists, and the findings of science and social science
confirm Aristotle’s view on the importance of virtue, especially moral virtue. As we review
human history, we see that moral failures resulting in war, tyranny, genocide, gulags, slavery,
and other horrors cause much more human misery than natural disasters and sickness. An
illustrative example is the contrast between North and South Korea. What is the relevant
difference between North Korea and a South Korea? North Korea is perhaps the most miserable
place on earth to live, and South Korea is a thriving part of the modern world. The crucial
distinction has nothing to do with geography, natural resources, race, or culture. The difference
has to do with the moral perspectives of the ruling elite and the dominated citizens. Both have
allowed self-interest to overrule moral obligations. There are completely understandable reasons
for this. It is not obvious that any of us in those same circumstances would not make the same
decision. But, the fact is that this is a moral choice. It illustrates the sad truth that when the stakes
are high enough, we are generally not good enough to do the right thing. The results of such a
moral failure are disastrous for all concerned. This is just what major ethicists predicted.
The importance of virtue and its connection to individual happiness and societal success
is what ethicists like Aristotle, Kant, and Mill have long claimed. Although each of the ethicists
had a different view of the nature of moral decisions, they all had very similar views of virtue.
All of them thought that virtue was intimately connected both to individual happiness and to
societal success. All of them thought that individual virtue was the basis of a just society.
Aristotle thought that virtuous men were the proper ones to lead society and to legislate moral
behavior. Kant thought that human injustice was the major cause of human misery and could be
decreased by widespread virtue. Since Mill believed that virtue consisted of being impartially
committed to the happiness of everyone, he thought the spread of virtue would alleviate most
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human suffering. Virtue is important not just for its societal impact, but for its role in individual
mental health.
Social scientists have long noted that we are moral beings and that a mentally healthy
self-image includes a perception of virtue. If you doubt that, just try suggesting to an
acquaintance that he is a bad person, that he is selfish, and that he treats those around him
unfairly. That will cause a crisis in that friendship! Few of us think we deserve moral criticism.
We all believe we are basically “good” and that we have a handle on what is right and wrong.
Although we are likely universally mistaken about this, it is nevertheless important for us to
think we are good. When good people make a mistake, they fix it. If we knew of a moral flaw, it
would be incumbent upon us to correct it immediately, and we would be self-motivated to do so.
To avoid guilt and depression, we must believe we are good and when we cannot conclude that,
we must change something quickly. Although our moral psychology is complicated and fragile,
the point is, we are moral beings and being virtuous is very important to us. It matters to our
mental health and to our physical health.
Moral failings often have serious physical health implications. Whether it is drunk
driving, smoking, poor eating and exercise habits, promiscuity, drug abuse, or marital discord,
our moral weaknesses often lead to stress, physical complications, and even death. We are often
in denial about the implications of our choices. This is again our tendency to think we are “good”
and not blame ourselves for our choices. But denial does not change the fact that these choices
often lead to very predictable bad outcomes. There is abundant evidence that the majority of
premature deaths in our country are the result of personal moral decisions. If our society grasped
the importance of virtue and pursued it, we could make significant improvements to individual
and societal happiness. Such a pursuit might begin with understanding the definition of virtue.
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A Definition of Virtue
Virtue implies possessing a well-developed, enduring inner state (what Aristotle calls the
soul) characterized by a strong commitment to doing the right thing, having the ability to
recognize the right thing, and finally having the desire and will power to do the right thing in all
situations. Virtue is not simply doing the right thing. An important aspect of virtue is having the
right motives. In the vast majority of the mundane moral decisions in life we do the right thing
for self-interested reasons. Taking care of ourselves, our family, and those around us is to our
advantage, and it is society’s expectation. Being polite, honest, and hard-working is typically to
our benefit. It is normally right to do those things but doing them because they are to our
advantage is no indication of virtue. Because actions do not always reflect motives, Kant said
that our virtue could only be determined by the obstacles (natural inclinations) it overcomes.2
Some think one’s virtue is determined by what one does when no one is looking. There is some
truth to that. But actually, virtue is better revealed by what we do when lots of people are looking
and they want us to do what is wrong. That is when we not only have to overcome our own
inclinations, but societal pressure as well. Our behavior when there is tremendous pressure,
internal (self-interest) and external (peer pressure), to do wrong, reveals our motives and our
virtue. Because motives are so hard to discern, virtue is easily misunderstood and misread.
In the normal course of events in life, we rarely know if the people around us are
virtuous. In fact, we do not even know if we are. We have little, if any, insight into actual
motives. Plus, even if we tend to do virtuous things, it is not clear what we will do under duress.
This is why the behavior of the police battalions described in Browning’s book Ordinary Men is
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so discouraging. These were men with families who were respected members of a community.
They probably appeared virtuous and thought they were virtuous. No one expected them to
become killers of innocent men, women, and children. Their lack of virtue was not evident until
they were placed in a stressful situation. We think virtue is the possession of people with an
ordinary upbringing and education (habituation), but it is not. The ability to recognize what is
right, to desire it, and to do it unflinchingly from a determined character is a rare attribute. The
difficult journey to virtue is why Aristotle thought virtue was reserved only for the mature who
have had years of training and practice.
Aristotle, Virtue, and Habituation
Aristotle provides an account of our moral psychology to undergird his thoughts about
virtue and the indispensable role of habituation. He accounts for rational and non-rational
reasons for our behavior. Pleasure and pain reside in the non-rational part of our being. Aristotle
recognizes that pleasure and pain are extremely important motivators. Fortunately, Aristotle
thought our experience and expectation of pleasure and pain could be trained. Training our
inclinations is the role of habituation. We must be trained to take pleasure in noble things and to
be pained by ignoble things. So, we should be pleased with honesty and pained by cowardice.
This moral training must occur during our youth. It has to be imposed on the young by parents,
family, educators, and society. It is adults who are virtuous and can teach the young what is
virtuous. Not only are the young practicing virtuous behavior, but they are developing practical
wisdom so that they recognize the good and how to attain it. Those youths who have received
proper moral training (habituation) may continue to practice virtue and grow in practical
wisdom. Only adults who have become virtuous will then pursue intellectual wisdom and
contemplation. When the various elements of the human being (rational, non-rational, physical,
161

and emotional) are all functioning correctly, then a person is virtuous and happy. Aristotle
thought this blessed state could only be achieved as an adult after a full life.
The moral training Aristotle has in mind is quite rigorous, lengthy, and contingent upon
being in the right social settings. To the extent being born into the right family and social setting
is out of one’s control, “moral luck” is an essential part of Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle sees that
our character is shaped not just by experience, but by habit. In our youth we must be required to
develop good habits. In the process of learning to play an instrument, we must practice regularly
and long enough to experience the benefits of having developed skills and an “ear” for good
music. No one becomes a proficient musician without years of practicing to play an instrument
and years of listening to a variety of good music. Similarly, no one becomes virtuous without
years of practicing good behavior and years of learning to recognize what is good and how to
achieve it in various circumstances. Aristotle does not think that simply telling someone what is
good will succeed in convincing them to behave in a good way. The good is often counter to
untrained inclinations. Few, if any, people will act in a way that seems counter to their advantage
and painful. If they have not been properly trained to see the good as both pleasurable and
ultimately advantageous, they will not embrace it. The requirement to train our inclinations is
why Aristotle thought that a person lacking a proper habituation had no chance of becoming
virtuous. Conversely, a person with proper habituation should embrace virtue and continue to
pursue it as a young adult. This would result in further moral growth and an increase in practical
wisdom. Assuming a person continued this lifestyle, Aristotle believed virtue and happiness
would be the result.
There are two very important claims embedded in Aristotle’s conception of virtue and
habituation. First, Aristotle’s moral psychology claims that our psyche is malleable enough that
162

we can develop habits and take actions counter to our perceived self-interest. Second, is the
corollary claim that proper habituation can develop good habits and motivate actions counter to
our perceived self-interest. This is partly because Aristotle views moral behavior as ultimately in
our self-interest. He thinks this is true in the long run, which is why he thinks habituation over
many years is crucial. But good habituation does not change the fact that sometimes moral
obligations run counter to what appears to be our self-interest. This is why plenty of people from
good homes, with a good education, and members of civilized society, still fall short of virtue.
As a result, an Aristotelian ethicist would likely have been surprised at what transpires in the
next 2,000 years of human history, especially at what we see in contemporary Western
civilization.
Human Nature is Flawed and Habituation is No Remedy
History, current experience, and social science reveal that human nature is flawed, and
habituation is an inadequate remedy. Aristotle thought that habituation could program us to take
pleasure in the noble and be pained by the ignoble. He was wrong about that. We all have an
inclination for advantage that is strong and never silent. No amount of habituation will eradicate
our preference to pursue self-interest. We also have an inclination for justice. But habituation
will not make our commitment to justice impervious to our inclination for advantage. Indeed, it
is unclear how to make our inclination to justice very powerful on our own. The historical record
indicates that justice has seldom prevailed. The human record is one full of violence.
It is not just that horrific wars and genocides have occurred in history, but that human
violence is a consistent theme across all times and all societies. Regardless of the quality of
habituation, no person is immune to violent behavior, man or woman. We watch in horror as
women become suicide bombers and accomplices in mass murder. Some mothers and fathers in
163

the Middle East teach their children to hate others and instruct them from childhood how to kill
them. This is not unprecedented. World Wars I and II precipitated the killing of civilians on a
scale modern society thought no longer possible. In the case of rounding up Jews from
throughout Europe, this required the active cooperation of ordinary citizens, communities, towns,
and cities. People, not just soldiers and police, in virtually every country in Europe participated.
Brutal behavior occurred on all sides in all parts of the world. Violent behavior is not the work of
a few psychopathic individuals; it flows from the conduct of “normal” men and women. The
probability is that anyone in similar circumstances would do the same thing. Not only is violence
pervasive, but it seems frequently unjustified. Although there are a multitude of reasons for war
and genocide, we do not have to dig far before we find “national interest” as a justification. This
“national interest” usually involves territory, natural resources, water, trade, taxation, or any
number of things that boil down to enriching one group at the expense of another. The point is
that our self-interest is quite strong, and it is powerful enough to induce us to violence when it
suits us. War is not typically simply a matter of one group defending itself against an immoral
invader. It is the result of a flawed human nature. This becomes obvious as we consider daily
human behavior.
In our daily lives we routinely encounter less then virtuous behavior. Whether it is
cheating on taxes, insurance fraud, employee theft, sexual indiscretions, gossip, slander, or lying,
the banality of bad behavior is inescapable. This happens in mundane situations. It is even worse
in the kind of situations that Lance Armstrong faced. Some of us live and work in circumstances
where dishonesty is the norm, an essential ingredient to success. Some think that Western culture
is descending into just such an abyss. The moral bankruptcy of our society reveals two
significant facts. Culture is simply the stereotypical behavior of the vast majority of a particular
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population. If our culture is corrupt, it is because the people are corrupt, not vice-versa. Second,
if our culture is corrupt, it is because the vast majority of us are not virtuous enough to withstand
the temptations we face. We succumb to self-interest because that is our priority, and because
after all, it is everyone else’s priority as well. The simple fact is that virtue is rare, and it runs
counter to the human psyche. This becomes even more plain when we look at the surprising
frequency of divorce.
Marriage is perhaps the single most important human institution. It is the one institution
that is almost universally celebrated by families, with a religious ceremony, and public vows. It
is the relationship most associated with love, permanent love. It is the one place where love,
devotion, and moral integrity are most expected. Adultery is still universally looked upon as a
moral failure and an evil. Yet the number of marriages that fail exceeds 40% in the United
States. That does not account for the marriages that are a failure, even though they remain intact.
How do we explain the fact that nearly one in two people cannot make marriage work?
Certainly, there are plenty of stresses on marriage. There are plenty of reasons marriages fail. But
all these reasons boil down to the fact that two people could not love each other, treat each other
graciously, and enjoy a healthy friendship and partnership. I am not suggesting that having a
good marriage is easy or that those who fail are more immoral than those who appear to succeed.
As already stated, most of us are not virtuous and cannot attribute what virtue we have to our
own goodness. The point simply is that human nature is flawed. It is so flawed that making the
most important human relationship we have succeed is often beyond our capacity. Another
example of our frail moral constitution is our inability to sacrifice self.
Sacrificing one’s personal time and money to help others is one of the most admired
signs of virtue. Since self-sacrifice is one of the surest signs of virtue, we know conclusively that
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virtue is rare. Few people give up a significant portion of their personal time and money. Most
statistics indicate that around 5% of the population give more than a percent or two of their time
and money to charitable causes. This is true of the people with the highest standard of living, the
most wealth, and most leisure time in human history. This is occurring at a time when there is
still much poverty and sickness in the world. All the starvation and lack of clean water could
easily be remedied. And much of the world’s sicknesses could be prevented or treated. The
world community’s failure to deal with very preventable problems is not due to technological nor
resource constraints. This is purely a moral failure. It says a lot about human nature. Aristotle
would doubtlessly claim that our moral frailty is due to the fact that so many lack virtue for lack
of habituation. But if the citizens of Western society are unable to produce virtuous citizens, then
we have to question the possibility of good habituation and/or the adequacy of habituation. Both
seem suspect in the light of history and experience. Social science seems to confirm those
suspicions.
The findings of social science are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand we all want to
be virtuous and to have a reputation of virtue. On the other hand, we are quite willing to cheat to
get ahead. We just do not want to get caught or deceive so much that we cannot rationalize our
behavior. Because we have to rationalize our behavior, we totally underestimate the significance
of our immorality. We underestimate the personal repercussions, like Lance Armstrong and
Henry Blodget did. We underestimate the social impact, like the increasing U.S. debt, the
increased cost of auto insurance, and implications of theft on corporate costs. We underestimate
the catastrophe of creating a cheating culture. Possibly most significantly, we overestimate our
ability to withstand temptation. We think we will behave honorably in the face of unusual sexual
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or financial temptations. In reality, we will not, even if we have really good habituation. And we
cannot take credit for having good habituation.
An interesting aspect of virtue is that we consider it a personal achievement, but if
habituation is a necessary ingredient, we cannot take credit for virtue. Habituation, and many
related ingredients of virtue, are the result of “moral luck.” No child got to pick their parents,
their elementary and secondary schools, or their religious and cultural upbringing. Additionally,
it was a matter of luck who their neighbors and classmates were, what significant events they
attended (marriages, funerals), and what extraordinary events they experienced (near death
experiences, accidents, sicknesses, etc.). These experiences likely had a major impact on their
moral outlook. To a significant degree, what virtue we have is based on events entirely out of our
control. Hopefully, as adults, we can begin to overcome, or build on, the moral foundation
bequeathed to us. If we are fortunate enough to live a full life, much of our character may be
attributed to our choices. Nevertheless, had Aristotle been correct, our early habituation would
get most of the credit for our virtue. But neither luck nor habituation is likely to result in virtue.
Virtue is most likely the result of a supernatural transformation.
Moral Transformation & Virtue
Aristotle, along with most of Western society, ignores the power and potential of moral
transformation. This is particularly problematic if transformation is essential to virtue. Aristotle
thought habituation and the associated development of practical wisdom were the key ingredients
to virtue. On the contrary, this dissertation argues that habituation is inadequate and even
unnecessary. It looks like a moral transformation is able to produce virtue, even without prior
habituation (Augustine and John Newton). In the case of Saul and Franklin Graham,
transformation was required, even though both had been blessed with excellent habituation.
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Since human nature is fundamentally flawed and self-interest is preeminent, habituation is
doomed to failure. Since human nature is flawed, it is beyond human resources to achieve virtue.
In all of the four examples explored, (Saul, Augustine, John Newton, and Franklin
Graham) the individual was trapped in a less than virtuous position and only divine intervention
was able to rescue them. The spiritual transformation each experienced led also to a moral
transformation. The transformation was not instantaneous. None of them were immediately
virtuous. John Newton continued slave trading after his transformation and succumbed to some
degrading behavior. Yet transformation started each of them on a journey that led to the
increasing subordination of self-interest to moral obligation. John Newton eventually became a
champion of the abolitionist movement. Saul became Paul, a humble servant of Jesus, and
servant of the church he had previously hated and persecuted. Augustine was able to put away
his lust for women and prestige and become a servant of Jesus and His church. Franklin Graham
was finally able to genuinely embrace Christianity and the ministry he had been rebelling against
his entire life. These remarkable biographies may seem rare and unusual to those outside of
Christian circles, but they are commonplace, indeed almost the norm, in Christian communities.
They illustrate the inadequacy of purely human efforts to overcome our innate self-interest.
Habituation is not enough. Something supernatural has to happen to give the inclination to
justice priority over the inclination to advantage. In these cases, it was a spiritual transformation
that included a moral transformation.
Is Christianity Necessary for Virtue?
This dissertation has not made the case that Christianity is necessary for virtue. It has
argued that a supernatural moral transformation is necessary to overcome our inherent selfinterest. I concede that virtue is rare and is very difficult to positively identify. As a result, there
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is no basis for being dogmatic about who can and cannot achieve virtue, or who has or has not
achieved virtue. Some would deny that the four examples offered are even legitimate examples
of virtue. The point of this argument is that human nature appears flawed, so flawed that
habituation is inadequate to achieve virtue. The inadequacy of habituation calls into question the
common reliance on education and social mores to produce a virtuous person. If some
supernatural assistance is required, then Western society should be reevaluating its attitude
towards the role of faith. The evidence suggests that instruction in ethics that ignores the role of
faith is fundamentally flawed. But the only faith that would work would be one that provides a
relationship with God that results in a supernatural moral transformation and a supernaturally
sustained journey towards virtue. There is evidence to suggest that a Christian faith could
provide the necessary transformation. Whether or not other faiths might work has not been
addressed.
Any religion, including Christianity, that fails to produce a relationship with God that
results in a supernaturally changed life, leaves a person with a flawed human nature. Religion,
minus relationship, can be very powerful. But religion, without a relationship with God, does not
change the preeminence of our inclination for advantage. People are religious for a variety of
reasons and may do some very good things as a result. However, practicing a religion does not
necessarily imply a supernaturally changed life. Minus a supernaturally changed life, even a very
religious person is likely to take actions ultimately motivated by self-interest rather than moral
obligation. This is one explanation for the current scandals among religious leaders. Some of
these religious leaders have used their religious status to abuse others to their own advantage.
Sexually abusing others is certainly not a mark of virtue and probably indicates a lack of a
spiritual/moral transformation. This dissertation argues that supernatural assistance is essential
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for virtue. Christianity could be a source for divine help. To the extent Christianity is merely
human rituals, it would not be a source for a transformation. Human religious practice can shape
much human behavior, but it cannot change the preeminence of our inclination for advantage.
We need supernatural help.
Conclusion
This dissertation began by noting the extraordinary difficulty of leading a truly virtuous
life. Elizabeth Anscombe, writing in 1958, said there was no point in talking about virtue until
we had a clear notion of human nature.3 Lacking a clear notion of human nature is disastrous
given the importance of virtue. The vast majority of human problems are fundamentally moral
ones. Whether we are dealing with war, genocide, hunger, poverty, crime, family breakdown,
drug abuse, suicide, etc., each has an important moral component. Virtue is not simply important
from a societal perspective, but from a personal perspective. Personal happiness, marital and
family success, health and longevity are all dependent to a great extent on moral virtue. So, what
does it mean to be a virtuous person? Virtue implies possessing a well-developed, enduring,
character that consistently recognizes the good, wants the good, and does what is required to
achieve the good. A virtuous person is wise enough to know what to do and good enough to do
it, even when it is difficult. It sounds easy, but it is not. Aristotle thought that virtue was the
result of many years of moral training beginning from a young age. His view of human nature
was that it could be trained to be virtuous. Aristotle thought if we were forced to develop good
habits in our formative years, we would learn to appreciate goodness and how to achieve it
(practical wisdom). If we stayed on that path until full adulthood (late 30s or 40s), we would

G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 33,
no.124 (January 1958): 1.
3
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become a virtuous person. All this required good parents, good educators, and a good community
with good laws. Habituation sounds like it should work, until we look at what happened in the
2,000+ years after Aristotle. Human history is a tragic tale of war, genocide, civil conflict,
slavery, social injustice, divorce, family breakdown, crime, drug abuse, cheating, lying, suicide,
and the list never ends. This is true despite the fact that every society attempts to train their youth
to be virtuous. This was especially true in Western society which embraced Aristotle’s ethics.
Societal dysfunction is not the plight of the immoral minority. It is the plight of all of us. Most of
us who have avoided these problems have moral luck to credit, not our virtue.
Apparently, Aristotle was wrong. Human nature appears fundamentally incapable of
becoming virtuous, even with good habituation. There just is not that much virtue out there, even
in modern societies that should be capable of it. The number of people making genuine sacrifices
to help others is probably less than 5% of the population. Humans need help. It turns out that a
significant number of those people who might be virtuous (because they are self-sacrificing)
have a relationship with God. These people appear to have become virtuous as a result of a
supernatural transformation. Many of them became virtuous despite lacking proper habituation.
This has important implications for how Western society views virtue. Since virtue requires a
supernatural transformation, then faith is an important part of moral training. Seeking or
maintaining a relationship with God should be an important consideration for every person,
every family, and addressed as part of any good education. Since human nature is flawed and
needs supernatural help, then the project of ethics and ethics education should take a radically
different approach from what is now standard in Western academia. A relationship with God
should be respected and treated as an important constituent of moral education. Elizabeth
Anscombe was right. Ethics cannot proceed without an understanding of human nature. It is time
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to acknowledge that Aristotle got human nature wrong, and we need God’s help if we really
want to be virtuous.
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